
Yeltsin’s legacy
The death of Boris Yeltsin in April was the signal
for a blatant propaganda offensive. Capitalist politicians and media
portrayed him as a flawed but heroic leader who freed Russia from
Stalinist dictatorship. Socialism was, once again, pronounced dead.
CLARE DOYLE assesses Yeltsin’s role and the impact of capitalist
restoration.
THE EX-PRESIDENT OF Russia, Boris Yeltsin, was
buried on 25 April amid a pomp and ceremony not seen since the days of
the tsars. It was the first religious burial of a Russian head of state
for more than 110 years and was meant to show the world that Russia,
under Vladimir Putin, had finally returned to all that was supposedly
great and glorious before the revolutionary year of 1917.
Few Russians turned out to honour the first
president of the Russian Federation after his death in the elite Central
Clinical Hospital. They have little to thank him for. At Yeltsin’s
graveside, however, were past ‘world leaders’ like George Bush Snr, Bill
Clinton and John Major who had given him whole-hearted support in the
1990s as he dragged the Soviet Union into the capitalist world. They
rubbed shoulders with Russia’s two richest oligarchs who piled up vast
fortunes through being part of Yeltsin’s inner circle – Roman
Abramovitch, owner of Chelsea football club and still governor of
Chukotka, and Oleg Deripaska, married to Yeltsin’s daughter (each of
them is now worth well over £10 billion). All the current president’s
men were at the funeral too – cronies from Putin’s St Petersburg days,
themselves rich and powerful heads of industry.
The capitalist press, predictably, took this
occasion to remind discontented workers and young people worldwide that
there is no point in challenging their system. Fulsome praise was heaped
on Yeltsin – the man who famously stood on a tank in August 1991
defending parliament against an attempted generals’ coup. After seven
years in obscurity, he was again ‘lionised’ in the world’s media for his
role in finishing off ‘communism’ and introducing the first-ever
democratic regime in Russia.
It is ironical that, as a member of the ‘Communist’
Party for decades, Yeltsin must have argued many times against a return
to the Russia of the tsars, which had been a nightmare for workers,
peasants and soldiers. It was the despotism, tyranny and luxurious
living of the emperors, the super-exploitation and hunger, the
blood-letting of war under Russian and foreign capitalism, that were all
swept away by the mass uprisings of an angry population, culminating in
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
Much that was rotten and cleansed from Russian
society has returned with the restoration of capitalism. There is the
obscene wealth of the few – with just 36 people owning a quarter of all
assets in Russia. One of them, Victor Vekselberg, splashed out £50
million on a collection of the tsars’ notorious jewel-studded Feabergé
eggs! The average worker scrapes by on little more than £100 a month.
A new court camarilla has grown up around Putin
which displays the same cold callousness towards the fate of millions as
those of yesteryear, trampling on national and democratic rights and
pursuing to this day a bloody war in Chechnya. Meanwhile, workers,
pensioners and students see their incomes dwindle, public services are
reduced to nothing and immigrants from the ‘near abroad’ are hounded out
of town.
Schools of falsification
TO SAY THAT Yeltsin’s ‘democracy’ was the first ever
in Russia is a lie. In fact it is two lies! Firstly, his regime was far
from democratic. Secondly, that of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky 75
years earlier was the most democratic form of government in history. The
Bolsheviks were chosen to govern by majority, renewable votes, taken in
elected councils of workers’ and peasants’ delegates.
Capitalist and Stalinist historians alike fail to
show how Stalin’s rise to power, after Lenin’s death in 1924, marked a
complete break with the revolution’s aims and principles, not a natural
continuation. Stalin’s monstrous one-party dictatorship and all the
regimes preceding Yeltsin’s rise to power could never be described as
communism.
But the enormous potential of an economy from which
private ownership of land and industry had been eliminated were proven
in the USSR in the 1930s. The same capitalist propagandists who condemn
‘communism’ ignore the unprecedented growth achieved by state ownership
and planning. In the inter-war period the economy of the USSR grew at a
pace that has never been equalled, let alone overtaken – not by Japan,
the ‘Asian tigers’ or even today’s China. It went from being an India in
Europe to being the second most powerful industrial nation in the world.
