US-Israeli 'new Middle East' plan derailed
The barbarous 34-day assault on Lebanon saw the
deaths of at least 1,300 Lebanese, thousands injured, up to a million
people forced to flee their homes, and civilian infrastructure
shattered. On the Israeli side, 157 were killed, including 118 soldiers.
But none of the Israeli regime’s objectives were achieved. The war
exposed the limits of Israel’s military power, and that of its sponsor,
US imperialism. Hezbollah, on the other hand, has been strengthened
politically. This has provoked a crisis for Ehud Olmert’s government.
The ceasefire has brought fighting to a halt for the time being, but the
US-French brokered UN resolution will resolve none of the region’s
problems. KEVIN SIMPSON analyses the situation.
ON AUGUST 14, a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire
in the latest Israeli-Lebanese war came into effect. Sporadic clashes
have continued. However, for the moment, the Israeli regime’s murderous
violence against Lebanon has ceased and Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on
northern Israel’s civilian areas have halted. It is not clear how long
this period of relative quiet will last. For example, Israel blatantly
violated the ceasefire by attacking Hezbollah fighters in a village deep
in the Beka’a valley just six days after the UN resolution was signed.
Rather than improving the position of capitalism and
imperialism in the Middle East, this war has vastly worsened the
situation. The proposals in the UN resolution, even if implemented,
would solve none of the underlying contradictions which led to the war.
The deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon and the promise
of a 15,000-strong multinational force are a face-saving way out of the
impasse, mainly devised to allow Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, to
withdraw Israeli forces. Under present social and economic conditions
further conflicts will take place unless the Arab and Israeli Jewish
working class can find a route out of the periodic descent into bloody
wars which has been all that imperialism and capitalism have offered the
region since the end of the second world war.
What has been dubbed the ‘sixth Israeli-Arab war’
will be recorded in the history books as a major defeat for Israeli
capitalism, its first on the field of battle since the founding of the
state in 1948. The Israeli regime had to change its stated war aims
half-way through the conflict, from "destroying" Hezbollah to
"weakening" Hezbollah. Israel failed to gain the return of the two
Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah on 12 July, the immediate pretext
for Israel’s offensive. The Chief of Army Staff was replaced during the
war, and there were public divisions between different parts of the
military elite and within the cabinet over whether to go ahead with a
full land invasion in the 48 hours before the UN resolution came into
effect.
Reuven Pedatzur commented in the Israeli Ha’aretz
newspaper: "This is not a mere military defeat. This is a strategic
failure whose far-reaching implications are still not clear… In
Damascus, Gaza, Tehran and Cairo too, people are looking with amazement
at the IDF [Israel Defence Forces] that for more than a month could not
bring a tiny guerrilla organisation to its knees, the IDF that was
defeated and paid a heavy price in most of its battles in southern
Lebanon… What happened to this mighty army which after a month was not
able to advance more than a few kilometres into Lebanon?" (16 August)
The result of the war will also be recorded as a
political victory for Hezbollah. Paul Moorcraft, director of the Centre
for Foreign Policy Analysis, said: "Hezbollah has done a lot better than
the conventional forces of all the Arab states that have fought Israel
since 1948. It has won a stunning propaganda victory and shattered
Israel’s defensive posture". (Guardian, 11 August) Hezbollah has become
hugely popular across the Arab world. A recent opinion poll in Egypt
found that Sayyad Hassan Nasrullah, the general secretary of Hezbollah,
is now the region’s most popular leader, despite the fact that he is a
Shia while the majority of Arabs are Sunni.
The result of the war is a setback for US
imperialism, Israeli capitalism’s main backer in the Middle East.
Undoubtedly, it also spells trouble for the corrupt and spineless Arab
elites who have bent the knee before the Israeli regime and the
capitalist west for decades.
Clearly, the Middle East will become more unstable;
US imperialism’s influence will be undermined further; and the Arab
regimes, already under siege because of the anger of the Arab masses
towards mass poverty and corruption, could face major social upheavals.
What is completely different about this war is that
there is a clear understanding internationally that the imperialist
powers, particularly the Bush and Blair administrations, rather than
playing a moderating role on Israeli capitalism, blatantly gave it full
support and encouraged the war aims of the US’s client state in the
Middle East. The result will be even higher levels of anger amongst the
Arab and Muslim masses around the world and a further slipping in the
authority of the imperialist powers amongst the working class
internationally. The effects of this will echo through political
developments regionally and internationally over the next few years.
