
Fukushima disaster
The ever-present nuclear threat
IT IS a tragic irony that the nuclear disaster at
Fukushima occurred within weeks of the 25th anniversary of the
catastrophe at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union, the world’s worst
nuclear accident.
When the scale 9.0 earthquake struck just off the
coast of the Japanese city of Sendai on 11 March, the seismic shock was
immediately registered by the sensors at the Fukushima One plant which
is situated on the coast, south of the epicentre of the quake. This had
the effect of shutting down the reactors as a precautionary measure.
Initially, nearly all of the dozens of pro-nuclear experts who were
asked to comment kept repeating that this showed that ‘everything was
under control’.
However, after the control rods had been lowered
into the reactor core to stop it functioning, it was vital that the
cooling system kept operating, because the fuel rods continue producing
significant amounts of heat due to the on-going nuclear reaction, for up
to a week after shut-down (see diagram). If this was not done, the heat
would boil off the water covering the reactor core, which could melt
down, penetrate the containment structure and release radiation to the
atmosphere. The quake had cut off the electric power supply to the
cooling system, but the diesel powered back-up cut in as planned, so
things still seemed to be under control.
The main problem arose when the earthquake was
followed by a tsunami, which easily overcame the coastal defences around
the plant and inundated the reactor buildings, putting the diesel
generators out of action. All that was left was a third line of defence
in the form of a room full of batteries. These lasted for only a few
hours. John Gittins, former safety director of the UK Atomic Energy
Authority, explained that the only option was to try to pump seawater
into the reactors to cool them. This was difficult because, as the
pressure in the core rose, it became ever more difficult to force the
seawater into the vessel. Also, the heat was so great by then that the
seawater was evaporating more quickly than it was being pumped in, and
"that heat makes xenon and krypton gas inside the fuel rods exert a
positive pressure, cracking some of the zirconium alloy fuel rod
capsules". (New Scientist)
Radioactive caesium and iodine fission products
could then get out from the rods and into the steam, which was vented
from the containment vessel to stop it exploding. This did not prevent
the outer buildings surrounding the containment structures blowing up
when the steam was vented, since highly explosive hydrogen was also
generated by the conditions.
Part-used nuclear fuel, such as existed at
Fukushima, contains several radioactive isotopes with different toxic
effects. Iodine 131, released here – and in far greater quantities at
Chernobyl – is absorbed by the thyroid gland and can cause cancer,
particularly in children. Caesium 137 was also released in Japan and
Chernobyl, but was not definitively linked to cancer at Chernobyl,
although this may have been due to poor health data.
Fukushima One has six reactors, three of which were
operational at the time. However, as it later emerged, just as much
trouble arose with the stored spent fuel that is housed in the same
buildings as the reactors. There was, it appears, a partial meltdown of
the nuclear fuel in reactors one and two. In reactor two, there was also
damage to the containment vessel which is meant to be virtually
indestructible. This may have been responsible for the very high spikes
of radiation that occurred early in the emergency. The buildings housing
the reactors one and three were destroyed by hydrogen explosions, as
steam was vented into these areas from the containment vessels.
The situation in the reactor four building was very
serious, with a possible hydrogen explosion in the area storing spent
fuel rods, leading to a fire. The spent fuel does not have a containment
structure around it, so radiation from the ponds holding this fuel could
be released directly into the atmosphere. There was a danger that, as
these rods heated up they could go ‘critical’, starting a nuclear chain
reaction, although a nuclear explosion was not possible. This scenario
arose when it was revealed that the entire core of reactor four had been
put into the storage ponds, creating a potentially critical mass. At the
time of writing, there are reports that radioactive iodine has been
found in food in the area around the plant and the government is
considering banning food originating in the Fukashima prefecture.
There is still not enough information to draw out
all the lessons of this disaster, partly because there was a scandalous
lack of data made available by the private operator, the Tokyo Electric
Power Company. In the late 1980s and 1990s, this organisation had been
found to have systematically falsified records of safety problems at its
nuclear reactors. It also admitted that it was unaware that its
Kashiwazaki Kariwa facility was built directly above an active fault
line where four tectonic plates converged. When an earthquake hit that
nuclear plant in 2007, it was put out of action for two years.
Despite the continuing lack of information it is
possible to reach some conclusions. Firstly, there are clear
similarities with the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986, since design
flaws played key roles in both disasters (see box). At Fukushima, the
chief flaw was that the multiple backup safety systems should not have
had causes of failure in common. The earthquake toppled the power lines
that cut off electricity to the cooling system, and the resulting
tsunami put the diesel backup power out of action. In other words, the
failure of both systems had a common cause. Backup independence may have
been achieved with higher walls protecting from a tsunami, or simply
putting the backup power generators on high ground.
There were multiple design flaws in the Chernobyl
reactor, the most serious being that the reactor core did not have a
containment vessel around it at all. A similar situation was found at
Fukushima. Here, the spent fuel storage area, where a fire started and
radiation was emitted, also did not have any containment around it.
