Venezuela: the revolution in danger
Hugo Chávez’s defeat in December’s referendum
marks a key point in Venezuela’s revolution. The high abstention rate
indicates a growing frustration at the slow pace of change. Meanwhile,
the right-wing opposition has been emboldened by its victory. TONY
SAUNOIS looks at the warning signs and assesses the current situation.
ON 2 DECEMBER 2007, Hugo Chávez, president of
Venezuela, unfortunately suffered his first electoral defeat since
winning power in 1998. The 69 proposed amendments to the 1999
constitution included giving greater power to the president, allowing
Chávez to stand for more than two terms, establishing ‘popular power’,
declaring Venezuela a ‘socialist Bolivarian’ state, and reducing the
working week from 44 to 36 hours. These amendments were rejected by
50.7% to 49.2% of those who voted, with a high abstention rate (44%).
The rejection of these proposals poses important
questions about the future of the revolution and the dangers now facing
the working class and masses. It highlights the need for all socialists,
in Venezuela and internationally, to analysis the current conjuncture of
the struggle against capitalism and landlordism, and the tasks facing
activists in the movement.
The referendum defeat represented a setback for the
working class and has helped to strengthen the right-wing,
pro-capitalist opposition. The Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI)
and its supporters in Venezuela supported a ‘yes’ vote. This was in
spite of the important limitations of the proposals, some of which were
designed to increase the central powers of the presidency and allowed
the right-wing to portray them as ‘dictatorial’. Despite these
weaknesses it would have been a mistake to support an abstention or
boycott as some did on the left, like trade union leader Orlando Chirino.
A victory for the ‘no’ vote has left those who urged a boycott more
isolated from the activists, making it more difficult to raise
criticisms of the deficiencies of the leadership.
It is a serious, although not yet decisive, defeat.
But it is urgent that the lessons are learnt if a more serious defeat is
to be avoided, and the revolutionary process taken forward.
As the CWI commented at the time, the coming to
power of Hugo Chávez represented the beginnings of an important change
in the international situation. Chávez’s election was a decisive
rejection of the neo-liberal policies which had dominated the 1990s
following the collapse of the bureaucratic dictatorships and planned
economies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His government
was not prepared to tamely bend the knee to the demands of imperialism
and introduce neo-liberal policies.
Initially, Chávez did not speak of socialism but
limited himself to the idea of a ‘Bolivarian revolution’. His populist,
nationalist regime and the radical reforms he introduced rapidly came
into conflict with US imperialism and the ruling oligarchy which had
ruled Venezuela for decades. They organised a series of attempts to
overthrow his regime. Each of these – an attempted coup in 2002, a
bosses’ lock-out in 2002/3, an attempted recall referendum in 2004 – was
defeated by a spontaneous movement of the masses rallying to defend
Chávez.
These conflicts between the masses and the ruling
class provoked political radicalisation at each turn. This was reflected
in Chávez eventually declaring that the ‘revolution’ was not only
‘Bolivarian’ but ‘socialist’. He proclaimed that Venezuela was embarking
on a road to construct ‘socialism in the 21st century’. Following his
election victory in December 2006, he went further and announced his
support for Leon Trotsky’s Transitional Programme, and Permanent
Revolution.
Against the background of the global ideological
offensive against socialism conducted by the ruling class and its
representatives in the former mass parties of the working class, these
developments represented and still represent important steps forward.
They were enthusiastically welcomed by a new generation of workers and
young people who looked towards Venezuela and Cuba – more recently,
Bolivia, following the election of Evo Morales, and now Ecuador – as a
radical left counterweight to Bush, Blair and neo-liberal capitalism.
While in other countries the application of
neo-liberal policies resulted in cutbacks and attacks on the working
class, the Chávez government introduced a series of popular reforms,
which we supported, as explained in many previous articles and pamphlets
(CWI website: www.socialistworld.net). They have been financed by the
high price in oil on the world market and economic growth, which has
particularly benefited the middle class.
Poverty & alienation
NONETHELESS, MASSIVE SOCIAL problems continue, with
high levels of poverty remaining. Frustration at the failure to resolve
these problems, coupled with anger about growing corruption, bureaucracy
and top-down administrative methods paved the way for the referendum
defeat. Unemployment officially stands at nearly 10%. Food shortages,
inflation over 20% and a massive housing crisis cannot be resolved while
the capitalist system continues. The shortage of 2.7 million houses,
with a further 1.3 million dwellings little more than self-built shacks,
illustrates how desperate the situation remains for millions.