Collective punishment
FROM THE BEGINNING it was clear that the military
bombardment, rather than being an attempt to destroy Hezbollah, was
designed to crush an entire nation into submission. The Israeli Air
Force flew over 15,500 sorties against 7,000 targets while its navy
fired more than 2,500 shells at Lebanon’s coast. Lebanon’s
infrastructure has been devastated with over £2.5 billion worth of
damage being done. Schools, hospitals, power stations and even milk
factories have been destroyed. Over 1,300 Lebanese civilians were killed
and tens of thousands more injured. Lebanese journalists have commented
that more damage was inflicted by Israel’s month-long bombardment than
the entire 20-year-long civil war.
Even by the standards of Israeli capitalism, this
was a particularly brutal war. The Israeli regime committed war crimes
in areas like Tyre and Sidon. They threatened to bomb any traffic moving
on the roads and refused requests by the UN and Red Crescent for safe
transit for vehicles going to rescue civilians dying in the rubble.
Towards the end of the war, the Israeli regime, increasingly desperate
to achieve at least some of its war aims, dropped a leaflet over Lebanon
which stated "each expansion of Hezbollah’s terrorist operations will
lead to a harsh and powerful response, which will not be confined to
Hassan’s [Nasrullah] gang of criminals".
If ever a formal admission by the Israeli state was
needed that it was involved in the collective punishment of the Lebanese
working class and rural poor, this was it. What makes this even more
monstrous is that US imperialism and the Blair administration openly and
cynically supported these tactics. Both refused to call for an immediate
ceasefire and instead rushed bunker busting bombs from the US, via
Prestwick airport in Scotland, to Israel’s war machine. In this context,
Condoleezza Rice’s statement that the war represented the "birth pangs
of a new Middle East" is seared into the minds of millions around the
world, particularly the Arab masses, as the pinnacle of imperialism’s
barbarism in the modern era.
The cessation of violence has, of course, brought
some sort of relief to the working class of Lebanon and Israel. But the
war’s effects will be felt for generations to come. Hundreds of
thousands of mainly Lebanese families have had their lives shattered,
through the loss of loved ones but also in the destruction of homes
occupied for generations; the flattening of whole villages and towns;
the destruction of the livelihoods of millions of people; and a health
and environmental disaster which modern warfare with its depleted
uranium tipped armaments always leaves in its wake.
Working-class Israelis, both Jewish and Palestinian,
have lost much too, although not on the same scale. This was Israel’s
longest war since 1948 and also the first time that civilian areas have
come under sustained military attack since the founding of the state.
Hezbollah fired nearly 4,000 rockets, 250 on the last day of
hostilities. Apart from the Palestinian intifada this conflict saw the
highest number of civilian casualties in any conflict since 1948.
The Israeli working class will bear the costs of the
war through increased taxation and cuts in living standards. The
government estimates that the assault cost $2.3 billion, but the
newspaper, Yediot Aharonot (15 August), calculates that it will be
upward of $5.7 billion when the costs of war damage in Israel are taken
into account. Although not necessarily apparent now, the biggest blow
for the Israeli ruling class will be the further shattering of the idea
that the Israeli state, with the fourth strongest army in the world, can
protect their security from outside attack. This will have profound
effects on the psychology of the Israeli Jewish masses and therefore on
social and political developments in Israel.
Above all, what stands out is that the Israeli
ruling class and US imperialism completely failed to achieve any of
their major war aims. Moreover, they have no clear strategy for the next
period.
‘The deterrence factor’ undermined
UNDOUBTEDLY, THE ISRAELI regime wanted to completely
destroy Hezbollah. In part this was to put to rest the ignominy of the
IDF’s early withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000 as a result of
Hezbollah’s guerrilla war against it. The Israeli military elite also
saw Hezbollah as perhaps one of the sharpest military thorns in its
side. Above all, the Israeli regime had a much broader aim in mind in
prosecuting this war. It was an attempt to reassert the military
superiority of Israeli capitalism across the region – in the jargon of
the military analysts, "to re-establish the ‘deterrence’ factor".
Despite the apparent differences on foreign policy
between numerous Israeli governments, in reality, the strategy of the
Israeli ruling class has remained fairly consistent since 1948. This has
been the policy of the ‘Iron Wall’, essentially, the creation of an
overwhelming military force which is used regularly to crush enemy
opposition. It is only on the basis of the application of this force
that the Israeli regime is prepared to negotiate under conditions where
its adversaries are forced to accept whatever is on offer.
