Aid was not channelled into the
development of the country, but into foreign wars, particularly with
Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, which has a large ethnic Somali
population. It was in the aftermath of a failed assault on this region
that Barre began to play off different clans.
Somalia is split between six major
clans: the Hawiye, Darood, Isaaq, Dir, Rahanweyn and Digil. They contain
sub-clans, and other ties exist between them, too. The clans are lineal,
but are also partially geographically based, with different regions
forming the homeland of each major and minor clan. Murphy writes: "The
clan tends to be the institution that people turn to in times of
violence and danger… [they] are entities that are only mobilised as
actual groups in situations of conflict".
Each clan and sub-clan has shifting
allegiances on a national and local basis as events take place, decided
by councils of elders which involve every adult male present. As a
result, in the words of a researcher, "one does not have a permanent
enemy or permanent friend – only a permanent context".
The inter-clan conflicts led Barre’s
national army to collapse into its component clan parts. Barre fled
office in January 1991, creating a vacuum that warlords have tried to
fill ever since, with the interference of outside powers, especially
Ethiopia and the US. Different warlords have controlled the country’s
capital, Mogadishu, over the past 20 years, forming various transitional
governments that have not lasted long. This was cut across, temporarily,
by the hold of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from 2006-08.
A reflection of the tensions has
been the breakup of Somalia, not only with the reconstitution of
Somaliland (roughly the area of pre-1960 British Somaliland), but also
the breakup of the old Italian Somaliland. The northern region of that,
around the Horn of Africa, has become a semi-independent area called
Puntland after rebels freed it from central control in the 1990s.
This social and economic collapse is
closely associated with the rise of piracy. Although pirates operate
from most of Somalia’s ports, the majority are based in Puntland with
its ease of access to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Murphy
quotes a local official: "Piracy-related business has become the most
profitable economic activity in our area and as locals we depend upon
their output… The district gets a percentage of every ransom from ships
that have been released, and that goes on public infrastructure,
including our hospital and public schools".
It is a commercial business, with
profits invested into new technology and equipment to launch bigger and
more daring operations. In December 2009, it was reported that a stock
exchange had been established in Haradheere to allow people to invest in
piracy.
Murphy makes it clear it is unlikely
to be stopped by the ships sent by the world powers, costing over $1
billion a year to maintain, or other means of outside intervention:
"Piracy has never been defeated unless its sponsors on land have been
arrested, defeated, bribed or agreed a political settlement based on a
combination of these elements". By not questioning the role of
imperialism in the region, however, Murphy is left merely proposing to
refine the naval patrols and other failed methods in the hope that keeps
a lid on piracy.
In such a short review it is
impossible to capture the detail that Murphy elaborates about the
contradictions within Somalia. The book is meticulously referenced, with
a useful map and guide to abbreviations to help readers find their way
through it. The layout into oddly-sized chapters, whose chronology jumps
backwards and forwards, can make it difficult to follow at times.
Nonetheless, for anyone attempting to grapple with the chaotic nature of
Somalia today, The New Barbary? is a valuable source of information.