The poverty and alienation from society are
reflected in high levels of crime, especially murder, which affects the
main cities. In 2000, the murder rate in Venezuela was 33.2 per 100,000,
compared with 1.1 in Japan and 5.51 in the USA. Since then the situation
has only worsened and the capital, Caracas, is now more violent than
Rio.
During November 2007, eleven murders per day were
reported in Caracas. An estimated 1,000 people were kidnapped and
ransomed during 2006. Violent crime is now a major issue as the
government is seen as having failed to deal with it. Some may argue that
it is unfair to blame Chávez for high levels of crime. Crime will exist
in societies which are blighted by poverty and social deprivation.
Ultimately, it can only be resolved on the basis of ending capitalism
and the social conditions it creates.
However, this is a crucial question and it is
necessary for the workers’ movement to take it up in a practical way.
The police, as part of the capitalist state machine, are riddled with
corruption and it is necessary to fight for democratic control of them
by the community. At the same time, this needs to be linked in Venezuela
to the local communities organising to defend themselves from violent
criminal attacks and gangs. One of biggest weaknesses of the movement is
the absence of a conscious, organised, independent movement of the
working class and poor. If this existed, the building of democratically
elected councils in the local communities could be linked to forming
neighbourhood defence committees. These could have taken measures to
drive out mafia-type criminal gangs and offered an alternative to the
youth who are drawn into them.
Break with capitalism
THE SOCIAL AND economic problems which continue to
blight Venezuelan society arise from the continuation of capitalism.
Chávez’s speeches and propaganda supporting ‘socialism in the 21st
century’ are not the same as a programme to achieve it.
The high levels of poverty, together with a growth
in corruption and bureaucracy in the government and leaderships of the
trade unions and community and social organisations, have exacerbated
the frustration, anger and disappointment amongst growing layers of
workers and the poor, especially in urban areas. This and the failure of
the revolution to advance have given rise to a certain impasse in the
situation. Possibly, the disappointment is less in the rural areas which
have benefited most from many of the reforms, but it is widely felt in
the cities.
This has arisen from the failure to decisively break
with capitalism and establish a workers’ and peasants’ government based
on a democratically planned, socialist economy. Many clearly felt they
could show their frustration by not voting as there was not the
immediate threat of counter-revolution. If this impasse is not broken,
however, counter-revolutionary forces will grow and eventually threaten
the defeat of Chávez.
Additional dangers now face Chávez and his regime.
While the reform programme has been financed largely through the rising
price of oil, this can change with the onset of a crisis in the world
economy. This can trigger a fall in oil revenue and result in the
rolling back of the reforms.
Between 1974-79, the left-of-centre nationalist,
populist regime of Carlos Andrés Perez introduced some significant
social reforms which were paid for by rising oil prices. By 1979, oil
had reached $80 per barrel. Yet these reforms were wiped out in the
1980s as a major economic crisis hit Venezuela following a crash in oil
prices to $38 per barrel. Those living below the poverty line rocketed
from 17% in 1980 to 65% in 1996. This is a warning to Chávez and the
working class if capitalism is not replaced by a democratically planned,
socialist economy.
Unfortunately, some on the socialist left have
regarded such warnings as ‘hair splitting’ and ‘sectarian’. Only now,
when faced with the reverse in the referendum, have they belatedly woken
up to the dangers and begun to echo the warnings. This is reflected by
the International Marxist Tendency (IMT) which has sought to try and act
as benevolent advisers to Hugo Chávez. Following the referendum defeat
it criticised a dangerous "illusion in the leadership and the masses
themselves that the revolution was some kind of triumphal march that
would sweep aside all obstacles". (Alan Woods, The Venezuelan Revolution
at the Crossroads, 11 January)
However, the Venezuelan group of the IMT seems to
have fallen victim to exactly this danger, underestimating the dangers
facing the movement and the prospect for the counter-revolution to
strike back and score some successes. Two days prior to the referendum
an article on the IMT webpage predicted: "And we do not doubt that the
majority’s decision will be in favour of a YES… The victory of the YES
on December 2nd is the first step on this road".
Referendum warning
THE CONSEQUENCES OF the failure to defeat capitalism
are beginning to erode the enthusiasm for Chávez and his regime.