The Israeli regime more recently has drawn the
conclusion that despite the IDF’s brutal tactics in Gaza and the West
Bank (the Occupied Territories), its image as a powerful, regional
military superpower has been undermined. This was emphasised by the IDF
withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000 and also by the victory of Hamas
in the Palestinian elections in January this year. The political and
military setbacks of its main backer, US imperialism, in the Iraq
quagmire, also undermined the image of invincibility of the Israeli
regime. Other processes, such as the growing regional influence of Iran,
in part because of events in Iraq, where parties with links to the
Iranian regime now dominate the political scene, have also added to this
process.
It was for these reasons that the Israeli military
elite laid plans for a massive show of firepower in Lebanon at least two
years ago. These were to be set in motion as soon as a pretext was given
by Hezbollah. This it did on 12 July with the cross-border incursion
which involved the taking prisoner of two soldiers and killing of three
others. In an article by George Monbiot, Gerald Steinberg, a professor
of political science at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, commented: "Of
all Israel’s wars since 1948, this was the one for which Israel was most
prepared… By 2004, the military campaign scheduled to last about three
weeks that we’re seeing now had already been blocked out and, in the
last year or two, it’s been simulated and rehearsed across the board".
(Guardian, 8 August)
What is more, US imperialism was kept fully informed
about these plans with a senior Israeli army officer giving
off-the-record presentations to US diplomats and others from more than a
year ago.
According to some reports (including in the
right-wing Jerusalem Post), Washington neo-cons saw the war on Lebanon
as an opportunity for an attack on Syria and even a pre-emptive strike
against Iran’s nuclear processing facilities. In reality, however, the
US is bogged down in Iraq, while Iran’s regional influence has been
strengthened, making it unlikely that the Bush regime, even if the war
had continued, would have contemplated military attacks on Syria or
Iran. Instead, the US is likely to push harder for UN-authorised
sanctions against Iran, though even this is problematic given opposition
from Russia and China, and Iran’s threat to cut off oil supplies from
the Persian Gulf.
The Olmert government’s plans lie in tatters,
shattered in the hills and valleys of south Lebanon. This is where the
IDF came up against ferocious resistance from Hezbollah fighters,
despite a ferocious ‘shock and awe’ bombing campaign by its air force.
Rather than re-establishing the deterrence factor of the IDF, the
military prowess of the Israeli regime has been massively undermined.
US, and to a lesser extent British, imperialism have been exposed once
again just as they have been by the failure of their occupations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and by the Hamas victory in the Palestinian
elections. Once again, the Bush administration’s campaign to ‘reshape’
the Middle East has been shaken to the core.
The character of Hezbollah
AN IMPORTANT LESSON which can be drawn from this
conflict is that the outcome of wars is determined by many factors, not
just military ones. Social and political factors can play just as much
if not a more important role in determining the result of any conflict.
This is where the Israeli ruling and military elite
made a fundamental error in underestimating Hezbollah and its ability to
resist the might of the IDF. Undoubtedly, Israel’s military tacticians
looked to the bombing campaign of US imperialism at the start of the
Iraq war as its model.
However, the social and political conditions in
Lebanon were completely different from Iraq. The conscripts of the Iraqi
army, while not wishing foreign occupiers on their soil, had no wish to
sacrifice their lives for a dictator under whom they had suffered for
decades. This was one of the factors in paving the way for a relatively
easy dash to Baghdad by the US army.
In contrast, even before the conflict started,
Hezbollah had mass support in the southern, mainly Shia, part of Lebanon
where the conflict took place. This arises from the history and
development of this organisation, whose leadership has been able at
times to appeal to audiences beyond its main Shia support base in the
south and the poor southern Beirut suburbs. The evolution of Hezbollah
shows that the national political conditions that exist in Lebanon,
including the existence of 17 ethnic and religious groupings, have had
an important effect on its orientation and propaganda.
The Shia population has always formed the most
oppressed section of Lebanese society. One of the first Shia-based
parties reflected this by calling itself the ‘Movement of the
Dispossessed’. In 1974 when, as a result of government grants and
outside investment, Beirut was flourishing (the ‘Switzerland of the
East’), the Lebanese Shia population (20% of the total at that time)
received only 0.7% of the government budget. As well as facing the worst
poverty and discrimination, the Shias also bore the brunt of the Israeli
occupation 1982-2000.