Like capitalism’s phenomenal rise in the 19th
century, there were huge overheads. Stalin’s bureaucratic and tyrannical
rule meant the deaths of millions and human suffering on an unbelievable
scale. If the state-owned planned economy had been run along the lines
of real workers’ democracy, with workers themselves running things
instead of bureaucrats and policemen, with their energy, ingenuity and
ability unleashed, then a rate of development even four times greater
could have been achieved. Did Yeltsin prove that capitalism was a
superior system?
From Gorbachev to Yeltsin
AFTER TEN YEARS as First Secretary of the Communist
Party in Sverdlovsk, and particularly when he was transferred to Moscow
to head the city party there, he became widely known (and popular) for
his vigorous campaigns against privilege, red tape and corruption. While
still enjoying the perks of office himself, he was seen to ride on
public transport, exposed the pilfering of the state by bureaucrats, and
raised the banner of multi-party democracy in a campaign against article
six of the constitution, which prevented any but the ruling Communist
Party from participating in elections.
Yeltsin carried further the process begun by Mikhail
Gorbachev and his fumbling reform measures of glasnost and perestroika –
transparency and restructuring. Gorbachev had become aware that the rule
of the bureaucracy could not survive the stagnation that had beset the
USSR. Roy Mevedev tells Giulietto Chiesa in the book, Time of Change,
that according to new figures, national income had not grown for the
previous 20 years. Gorbachev was attempting to ‘re-boot’ the economy,
clinging to the idea of introducing only elements of the market into the
state-owned, centrally planned system. He even cited Lenin’s example of
the New Economic Policy of 1921, a policy introduced in an entirely
different period and in entirely different circumstances.
In Gorbachev’s day, there was no such thing as
workers’ democracy in the way the economy was run. The plan was
introduced and enforced from on high. That was why the stagnation had
set in, just as Trotsky had explained it would if workers proved unable
to wrest power back from the Stalinist bureaucracy. The vital ‘oxygen’
for a planned economy to survive can only be generated by major
decisions about production and distribution being made by people working
in industry, public services and by consumers.
A stagnating system would not be able to keep the
privileged elite in the manner to which it had become accustomed, nor
would it be able to maintain the basic provisions for workers of cheap
housing, guaranteed jobs, free public health and education. The
bureaucrats, Trotsky explained, could save themselves in the long run,
if workers were unable to regain political power, by using their
privileged positions to become actual owners of the means of production
– capitalists. Exactly what happened. But was there an alternative?
As the CWI explained at the time when Gorbachev
began his experiments, he was trying to introduce reforms from above to
prevent revolution from below. He nearly did not succeed! Yeltsin was
the individual in history destined to complete the process Gorbachev had
begun. In his hands, the proliferation of reforms of the old system
turned into something qualitatively different, a rapid ‘transition to
the market’.
When Gorbachev began his reforms, with the
decentralisation of certain decisions and allowing workers to express
their criticisms about the way things were done, he opened the
floodgates. Workers keenly embraced the new freedoms. They filled out
the workplace committees set up to allow a limited degree of workers’
control. They voiced their manifold discontents and searched out a new
way of doing things, contemplating how to throw off their backs the
factory and trade union ‘bosses’.
As Yeltsin began his defiance of the party
leadership and his attack on privilege and corruption, workers supported
the campaign for multi-party democracy and began to take things into
their own hands. In elections they replaced party hacks with new
representatives. They exposed and complained about the luxurious
lifestyle of the elite. Unions independent of the ‘vertical’ state ones
began to appear, new political movements and embryonic parties were
being formed, new newspapers appeared, street demonstrations took place
in defiance of the authorities and workers, especially the miners of
Donbas and Kuzbas, began taking strike action.