Significantly, 44% abstained in the referendum and the ‘yes’ vote was
three million fewer than the number of votes cast for Chávez at the
presidential elections in December 2006. The number voting ‘yes’ was one
million less than the claimed membership of the recently launched
Partido Unificado Socialista de Venezuela (PSUV).
Moreover, the ‘no’ vote triumphed in the nine most
populated of the 23 states and in 13 of the largest cities, including
Caracas. The ‘yes’ vote won in 14 states which are the most rural and
less populated. In the capital, previous bastions of ‘Chavismo’, like
Petare, Caricuao and Catia registered a substantial ‘no’ vote and a high
level of abstention. Overall, the right-wing won 300,000 more votes than
it did at the last presidential election.
The warning signs could be seen in the presidential
elections in December 2006. Despite the fact that Chávez won a clear
majority, the right-wing, pro-capitalist opposition began to reunify
itself around Manuel Rosales and emerged strengthened. The election
campaign was marked by bigger right-wing rallies and a lower level of
participation from Chávez supporters. The masses eventually rallied
behind Chávez when the threat of a defeat appeared as a serious outcome.
The low level of activity and enthusiasm in the
election campaign reflected a growing sense of frustration and anger at
the failure to take the revolution forward. Despite the immensely
popular reforms that have been introduced in health, education and food
subsidies, the continuation of capitalism has resulted in high levels of
unemployment, food shortages, rising inflation, a massive housing crisis
and growing bureaucracy and corruption. In addition to these social
problems, the explosion in crime, especially violent crime, have begun
to lead to frustration, and even disillusionment amongst some sections
of Chávez supporters.
These issues have also allowed the right-wing
opposition to rally sections of the middle class behind its banner. The
threat of a right-wing victory in the presidential elections provoked a
turnout in support of Chávez. Yet the same direct threat was not seen by
the masses in the referendum to change the constitution. Although Chávez
still has some room to manoeuvre and would probably win an election were
it held today, this defeat is a serious warning of the processes that
are taking place.
Right-wing resurgence
THE EFFECTS OF the social and economic problems were
re-enforced by some mistakes by Chávez which have played into the hands
of the opposition, which plays on people’s fears, especially sections of
the middle class. They have accused Chávez of introducing a ‘creeping
dictatorship’. The CWI warned that the decision to revoke the licence of
RCTV (a right-wing, pro-opposition television station) would allow the
opposition to regroup and reorganise itself. We wrote: "Unfortunately,
the revoking of the license of RCTV, because of its timing and the way
it has been done, is a tactical mistake by the Chávez government that
has played into the hands of the opposition". (RCTV and the Question of
the Media, 20 July 2007) This issue became a central point around which
the right-wing was able to rejuvenate and mobilise its forces. Large
protests were called with the support of previously passive middle-class
students.
These concerns were further re-enforced by some of
the proposed amendments to the 1999 constitution, which attempted to
strengthen the powers of the presidency without a democratic
counterweight, and included strong bonapartist elements. The limit on
the number of times a candidate could be elected was to be removed and
the presidential term extended from six to seven years – as in France
during Charles de Gaulle’s fifth republic. A democratic workers’ state
is not the same as a bonapartist regime. In a genuine workers’ democracy
the question of who is formally president and for how long would be
immaterial. However, Venezuela is not a workers’ democracy and this
issue was perceived by a layer of society as an attack on democratic
rights and was seized upon by the opposition.
The president, not the national assembly, was also
to have the power to appoint all military officers. The president was to
get the right to designate new political/geographical areas, such as
federal municipalities, and nominate the respective authorities to run
them. There was no definition of the power or functions of these
authorities and territorial districts. Other proposals included the
removal of the ‘right to information’ in the event of a declaration of a
state of emergency by the president. Socialists defend the right of the
Chávez government to take any measures necessary to defend itself from
another attempt by reaction to take power, through another coup, for
example. Yet this is not a matter for the constitution. By making it one
it gave the opposition another club to beat the government with. While
the opposition whipped up its middle-class supporters, sections of
Chávez’s traditional supporters were confused by the campaign.
This was re-enforced by a rising anger against the
growing bureaucracy and its top-down approach, and the absence of a
genuine system of workers’ democracy and active, conscious participation
in the struggle by the masses. While Chávez supporters in general were
not prepared to go over and support the ‘no’ vote, they stayed away from
the polls. According to reports from CWI members in Venezuela, many now
regret this decision.