Hezbollah, the ‘Party of God’, formed in 1982, was
created as a reaction to the occupation. It arose from the more
combative rank-and-file members of the secular Shia Amal movement who
believed their leadership had ceased to be an effective fighting force
against Israeli aggression. These members looked to what they saw as the
success of the Iranian revolution and were helped by members of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard to set up their new organisation. Hezbollah
looked ideologically to Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini in its early years as
an inspiration.
More recently, however, Hezbollah has taken the
complexion of a more populist Islamist resistance organisation, with a
strong nationalist tinge. The building of a powerful militia force has
been combined with the provision of social and welfare services by its
political wing. Some of its activists play a role in the trade unions,
the majority of which are divided along sectarian lines. In the last few
years it has become one of the strongest and most influential political
and military forces in Lebanon, more powerful than the Lebanese army.
Like all populist organisations it appeals to many
different audiences through the skilful use of radical demands and
propaganda. Hezbollah does not hide its Islamic roots, but has recently
tried to appeal to a much wider audience, mainly on the basis of
Lebanese nationalism. Under Sheikh Hassan Nasrullah, the Hezbollah
leadership dropped mention of its earlier aim of transforming the
country into an Islamic state. Over the years, although often describing
itself as the ‘Islamic resistance’ (which was taken to mean a fighting
resistance on the part of Shias and Sunnis), it increasingly asserted
that it was fighting for all Lebanese, be they Christian, Druze, Shia or
Sunni, against aggression by the Israeli state. This was especially the
case in the fight against Israeli occupation which culminated in victory
for Hezbollah when the IDF were driven out of Lebanon. Following this,
Hezbollah entered ‘official’ politics and stood in elections, winning 14
seats in parliament. In these elections it stood Christian candidates on
its lists. Earlier this year it formed a bloc in parliament with the
populist Christian leader Michel Aoun.
In the latest war it once again referred to itself
as the ‘Resistance’ as opposed to the ‘Islamic Resistance’. Hezbollah
leaders’ speeches stressed that this was a nationalist struggle for the
future of Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s main base of support is undoubtedly
among the Shia rural poor and working class, but it has not based itself
on a class-struggle approach. Hezbollah has two ministers in the
national unity government in Lebanon which recently voted for the
privatisation of electricity services. At the same time, it helped
organise a mass protest movement against the rise in electricity prices
in advance of privatisation. This shows the contradictory nature of
Hezbollah and the way in which its leadership attempts politically to
face in different directions.
Some on the left internationally have compared
Hezbollah to the African National Congress, the national liberation
organisation whose supporters fought against the white apartheid regime
in South Africa. This is a false comparison to make.
It is true that Hezbollah is fighting against US and
Israeli domination of Lebanon and has mass support among big sections of
the population. Although the ANC had a multi-class makeup, the specific
weight and influence of the working class played a much greater role
within it. Socialist and revolutionary ideas were discussed within the
organisations ANC supporters built on the ground, and were the basis on
which the COSATU trade union federation was built. This working-class
base played a major role in defeating apartheid. The movement against
apartheid was a mass struggle by the working class for social, political
and economic change. The Freedom Charter, which was the political
manifesto of the ANC called for nationalisation of the mines and the
banks. At the height of the battle against apartheid in the townships,
committees were set up to decide through democratic discussion and
debate how to take the struggle forward. Unfortunately, because the ANC
was not committed to a rounded-out programme for the socialist
transformation of society, the leadership became more and more detached
from the rank and file and subsequently adopted blatant pro-capitalist
policies.
Hezbollah, however, does not deploy the methods of
working-class struggle used by the ANC in the period of mass struggle
against the apartheid regime. While Hezbollah has organised mass
protests movements, this is an auxiliary tactic rather than a way of
encouraging the development of organised mass movements of the working
class and rural poor as a central aspect of the struggle. While they
have opposed some of the worst excesses of neo-liberal economic policies
in Lebanon they are not explicitly against capitalism. The problems of
mass poverty, price rises and cuts can only be ended through the
overthrow of capitalism in Lebanon and the Middle East, and the
organisation of society along socialist lines. This is not the political
position of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s limits
HEZBOLLAH HAS DEVELOPED sophisticated social welfare
support particularly for the Shia population in the poorest areas of
Lebanon. It played the role which the corrupt Lebanese elite failed to
do in providing schools, hospitals and employment. Today it is the
second biggest employer in Lebanon, with 250,000 relying directly on it
for jobs. There are numerous examples of how families whose sole
breadwinners have lost their jobs have had visits from members of
Hezbollah who have turned up unannounced to leave money or food boxes.