Warnings unheeded
IN 1990, THE Labour MP for Liverpool Broad Green,
Terry Fields, himself a firm supporter of Trotsky’s tireless struggle
against Stalin’s dictatorship, visited Kuzbas miners. Speaking at a
seething mass meeting he conveyed the solidarity of workers in Europe
with their fight for the right to decide their own futures. His every
sentence was warmly received until he began to warn against taking the
path of market capitalism: "You will, unfortunately, not have an
America, a Sweden or even a Britain [where Thatcher was attacking
everything workers had fought for]. You will have Latin American
capitalism: mass unemployment, hyper-inflation and dictatorship!" Some
of the miners, but especially their pro-market ‘advisers’, began calling
‘time’s up!’, tapping their watches and literally closing their ears to
what was being forecast!
CWI members beginning to work in the ‘Soviet Union’
at that time witnessed the workers’ enthusiasm for ending
totalitarianism. They were flexing their muscles and sensing their
collective power. But we were also keenly aware that organised forces
were not in place that could lead a struggle to dispense with the hated
bureaucrats and establish genuine workers’ democracy. If that had been
possible, it would have been on a far higher level than in 1917, with
much more chance of spreading internationally.
The attraction of the market was winning out.
Illusions were multiplying. Intellectuals and others who had suffered at
the hands of Stalinist dictatorship had set their face against
‘communism’. Unlike in the thirties internationally, when writers and
cultural figures had been attracted by a system in the Soviet Union that
was going ahead, intellectuals in the Soviet Union, nearing the last
decade of the 20th century, saw capitalism going ahead. They and
millions around them fell for the idea that it would be accompanied by
democracy, freedom and even general prosperity. Many of the
intelligentsia, along with high-ups in the apparatus, switched sides as
easily as crossing a street.
After the unsuccessful attempt by generals in August
1991 to turn back the tide, the process was unstoppable. Long before the
coup leader, Gennady Yanayev, chaired a televised ‘press conference’
with hands shaking, the declaration of the emergency had spoken of
protecting all forms of property, including private, and continuing the
‘reforms’. The CWI stood implacably for independent action on the part
of workers – who had spontaneously opposed the return of the generals.
We urged no trust in Yeltsin and capitalism and a struggle for genuine
workers’ democracy and socialism.
The enfeebled Gorbachev was pushed aside by the
swash-buckling Yeltsin. One of his first acts after the defeat of the
coup was to outlaw the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev
had proved unable to prevent, by force or persuasion, the declarations
of independence in the Baltic states. Now the Stalinist leaders of all
the republics that had been part of the USSR began to change their
spots, renouncing ‘communism’ and posing as champions of national and
social freedom. All of them ended up presiding over far from democratic
states and collapsing economies.
The USSR that simply collapsed before the end of
1991 was not the same USSR that was set up in 1922 under Lenin – the
voluntary federation of previously subject nations, now choosing to
travel together on the road to socialism. The ‘Soviet Union’ had long
ceased, from the days of Stalin onwards, to embody the principles of
workers’ democracy and had been a ‘prison house’ of peoples.
As ‘communist’ leaders in the past, both Gorbachev
and Yeltsin had gone along with the severe repression of national
aspirations involved in holding the Stalinist Soviet Union together – by
force. Yeltsin famously nailed his colours to the mast of national
independence. But at the end of 1994, just three and a half years after
coming to power, he was dispatching troops to crush the national revolt
in Chechnya, employing a barbarity worthy of the tsars. A year and a
half later in 1996, when a ceasefire was announced in the run up to the
presidential elections, tens of thousands of people, mainly civilians,
lay slaughtered in Chechnya. The capital, Grozny, was as derelict as any
bombed out city in the second world war.
Dictatorial power
THE CAPITALISM THAT reappeared in the ex-USSR was
raw in tooth and claw. The democratic phase of the counter-revolution
was ending in a sham of parliamentary democracy. Unprecedented
catastrophes beset the economies and societies of that vast area of the
world.
Having kicked away the launching mechanism for his
rise to power, in the person of Gorbachev and the edifice of the
Communist Party, Yeltsin began to use methods as authoritarian as any
Great Russian emperor – or Latin American dictator! The fragile elements
of democracy acted as a flimsy fig leaf to cover the gargantuan struggle
for supremacy being waged on behalf of his own clan or ‘family’. In the
scramble over the spoils of privatisation, he was prone to dispense with
democratic methods altogether.