One of the tasks facing Marxists and the working
class in any revolution is to try and win the support of the middle
layers of society – students, professional people, small shopkeepers,
etc – who are also exploited by capitalism politically and economically.
The socialist revolutionary movement needs to try and convince them who
their real enemies are and that they have nothing to fear from
socialism. On the contrary, a socialist society can offer a solution to
their problems and embrace their talents and skills. Unfortunately, the
attitude adopted by Chávez has given a weapon to the right-wing to try
and whip up support amongst these layers.
Marxists do not simply lump the middle class and all
those who voted ‘no’ together as one reactionary mass. This wrong
approach was echoed by the IMT immediately following the referendum.
Woods simply denounced "…the small shopkeepers, the student ‘spoilt
brats of the rich’, the government clerks, resentful at the advances of
the ‘rabble’, the pensioners nostalgic for the ‘good old days’ of the
Fourth Republic… all these elements appear as a formidable force in
electoral terms, but in the class struggle their weight is practically
zero". (The Referendum Defeat – What Does it Mean? 3 December 2007)
The setback has left the opposition rejuvenated and
points to the developing threat from the counter-revolution. At the same
time, it has not yet resulted in a decisive defeat for the movement.
Should the right-wing overreach itself, it could provoke a reaction from
the masses and push the movement further to the left. There remains some
time for the necessary lessons to be drawn that will allow capitalism to
be overthrown and conclusively defeated.
But there is renewed urgency, a race against time,
as the counter-revolution will try and capitalise on the current
impasse. A rapid change in the economic situation and fall in the price
of oil could accelerate these developments and give the opportunity for
the right-wing to strengthen its forces and prepare the ground for a
more decisive defeat for Chávez and the masses.
It is urgent that a balance sheet of the experience
of the workers, youth and masses is drawn up from the different stages
of the struggle since Chávez came to power. To this, crucial lessons
from the arsenal of the working class internationally need to be added
to assist the workers and youth draw all of the conclusions necessary to
ensure that the counter-revolution is conclusively defeated and a
democratic socialist transformation of society is carried through.
Economic power
WHILE PROCLAIMING HIS support for building
‘socialism in the 21st century’, in practice, Chávez has tried to
construct a ‘parallel’ economy and state, alongside the existing
monopolies and state machine. Although Chávez has increased state
intervention in the economy, he has not nationalised the major banks or
monopolies which remain in private hands. He has so far limited
nationalisation to the steel company, Venepal, and the
telecommunications and electricity companies, CANTV and EDC.
Despite the hysterical attacks on Chávez by US
imperialism, as a consequence of economic growth in the private sector
(which has outstripped the public sector), the private sector now
accounts for a bigger share of the economy than it did before Chávez
came to power. (Pro-Chávez report by the Washington-based Center for
Economic and Policy Research, The Venezuelan Economy in the Chávez
Years, July 2007)
Despite verbal threats by Chávez to nationalise the
banks, he has not done this. Based on a credit boom which has benefited
the middle class, Venezuelan banks have become the envy of the
capitalist banking world. Profits in the banking sector were up 33% in
2006. Returns on equity reached 33% above the international norm.
The state-run supermarkets, Mercal, while selling
cheap food to the poor, are in competition with the major food chains
and supermarkets. While under certain conditions – ‘dual power’ for
example – elements of a ‘parallel’ economy may be able to edge forward
and make some progress, such a situation cannot last indefinitely.
For Marxists, a situation of dual power can arise
where the ruling class is no longer in control of the economy or state
because it is being challenged by a revolutionary movement of the
working class. While challenging the ruling class to the extent that it
is no longer able to govern or rule society, however, the working class
has not yet taken power into its hands and defeated the capitalist
ruling class. This situation will either result in the working class
taking over the running of society or the ruling class reasserting
control.
The capitalists will fight to the bitter end to try
and prevent the state sector gradually assuming more and more power
until it ‘overtakes’ the economic and state levers of power. Where
necessary they will resort to brutal military dictatorships to prevent
such a development taking place. Yet encroaching gradually into the
capitalist economy is exactly what Chávez has been attempting to do. At
the same time, he has left economic power in the hands of the
capitalists who have used it to manufacture shortages of coffee, rice,
beans and other basic foodstuffs as a means of striking back at
state-controlled prices.