Families needing money for expensive operations for sick family members
have been given cards enabling them to go to any clinic in Lebanon for
treatment. Hezbollah leaders are renowned for not being corrupt and, to
many Lebanese Shia especially, appear to undertake political activity in
the interests of the poorest sections of society.
This activity was in marked contrast to that of
national politicians, renowned for their corruption and failure to do
anything for the poorest sections. One Lebanese commentator stated that
Hezbollah was a "state within a non-state". The tendency for Hezbollah
to build further support, particularly in Shia areas which have borne
the brunt of the latest Israeli attack, is likely to continue given the
way it responded to the post-war situation.
On the day after the ceasefire, Hezbollah members
were active in most of the main bombed areas, surveying the damage and
beginning to direct clearance and recovery of bodies trapped under
rubble. Hezbollah leaders immediately announced that each family whose
house had been destroyed would receive over $12,000 in the first year
and Hezbollah would help them rebuild their homes. It is likely that the
finance necessary for this will be provided by the Ahmadinejad regime in
Iran, which will further boost its position in the region.
In the struggle against Israeli occupation in the
1980s, Hezbollah used its mass backing as a support base for its
military activity, melting into the villages once it had attacked IDF
positions or the client militia, the South Lebanese Army. The same
tactics were used in this war. Over the years Hezbollah built an
extremely efficient, secretive and underground guerrilla fighting force.
In this conflict, on the few occasions IDF units managed to capture
Hezbollah positions they found air conditioned bunkers with
sophisticated computer guided missile systems. This shows that Hezbollah
used the lessons learnt by Iranian militias in the Iran-Iraq war.
Moreover, these discoveries show that Hezbollah undoubtedly received
money and armaments from Iran. This made dramatic attacks such as the
guided missile attack on the Israeli naval destroyer possible. However,
although this was a propaganda coup for Hezbollah it was the tenacious
campaign by its fighters on the ground that caused the Israeli regime
its major difficulties.
But western commentators are in the main unable to
really explain the main reason for its effectiveness as a fighting
force. Undoubtedly its fighters are well trained and extremely
courageous. One Israeli general commented during the recent fighting:
"If you are waiting for a white flag coming out of the Hezbollah bunker,
I can assure you it won’t come. They are extremists, they will go all
the way". (The Best Guerrilla Force in the World, Washington Post, 14
August) But the reason for their courage and effectiveness is that all
their fighters are fighting to save their jobs, lands and houses and
those of future generations. What is more they have the support of the
local population for their struggle.
This explains the huge difficulties that the IDF
ground war faced. Repeatedly, IDF officials claimed the capture of towns
like Bint Jbeil only to admit a few days later that fighting was still
going on. In the end, the IDF only could gain control of these areas by
bombing them to the ground.
Despite the hammer blows of the Israeli regime,
Hezbollah continued fighting. Outrage against the Israeli attacks,
rather than uniting the Lebanese population against Hezbollah, led to
the complete opposite. One opinion poll at the height of the bombing put
support for Hezbollah at 85% amongst the Christian population. It was
even higher amongst other sections.
However, while there is support for it across the
country, the main question is whether Hezbollah can break the cycle of
sectarianism that has been part of Lebanese politics and build lasting
active support across the community divide, and a membership amongst all
religious and ethnic groups? Despite its popularity, which at the moment
will probably continue to rise across Lebanon, this is unlikely to
happen. The Islamic slogans and phraseology that is still used by
Hezbollah is likely to cause fears and suspicion amongst members of
non-Muslim communities in Lebanon that, in the last analysis, the
organisation is only interested in defending the rights of Shias.
It has to be recognised that, while Hezbollah may
gain broad popular support under certain conditions (as in the current
situation created by Israel’s assault and the power vacuum in Lebanon),
in its ideology, popular base and external connections, it is
essentially a sectarian organisation. Under changed conditions of
intensified sectarian conflict in Lebanon (between Shia, Christians,
Sunnis, Druze, etc) it can swing back to narrow Shia-sectarian policies.
The Hezbollah leadership will never escape these political limits on the
basis of policies that ultimately accept the rotten framework of
capitalism. Only a programme of socialist change, capable of uniting the
working class and poor across sectarian divisions, could provide a way
out.