In 1993, he proposed a constitution for Russia
extending the already considerable elements of personal power he had
given himself. He favoured rule by decree and plebiscite rather than
dependence on majority votes in the duma (parliament). Later, with
almost total control over the media – especially the television channels
– and the state apparatus, he was able to manipulate elections and
referendums alike.
In September 1993, when his lurch towards
Bonapartist rule failed to get the necessary support, Yeltsin moved to
dismiss the parliament. After days of siege and skirmishes, he ordered
tanks to fire on the White House! The vice-president, Alexander Rutskoi,
and the ‘speaker’ of the duma, Ruslan Khasbulatov, defended themselves
arms in hand. Finally, they were arrested and imprisoned: as many as 700
people died in the assault. It is a myth that Rutskoi and co were
risking their lives to defend parliamentary democracy. They were as
intent as Yeltsin on getting their share of power and control over the
processes going on in the country. (Later the rehabilitated Rutskoi
operated as provincial governor of Kursk on the basis of blatant
nepotism and crony capitalism. Between 1996 and 2000, relatives of his
ended up in control of the oblast’s oil concerns, pharmacies, public
security and cultural affairs!)
It was the very ruthlessness and stubbornness of
Yeltsin that enabled him to force through the fiercely unpopular
measures needed to re-establish capitalism in Russia. Compared with what
is still happening in China today, the process was over in no time. But
at a huge cost in human suffering, economic collapse and also to the
prestige and authority of Yeltsin himself – at home and abroad. He
resorted more and more to using his control over the media and his
‘family’ cabal to tighten his increasingly shaky grip on power. His
bodyguard and drinking partner, Alexander Korzhakov, began to call the
shots, literally in the case of launching the December 1994 attack on
the Chechen government of Dzhokhar Dudayev. Present day commentators can
bleat about how a more ‘sensitive and intelligent leader’ might have
been preferable, but he was the man for the job. And what a job!
Shock therapy
‘FAST TRACK’ AND ‘shock therapy’ ideas for ending
the state monopoly of production, distribution and exchange were urged
on Yeltsin by the International Monetary Fund, Jeffrey Sachs and the
Chicago Boys. They were taken up by the Russian free-market enthusiasts
– the Boys in Pink Trousers – and implemented under Yeltsin with a
vengeance.
Prices were ‘liberated’ and market practices
introduced. Yeltsin promised, when subsidies were removed that, although
‘life will be hard for six months’, after that, prices would fall.
Instead, in 1992 they rose by 2,529% – Latin American proportions
indeed!
Vouchers worth 10,000 roubles each were given to 144
million citizens, entitling them to a share in Russia’s major
‘enterprises’. But it was inevitable that most cash-strapped workers,
not seeing much value in them anyway, would sell their vouchers
immediately for cash. This enabled Russia’s future oligarchs to carry
through their rape of state property or ‘primitive accumulation’ of
capital, as they were fond of calling it. Another form of the big
privatisation robbery was the ‘loans for shares’ practice. Well-placed
individuals, many of them making big money on currency exchanges at the
time, could grab big chunks of state enterprises through their ‘tin-pot’
banks by offering cash in exchange for equity. The so-called ‘red
directors’ – bureaucrats who managed the state firms – also, belatedly
but eagerly, got involved in asset-stripping the state-owned economy and
enriching themselves.
What remained of the central plan had disappeared
and the state budget had dried up. Pensioners and conscripts alike went
hungry. Army officers were known to use their positions of power to
enrich themselves from whatever funds came their way. By the end of 1993
about 85% of small enterprises and one third of total state assets had
been privatised.
State property was thus ‘distributed’ according to
connections built up over years in the party apparatus or through
offering ‘incentives’ or bribes to those who made the decisions –
insider dealing on the grand scale! Crony capitalism was rife. So too
was open theft, backed up by mafia tactics.