However, at Chernobyl, the reactor itself had also been unprotected. So
it is probably unlikely that similar amounts of radioactivity will be
released in the Japanese plant, although the full facts are still not
clear.
The key point is that it is very difficult to
predict every possible situation that, in extremely rare circumstances,
could lead to failure. But when these circumstances arise, as they have
been seen to do, a catastrophe is possible. This is one of the
fundamental problems with nuclear power. Japan is one of the most
technologically advanced countries on earth. Theoretically, therefore,
it should have been able to design out failure. The situation in some
other countries using nuclear power will be even more dangerous. For
instance, China is planning a crash programme of building new nuclear
reactors, far outstripping all other nations. Despite strict
environmental regulations on paper, laws are commonly flouted at local
level in the wild-west capitalist atmosphere that exists there.
The safety of the plants is also only one aspect of
the threat that nuclear power poses. No safe method has been devised for
storing the spent nuclear fuel, which remains radioactive for more than
100,000 years.
So how are states around the world likely to react
to this latest disaster? The strategy of the Con-Dem government, like
the former New Labour administration and those in many other countries,
is to expand nuclear energy. This is because it does not produce
greenhouse gases and can therefore help in reaching targets on cutting
global warming emissions. In the aftermath of the disaster in Japan,
many governments have announced that they are reviewing the expansion of
nuclear power. In most cases, this will probably be temporary, since
they will not be willing to contemplate the relatively small, but
greater expenditure on renewable energy compared to nuclear.
A movement needs to be built to challenge the
nuclear policy of the bourgeois, yet again exposed as being reckless by
this incident. But it will take a change in society to remove the threat
permanently since, ultimately, the quest for profit comes first under
capitalism, not human needs and safety.
Pete Dickenson
1986: Countdown to disaster at Chernobyl
25 April 1986
1am: Reactor four at the Chernobyl
nuclear plant running at full power with normal operation. Slowly
the operators begin to reduce power for a test. The purpose of the
test is to observe the dynamics of the RMBK type reactor used at the
plant with limited power flow, in order to permit repairs to be
conducted in the future while it is operational.
2pm: Under the normal procedures of the
test the reactor would have been reduced to 30% maximum power. The
Soviet electricity authorities, however, refuse to allow this
because of an apparent need for electricity elsewhere, so the
reactor remains at 50% power for another nine hours.
26 April
12.28am: Chernobyl staff receive
permission to resume the reactor power reduction. Instead of setting
power at 30%, one of the operators sets a computer incorrectly which
results in the power level eventually falling to 7% – too low for
the test and potentially dangerous.
1-1.20am: In order to keep the reactor
from automatically shutting down under these conditions, the
emergency core cooling system and several of the automatic shutdown
circuits are disconnected.
1.22am: The turbine is disabled to
initiate the test despite the dangerously low power levels. This
causes four of the eight recirculation pumps to switch off. This
would have shut down the reactor if the automatic circuit to do this
had not been disconnected.
1.23am: Reduced coolant flow linked to
the turbine closure causes a rapid increase in boiling water because
of the heat, producing huge quantities of steam. The operator,
recognising an emergency, lowers all the control rods into the
reactor core to shut it down but, due to a design problem and the
abnormal operating conditions, instead causes power to surge to 100
times normal levels in four seconds. Because of the intense heat,
the core begins to break down and the steam tubes burst, causing a
huge explosion. Steam pressure blows the 1,000-ton steel and cement
filled shield off the top of the reactor, destroying the roof of the
reactor building and exposing the hot core to the atmosphere.
When the highly radioactive graphite control
rods catch fire, a huge cloud is released which spreads across
Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and much of Europe. Tonnes of radioactive
strontium, caesium, iodine, and plutonium are blown across the
globe, affecting millions of people.
27 April to 4 May
Most of the radiation is released in the first
ten days. At first, south and south-east winds predominate. The
first radioactive cloud goes high into the atmosphere and blows
north-west away from Ukraine toward Sweden. Kiev is lucky in that
the wind carries the radioactive cloud away rather than directly to
the Ukrainian capital and its population of three million.
6 May
The first extensive report on the situation
appears in Pravda, the official Russian Communist Party paper.
Schools in nearby Gomel and Kiev are closed, all the children sent
elsewhere. This brings the total number of people evacuated to half
a million – 140,000 never return.
14 May
Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev speaks for
the first time publicly about the accident on Vremya, a Russian TV
news programme. He insists there was no cover-up: "The moment we
received reliable data we gave it to the Soviet people and sent it
abroad".
15/16 May
New fires break out and more radiation is
released.
1986 to 2000
New Scientist magazine estimates that 100,000
could eventually die due to cancers linked to radiation, although
much lower figures were later put forward. However, it will never be
possible to know exactly how many died, because the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the chaos that followed have made accurate
assessments impossible. The Chernobyl nuclear power plant continued
to be used until 2000.
|