Workers’ unity & socialism
UNDER THE CONDITIONS of poverty and want which exist
in the Middle East for the majority of the population, and which are
even more pronounced in the post-war situation, the potential for a mass
united struggle of the working class and rural poor undoubtedly exists.
But in order to realise this potential a cross-community working-class
party is needed, which has a political programme and methods of uniting
the poorest sections of the population. Such a party could only achieve
this unity by explaining the class basis of society and by putting
forward demands which deal with the common problems of the working class
and rural poor, be they Sunni, Shia, Christian or Druze. Part of these
demands would also be a recognition of the democratic rights of all
minorities and their right to practise the religion they wanted to. But
such a party could only maintain unity by going beyond basic economic
and democratic demands which deal with everyday problems. It would have
to explain that division and sectarian strife are part of the capitalist
system and a socialist society is necessary to overcome these divisions
once and for all.
In the absence of such a socialist and mass workers’
party, other tendencies can develop in society of division and conflict
between the different ethnic and religious sections of society, whipped
up by reactionary forces. When they feel confident, such forces will try
to whip up propaganda against Hezbollah as the ‘party of the Shias’.
Under conditions where Hezbollah sees its popularity beginning to fall
or where there are increasing sectarian tensions in society, the
leadership could bring its Shia Islamic ideology to the fore, thus
leading to even greater polarisation.
The movement against increases in electricity prices
gives an indication of what can happen. This movement was undermined by
right-wing parties blaming Hezbollah for the increases because it was
supposedly taking electricity out of the national grid illegally for
Shias in the south of the country. Hezbollah will not be able to fully
answer these propaganda attacks to the satisfaction of the members of
non-Shia communities. These fears can only be answered through building
support for the ideas of workers’ unity and socialism.
Socialist ideas will not be accepted automatically
by the masses and will have to be systematically built in Lebanon and
across the Middle East. This is especially the case given the immediate
popularity that Hezbollah has achieved. In fact, the ideas of guerrilla
struggle against imperialism will be given a big boost in the countries
of Africa, Asia and Latin America as a result of Hezbollah’s victory.
Undoubtedly, the IDF suffered a military defeat at
the hands of Hezbollah’s small guerrilla army. But can Hezbollah’s
tactics prevent future invasions of Lebanon by the Israeli regime? Can
they end the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza? Will they bring about
a fundamental change in the conditions of abject poverty the Arab masses
are sinking further into every day, for surely this is what the struggle
against Israeli capitalism and US imperialism is all about?
In order to achieve these aims, the social and
economic conditions that lead to poverty and oppression need to be
removed. This means a struggle to overthrow Israeli capitalism and drive
the feudal-capitalist Arab elite out of power in the Middle East.
Under certain conditions guerrilla struggle can be
an important auxiliary to the struggle against imperialist aggression
and exploitation. But on its own, this tactic cannot succeed, for
example, in overthrowing the Israeli capitalist state. Frustrating an
invasion by the IDF of Lebanon is one thing. Militarily destroying the
Israeli army in a lasting defeat is something quite different and beyond
the military capabilities of Hezbollah. But in order to end the
possibility of future invasions by the Israeli regime then the Israeli
state machine has to be defeated.
The only possibility is to undermine the social base
on which the Israeli state rests, as a first step to overthrowing
capitalism in Israel. This means splitting away the Israeli Jewish
working class (whom the state relies upon to fight its wars) from the
ruling class, and winning them to the idea of overthrowing capitalism in
the region. In order to do this the fears that the Israeli Jewish
workers have for their survival have to be answered. It is for this
reason that, while we fully supported the right of Hezbollah to defend
Lebanon from invasion by the Israeli regime, we did not consider it
correct to fire rockets at Israeli civilian areas. This drove Israeli
Jewish workers into the arms of their ruling class, thus strengthening
its position
The existence of an Israeli national consciousness
has to be recognised. However, we do not believe this should be done at
the expense of the rights of a Palestinian nation to exist. How will it
possible to accommodate the national rights of the Israeli nation, the
Palestinian masses and the Arab masses in general? This is not possible
under capitalism. Only by utilising the resources and wealth of the
Middle East in the interests of the majority, will it be possible to
give an answer to all the problems and fears faced by the Arab and
Palestinian masses and the Israeli Jewish working class. This could be
achieved through the struggle for a socialist confederation of the
Middle East in which a socialist Palestine exists alongside a socialist
Israel.