Factories ground to a halt. Between twelve and 15
million jobs disappeared. Tens of millions of workers were still going
to work but receiving no pay. Some received payment in kind – potatoes,
pots and pans, flour and, in one engineering factory, tampaxes! Even in
1998 it is estimated that barter deals exceeded 50% of all transactions.
Enterprises were accumulating non-payments in terms of debts on trade,
non-payment of taxes and wage arrears. The ‘shadow economy’ accounted
for between 40% and 50% of GDP. Inflation was robbing pensioners,
students and workers of everything they had. Literally millions of
people, beguiled by strident television advertising, entrusted what
meagre savings they had to pyramid companies like MMM, promising annual
returns of 1,000%.
Rise of the oligarchs
BY THE PRESIDENTIAL elections of 1996, Yeltsin had
become so unpopular that he risked losing the contest. He tried to
postpone it and even to dispense with it altogether. The strain of the
way he was living – the drink and the abandonment of his original
principles – took its toll in the form of the heart attack he suffered
between the two rounds of this election. His ‘victory’ was extremely
contrived. In fact, it was probably only possible, in the style of
Berlusconi later in Italy, through his tight control over the country’s
mass media and bare-faced election fraud.
"The basis of Yeltsin’s second term government
[after his re-election in 1996]", says Jonathan Steele, a Guardian
correspondent in Russia at the time, "was a group of multimillionaire
businessmen who had done well out of privatisation… Yeltsin had a
succession of different chiefs of staff and press secretaries, but
relied heavily on the ‘family’… in 1998-99 he sacked and appointed five
prime ministers in 13 months". In behaviour characteristic of all
dictators, "the president was jealous of anyone stealing his limelight".
The author of the book, Sale of the Century, the
free-marketer Chrystia Freeland, wrote on 26 April in The Financial
Times: "Most damaging was the creation of the oligarchs – an act based
partly on an extreme faith in the power of private ownership, no matter
who the owner was or how the property was acquired". And yet she turns
things on their head by claiming the neo-cons ‘got it right’. "Central
planning did indeed turn out to be a less efficient way of running an
economy than free markets!"
Where’s the proof? Even John Lloyd, also a champion
of capitalism generally, was forced to admit in the same paper, the day
after Yeltsin’s death, that, "by the time he resigned on New Year’s Eve
1999… the indiscipline, corruption and inertia at every level of
bureaucracy was probably greater than during Soviet [Stalinist] days,
when the party could act as a disciplining force".
By 1997, according to pro-market pioneer, Rose
Brady, "A bigger share of property was in private hands in Russia than
in Italy. But, as in Italy, in Russia large conglomerates held leading
places in industry, and they were made up of formerly state-owned
structures that had been privatised. Like Italy’s, Russia’s underground
operated freely alongside the real economy, and people thought nothing
of not paying the state’s exorbitantly high taxes. As in Italy, in
Russia the mafia controlled important sectors of the economy. And, as in
Italy, in Russia the state was so weak that people had largely lost
faith in the idea that government would help them". At this time "70% of
GDP was produced by the private sector. In Italy the figure was 50%!"
(Rose Brady, Kapitalizm)
Boris Berezovsky, now living in luxury exile in
London, boasted that just six private banks (his among them) controlled
over 50% of the economy and could dictate, as they did in relation to
Viktor Chernomyrdin, who the government should have as premier. Yeltsin
was continually promising that the bottom of the collapse had been
reached and things could only get better. But then came the Asian crisis
followed by the very special Russian debt crisis. In 1998 Yeltsin was
forced to revalue the rouble and default on its international loan
repayments in another Latin American-style catastrophe. The rouble lost
three-quarters of its value, slumping from six to the dollar to 20 in
just three weeks. This led to another round of mass non-payment of
wages.
The great depression
A FEW SHORT years of disruption and anarchy brought
about an economic collapse unprecedented in history. Vladimir Popov, in
the March-April edition of New Left Review, reiterates that, between
1989 and 1998, the Russian economy lost 45% of its output. This
represents an economic collapse on a greater scale than even that of the
Great Depression, which followed the stock market crash of 1929. "Output
fell faster than during Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of the
Soviet Union in 1941", one blogger pointed out after Yeltsin’s death. In
a number of newly formed countries like Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and
Armenia, the percentage collapse was even more devastating than in
Russia. The economies of some of these countries have simply not
recovered and remain far below their pre-1989 levels. Others have just
managed to get back up and beyond 110%.
