What’s the use of psychology?
Revolution in Psychology: Alienation to Emancipation
By Ian Parker, Pluto Press, 2007, £15
Reviewed by Iain Dalton
THERE IS something deeply wrong with psychology.
This is the premise with which Ian Parker begins this book. Far from
simply understanding how we behave and feel, psychology goes on to try
to help people cope and adapt to the problems of everyday life, which is
where Parker says the main problems lie. He argues that, because life
under capitalism is organised around exploitation and alienation,
psychologists who aim to help people adapt to this life are only
prolonging these problems. Because of this, psychologists tend to be
inherently hostile to social change: "Activists need to know about
psychology, and what needs to be done to prevent it from operating only
as an instrument of social control". (p1)
Parker shows how psychology appeared at a particular
point in the development of capitalism. It emerged after the capitalist
accumulation in the late 19th century, when workers’ struggles were
beginning to materialise, and at the time of the formation of the second
international. Psychology was used to justify capitalism as the natural
state of affairs in the world and to locate human problems as being due
to ‘human nature’ or ‘mental defects’. Parker also notes that
psychology’s popularity increased massively under Margaret Thatcher.
Thus, poor people became seen as being less
naturally competent than the rich. Those who grew up outside of the
‘ideal’ nuclear family were predisposed to becoming hardened criminals.
Racism could be justified on the basis of so-called ‘essential genetic
differences’ between people of different ethnic backgrounds.
Furthermore, psychology even falsifies its own
history. Parker shows this by citing a book by the appropriately named
EG Boring. This book argued in 1926 for psychology to be a positivist
discipline based on the steady accumulation of ‘facts’ about human
beings. Parker notes how false this perspective is by pointing out that
Boring’s argument was constructed on the basis of ignoring any parts of
the history of psychology that did not fit his ideas. Parker notes how
psychology in the US adapted itself to a version of evolutionary theory
that fitted capitalist ideology, and how intelligence tests had to be
revised when researchers found that women and black people were doing
better than they ‘knew’ they should be doing.
He also shows how works from outside US and British
mainstream psychology, such as Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, were
adapted to this ideology. Freud’s terms ‘das Es’, ‘das Ich’ and ‘das
Über-Ich’, were not translated straightforwardly as ‘the It’, ‘the I’,
and ‘the Over-I’, but were mistranslated by James Strachey as ‘id’,
‘ego’ and ‘superego’.
Crucially, Parker notes that "psychologists are not
consciously dedicated to the survival of capitalism". (p30) Instead, he
comments, psychological ideas act as ideological guardians of
capitalism. He is critical of the fact that many psychologists have not
thought through their ideas to their natural conclusions, despite the
humanitarianism of many psychologists and the fact that some even came
from radical or socialist backgrounds.
Parker then goes on to discuss psychology in
relation to work, political dissent and mental health. One of the key
points he makes here is that the ‘psychologisation’ of the issues
involved confuses rather than clarifies, and serves to rip problems out
of their social, political and economic context. He cites the example of
recent research in Venezuela that has ignored the huge social
transformations there.
Parker also discusses the relationship between the
left and psychology where left-wing groups have become psychologised as
‘cults’ with unrealistic ideas. And he draws attention to more recent
approaches in psychology that have emerged from critiques of mainstream
psychology. In most cases, however, these have adapted themselves back
to mainstream psychology theoretically, got wrapped up in post-modern
ideas about the end of history, or been transformed into just another
branch of psychology.
In one of the most interesting chapters, Psychology
and Revolution, Parker shows how ideas and serious challenges to
psychology are bound up with material events. He deals with the 1917
Russian revolution, the May events in Paris 1968, second wave feminism,
and Latin American in the 1980s, showing how new ideas and concepts were
thrown up by each of these events. He points out that they only gave a
glimpse of what could be possible.
He concludes by outlining a programme of
transitional demands for psychology which he says "will put social
change on the agenda of psychological practise". (p200) These demands
relate to democratising psychological treatment and research,
questioning psychological ‘knowledge’ and categorisations of people,
research methodology and topics, and opposing the notions of
‘well-being’ and ‘work-life balance’ which stress individualistic
objectives.
Despite being a professor of psychology, Parker is
deeply hostile to the discipline and several times calls for an ‘end to
it’. Throughout the book you can sense his anger, sometimes condemning
everything psychology has ‘discovered’, at other times recognising that
there may be some useful knowledge that could (and should) be
interpreted differently. His main arguments are correct. Only great
social movements and revolutions can inject the notion of change into
ahistorical psychology. Psychology will either flourish and break
through its ideological trappings or get thrown into the dustbin of
history as the capitalist version of medieval alchemy.