Hezbollah’s victory will not only mean a rise in
support for the ideas of guerrilla struggle. Given the brutal
application of neo-liberal economic policies and US imperialism’s
military intervention in the region, an explosive mix exists. Up to now
one factor that partially held back social upheavals amongst the Arab
masses was the feeling of powerlessness, an inability to stand up to the
oppressive dictatorial regimes across the Middle East. However, the
defeat of the IDF has raised confidence to its highest level in decades
and exposed the weakness of the majority of Arab leaders. Under
conditions like this, nervous regimes which attempt to crush any
opposition could find that, unlike on previous occasions, such methods
are a spark for massive social protests.
In Iraq, the insurgency is likely to become bolder
as a result of the difficulties of US imperialism’s main regional ally.
Shia groups, such as the forces around Moqtada al-Sadr and even Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, will possibly adopt a more strident anti-US
position.
The Ahmadinejad regime will feel more confident of
demanding further concessions from the EU powers and US imperialism over
the offer they have made to try to persuade Iran to stop its attempts at
producing weapons’ grade uranium. In fact, the Iranian regime, which has
just carried out extensive war games in the Baluchi area of the country
as a ‘warning to its enemies’, may even go as far as carrying out its
threat to reject the package put forward by the EU completely. This
would once again lead to a rapid sharpening of tensions in the region
and would pose a major headache for US imperialism.
Israeli political crisis
HOWEVER, IT IS in Israel that the most immediate and
sharpest changes in consciousness and developments could be seen. The
result of the war will see a growth in political instability and fears
for the future amongst wider sections of the population. The Kadima
government has entered a period of crisis. It is not guaranteed that
Olmert and Amir Peretz, the defence minister, will even keep their jobs.
Support for Olmert has gone down from 78% to 40%.
Peretz languishes at 28% support, a complete
turnaround from the position which he had when he was first elected
leader of the Labour Party in November 2005. Many working-class Israelis
regarded him as breaking the mould of Israeli politics because he was
the first Labour leader to come from a poor working-class background and
spoke their language. Peretz initially put forward radical demands like
a doubling in the minimum wage and for a state-run pension system.
During the general election campaign he dumped most of these policies
and, just a few months later, has ended up as one of Israel’s most
unpopular politicians ostensibly in charge of one of the most disastrous
military campaigns in the country’s history.
Kadima was the creation of the former prime
minister, Ariel Sharon, and contains many of the old dinosaurs of
Israeli politics from the two main traditional parties, Likud and
Labour. It has no clear ideology or programme apart from the commitment
to a unilateral withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and the
declaration of final borders of a Palestinian state. With the crisis in
confidence in the government, Olmert has had to announce the shelving of
this plan, the main promise his party made in the election campaign.
One process in Israeli society emphasised by the war
is the undermining of the institutions of capitalist rule, particularly
the way in which the army is viewed. This would have important
implications in any country but in Israel, whose army has had mythical
status in what is essentially a capitalist warrior state, these are even
more serious. On top of this is a further undermining of the already low
standing of the political elite.
Despite the huge initial public support amongst
Israeli Jews for the war, particularly after Hezbollah rockets started
falling on civilian areas, the perception developed that the politicians
and generals had no clear aims and were continually surprised by
developments during the fighting. A commentator in Ha’aretz, dealing
with Olmert’s future, wrote: "You cannot lead an entire nation to war
promising victory, produce humiliating defeat and remain in power. You
cannot bury 120 Israelis in cemeteries, keep a million Israelis in
shelters for a month, wear down deterrent power, bring the next war very
close and then say – oops, I made a mistake. This was not the intention.
Pass me a cigar please". (15 August)
An indication of the problems that will come the way
of the ruling class is the huge scandal which broke out immediately
after the ceasefire, centring on the Chief of Army Staff, General Halutz.
It was revealed that in the three hours following the initial attack by
Hezbollah, before Halutz ordered the implementation of the military
campaign, he contacted the manager of his $15,000-share portfolio and
instructed him to immediately sell – a new version of insider dealing!
There is outrage that, while a war was being prepared which was
portrayed as one for the ‘survival of Israel’, its top general was
preoccupied with his personal wealth! This is especially so given the
complaints that surfaced at the end of the war from mobilised reservists
about the lack of equipment, supplies (including water!) and the total
chaos which the generals presided over. These criticisms are
particularly important since all adults in Israel below retirement age
are, in effect, reservists.