Popov maintains that Russian GDP in 2006 was still
only 85% of the 1989 level. "Life expectancy and levels of education are
still inferior to those of the USSR", he says, "and even below those of
Cuba". One hospital in five still lacks hot water and sewerage
facilities. Only two countries had higher murder rates – South Africa
and Colombia.
Later Popov says that "investment is still 40% of
what it was in the last year of the Soviet Union’s existence… The share
of state spending in GDP remains at less than half that of the USSR".
Popov cites a poll in 2004 which showed 41% of people wanting Putin to
return the money that ordinary people had lost during the ‘reforms’.
Tony Wood, also writing in New Left Review, comments that the Putin
administration has not actively redistributed any of the vast oil wealth
to those dispossessed by the ‘reforms’ of the 1990s. He talks with
concern about ‘resource nationalism’ and ‘sovereign democracy’ – Russian
independence from western imperialism and a ‘different’ idea of how much
democracy is necessary.
Popov concludes his ‘findings’ with the assertion,
"democracy is (also) needed, but only later, when the rule of law has
been established". So Marxists are right to assert that, for
capitalists, democracy is dispensable. Yeltsin was justified in his
ruthlessness!
But Wood complains about the very form of state that
Putin has inherited and adapted since the days of Yeltsin. It "has
little or no autonomy from the economic interests of Russia’s elite".
Putin is "deliberately working to maintain the fragmentation of domains
and interests that has thus far blocked the emergence of a unified
capitalist class". Cliques and factions are the order of the day as
evidenced by the number of St Petersburgers in Putin’s retinue.
Gangster capitalism
CONFIRMING THE BRUTAL origin of Russia’s bandit
capitalism, a one time banker, Igor Yurgens, wrote in a special
supplement of the Financial Times on Russia (20 April): "Inside the
country, the population still questions the legitimacy of some
acquisitions of huge wealth, concentrated in some big groups… But, after
15 years… we have people who I think should be considered legitimate
owners. By this time they’ve paid enough in revenues, taxes and job
creation. Those who did not are either in jail, dead or bankrupt!"
Indeed, the gangster nature of Russia’s capitalism
is indicated in the notorious contract killings of bankers and
journalists, the poisoning of one-time agents, the helicopter crashes
involving opponents of Putin, and the mysterious illnesses some of them
develop along with the regular arrests of protesters against the regime:
all point to a Bonapartist regime still struggling to placate the
demands of all the classes but not stopping at brute force to get its
way.
It is a myth that Putin has cleaned up the act. His
cabinet is full of heads of industry and of state forces – the siloviki
or power men. According to Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, the
siloviki constituted a mere 4.8% of the Politburo in 1988. By 1993 they
were 33%, and ten years later they constituted a majority in the cabinet
with 58.3%.
These figures indicate a very large element of state
capitalism in the Russian economy – elements of state ownership and
control that benefit the big capitalists. Putin’s government is a
government not only for the oligarchs but of the oligarchs. His ‘purge’
of people like the oil oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been motivated
more by the latter daring to consider using his wealth and influence to
develop opposition to his dominance than any ‘moral’ considerations.
The renewed tensions with ‘western’ imperialist
powers are no new version of the cold war, which was a contest between
states representing different social systems – capitalist ownership and
state-ownership. Interviewed in the Financial Times on 19 April, a
likely contender for Putin’s job, Sergei Ivanov, rebuts criticisms of
Russia’s ‘energy imperialism’. "Raising gas prices to Ukraine and
Belarus, is due to an embrace of capitalism, not a throw-back to
Soviet-style imperialism" – or Stalinist struggle for supremacy – he
insists. "Oil and gas have a price. In the mid-1990s you taught us how
to be a market economy. We learnt our lesson!"
The Financial Times adopts the concept of ‘Kremlin
Inc’ which it defines as "the web of state-controlled corporations that
has been created under Mr Putin and chaired by ministers and senior
officials".
Revival of workers’ struggle
IN SPITE OF the vast wealth being amassed in
Russia’s state coffers from energy, Putin promises nothing for the
long-suffering people. Genuine democracy is a chimera, but the
strengthening of the economy can spur workers to take action to recoup
their vast losses. The recent growth in the size and effectiveness of
new unions in the car factories near to St Petersburg and elsewhere are
the most encouraging signs for the future.
A Moscow Times journalist reported in July 2006 from
Vsyevolozhsk, in the Leningrad region, that Aleksei Etmanov had returned
from a Ford workers’ international conference in Brazil, and conducted a
victorious strike that caused grave concern among the multinational
firms that have moved to Russia, attracted "by low labour costs and the
virtual absence of effective trade unions". "In one month he recruited
1,000 workers for his small union and half a year later they won a 17%
pay increase. Now he is setting up a national autoworkers’ union". This
involves workers at the giant Togliatti car plant near Samara where
members of Socialist Resistance (CWI, Russia) have been active
supporting the building of an independent workers’ organisation.
Such developments mark a new stage in the build up
of opposition to Putin’s regime, building on the spirit of defiance seen
in the mass protests and blockades of pensioners and students in January
2005 against the monetarisation (ie drastic cutting) of their benefits.
Looking back on the Yeltsin years, most thinking
workers will see that what Terry Fields warned of back in 1990 actually
happened. Capitalism did bring with it mass unemployment,
hyper-inflation and dictatorship.
The Putin government, partly thanks to oil and gas,
in which the state now has a huge stake, may be somewhat more stable
than that of Yeltsin. But Putin’s jumpiness over billionaire
Berezovsky’s call for ‘revolution’ is understandable. The oligarchs,
chess champions and nationalist bands turning out on protests today,
however persecuted and battered by the state forces, will not prove able
(if even willing) to transform society in the interests of working
people. The generation that has grown up since the Yeltsin years will
question and challenge Russia’s wild and untamed capitalism. New forces
reviving the ideas of genuine democratic socialism and communism will
arise and grow rapidly, in numbers and in fighting capacity, in the
white heat of future class battles.
Putin’s friends
PUTIN’S CABINET and unofficial Politburo include
the following officials who double as heads or senior executives of
state-controlled companies. Nearly all of them go back a long way with
Putin:
First deputy prime minister Dmitry Medvedev
is chairman of the board of Gazprom, the world’s second-largest
company by market capitalisation after ExxonMobil. He served in the St
Petersburg mayor’s office under Putin in the 1990s.
First deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov
is chairman of the board of the United Aircraft Corporation. Also from
St Petersburg, he was a student at the KGB academy in Putin’s class in
the 1970s.
Igor Sechin, deputy Kremlin chief of staff and
the unofficial leader of the Kremlin siloviki clan, is board chairman
of Rosneft, the main beneficiary of the dismemberment of Mikhail
Khordokovsky’s Yukos. Sechin served with Putin in the St Petersburg
mayor’s office.
Sergei Chemezov is head of the state arms
monopoly, RosOboronExport. He and Putin met when both were KGB
intelligence officers in Dresden, East Germany, where the two lived in
the same apartment block and their families socialised. The Wall
Street Journal quotes him as saying: "You know, we’re not really the
state, we’re businessmen", he says of Rosoboronexport. "Call it state
commerce". (Call it state capitalism of the first order! – CD)
Viktor Ivanov is chairman of the board of
Aeroflot. Another colleague of Putin’s in the St Petersburg mayor’s
office.
Nikolai Patrushev has succeeded Putin as the
director of the FSB, the successor of the KGB.
Sergei and Viktor Ivanov, Sechin, Chemezov
and Patrushev were named in a recent interview by
well-respected Kremlinologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya as Putin’s
unofficial siloviki politburo.
Vladimir Yakunin heads Russian Railways, a
state monopoly. A close friend and neighbour of Putin’s in a gated
dacha community near St Petersburg.
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