In the absence of a genuine workers’ party which
could channel this anger electorally, it is likely, given peoples’ fear
for their security, that the standing of right-wing politicians like
Netanyahu could rise once again. A more right-wing coalition government
cannot even be ruled out in the future. However, even if this
perspective is borne out, this does not mean social peace in Israeli
society. There is likely to be a re-emergence of fierce class battles as
workers are forced to pay the costs of this conflict. Among more
conscious sections of the population, particularly among young people, a
new radicalisation will develop. This will result in increased interest
in the socialist and revolutionary ideas put forward by Maavak
Sotzialisti, the CWI’s affiliated organisation in Israel.
Volatile situation
THE FACT THAT the Israeli military elite suffered a
defeat opens up a new and possibly dangerous situation in Middle Eastern
politics in the medium term. While it would seem logical that the
Israeli regime should hold back from further military action, the ruling
class will want to repair the damage done to its image and may attempt
more military adventures.
The Israeli regime is likely to take a much harder
line in the West Bank and Gaza. Even before the end of the war, the IDF
was increasing its repressive measures in Gaza, partially hidden from
world view by the war in Lebanon. Up to 151 people were killed in the
Gaza strip in July, the highest level for two years. A UN report said
that 70% of the population were reliant for their survival on outside
food aid. It is clear that this is the result of the IDF attacks on Gaza
over the last few months.
A further contributing factor to instability is the
ceasefire itself. There are many issues unanswered by the UN-brokered
ceasefire. It is not even certain that it will hold. The agreement calls
for 15,000 Lebanese troops to be deployed in south Lebanon and a similar
number of UN troops to act as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon.
The implication of the resolution is that the
Lebanese army should be responsible for the policing of Hezbollah. If
this responsibility had been given to the UN forces this would have very
rapidly led to clashes with what would have been seen as a new foreign
occupation force acting in the interests of the Israeli regime,
camouflaged in the blue helmets of the UN.
But it is ruled out that the Lebanese army will
attempt to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. Under present conditions soldiers
would refuse to obey orders and would probably go over to the side of
Hezbollah. There has clearly been an interim agreement between the
Lebanese government and Hezbollah leaders that Hezbollah fighters will
store their weapons and rockets but will not disarm.
This has been openly acknowledged by Lebanese
leaders and some UN officials, even while US and Israeli leaders have
been asserting that the role of the Lebanese army and the multinational
force is to disarm Hezbollah. "The role of this [UN-sponsored
multinational] force", announced UN deputy general secretary, Mark
Malloch Brown, "is no large-scale disarmament of Hezbollah but rather
policing a political agreement". (International Herald Tribune, 19
August) The ‘political agreement’ is really a charade designed to allow
Israel a way out.
"It’s not a search-and-seizure operation", stated
the Lebanese premier, Fouad Siniora, referring to the deployment of the
Lebanese army in the south. "The army would not ask militants to
relinquish their weapons", confirmed Lebanon’s defence minister, Elias
Murr (International Herald Tribune, 16 August). "The reality", commented
the International Herald Tribune (18 August), "is a kind of murky deal
in which Hezbollah takes its weapons off the streets and the army does
not look too hard, if at all, for them".
France, which had initially indicated it would play
the major role within the UN force, has only committed 200 soldiers so
far! This is because the French ruling class realises that a UN force
could end up being seen as occupiers and suffer big casualties. This is
why France and other countries have asked for clearer rules of
engagement – at the moment they are not happy with the fact that they
can only retaliate militarily if they are attacked. A number of
countries have also expressed concerns about the unclear chain of
command in the UN force.
The UN force has been given the responsibility to
stop the transit of weapons into southern Lebanon from Syria and further
afield. However, it is likely that if it implements this proposal
forcibly, clashes with Hezbollah will develop. At the moment, the UN
agreement is in danger of being completely compromised by the failure of
different countries to provide soldiers.
This is why some Israeli commentators have claimed
that the recent conflict was a precursor for the ‘next war’. Alain Gresh
wrote: "Not since 1967 has the Middle East suffered so many simultaneous
high-intensity crises. Though each has its own rationale, they are
linked by many threads, making partial solutions more difficult and
dragging the region even faster into the abyss". (Le Monde Diplomatique,
August 2006)
The latest war in the Middle East demonstrates the
incapability of capitalism and imperialism to solve any of the growing
problems of the region. The devastation in Lebanon gives a concrete
reminder of the necessity to build a movement across the region for a
struggle for socialism and a socialist confederation of Middle Eastern
states to begin to repair the damage done over decades by imperialism
and their supporters.
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