These shortages were an important factor in the
opposition’s referendum campaign. In an opinion poll in November 2007,
75% of Venezuelans thought the food shortages were being created by the
employers to sabotage the government. In a poll taken in the week
running up to the referendum, however, a majority blamed the
inefficiency and corruption of the government.
It is not possible to skin a tiger by removing one
claw at a time from its paws. So it is not possible to take control of
the capitalist economy by gradually encroaching on one monopoly after
another. In fact, Chávez has not even done this. The Venezuelan economy
is highly monopolised. Five big oligarchic families – Cisnero, Mendoza,
Caprile, Boulton and Phelps – together with the banks control the
decisive sectors of the economy apart from oil. None of these
conglomerates have been touched by Chávez.
The failure to nationalise these monopolies has left
the ruling class in control of the economy. As a result, during the
recent economic boom, which has increased state expenditure on some
public works programmes, massive profits have been made. At the same
time, they have had a free hand to organise economic sabotage as a means
of undermining the government.
Slowdown signals
THESE FACTORS WERE all reflected in the referendum.
Yet, rather than grasp that this defeat reflected frustration,
disappointment and a certain impasse in the situation, it is the masses
who are blamed for their ‘lack of understanding’. On his weekly TV
phone-in, Alo Presidente, on 6 January, Chávez said he recognised that
the popular sectors and the state apparatus were not "prepared for what
would be involved in a constitutional reform that deepened socialism".
More threateningly, he declared that they (the people of Caracas and
other cities) "…have a debt with me. I have it noted down in my agenda.
We will see if they will pay it to me or not". (Spanish daily paper,
ABC, 9 December 2007)
This method of dealing with setbacks and defeats is
an echo of what the leaders of the communist parties and socialist
reformists have argued historically during revolutionary movements, like
Chile 1970-73 or the Spanish civil war in the 1930s. They justified not
moving to decisively defeat capitalism by claiming that the masses were
‘not ready’, and that it would provoke reaction.
Having initially blamed the lack of understanding of
the masses for the defeat, Chávez concluded that he has no choice but to
‘slow down the speed of march’: "The vanguard cannot separate itself
from the masses. It must be with the masses! I will be with you and for
that reason I must reduce my speed". (6 January)
Marxists do not adopt a sectarian approach towards
the masses and ignore the existing level of political understanding and
awareness that exists. That would result in advancing political slogans
and initiatives that are not understood and would cut genuine
revolutionaries off from the masses. Marxists engage in a political
dialogue, the exchange of ideas and experiences, and advocate slogans
and demands which help the masses move forward in the struggle,
assisting them to draw the necessary conclusions about the programme,
tasks and methods needed to achieve socialism.
This is not the same as using this issue as a reason
to ‘slow down the march’ of the revolution. The ‘slowdown’ included a
cabinet reshuffle in January. It was largely a question of reallocating
ministerial portfolios among existing ministers. Significantly, however,
the former vice president, Jorge Rodriguez, was removed and replaced
with the former housing minister, Ramón Carrizales. Rodriguez’s
appointment one year earlier had been heralded as a swing to the left
which ushered in the ‘drive towards socialism’.
The slowing of the pace of reform seems likely to
begin with an easing of price controls which the government had
previously introduced. By loosening them the government hopes to pacify
the food producers and distributors who had retaliated by creating
shortages and bottlenecks in distribution. These were acts of sabotage
which the government failed to face up to by nationalising the food
monopolies.
Behind this ‘slowdown’, Chávez is attempting to
establish a ‘national consensus’ and placate the capitalists. In the Alo
Presidente broadcast, Chávez argued: "Improvements are needed in our
alliance strategy. We can’t let ourselves be derailed by extremist
tendencies. We are not extremists nor can we be. No! We have to pursue
alliances with the middle classes, including the national bourgeoisie.
We can’t support theses that have failed in the whole world, as the
elimination of private property. That is not our theses".
In other words, when faced with defeat in the
referendum, Chávez concludes that an agreement needs to be reached with
the ruling class. Socialists do not advocate the elimination of all
private property, such as nationalising every small business or taking
away people’s houses. However, it is necessary to nationalise the major
monopolies and banks which control the economy, and introduce democratic
workers’ control and management if socialist planning of the economy is
to take place. Chávez also declared an amnesty for some of those
involved in organising the coup in 2002, to "send a message to the
country that we can live together despite our differences".
No third way
CHÁVEZ IS RETURNING to the position he put forward
before he endorsed the idea of socialism, that of a ‘third way’. This
was based on the mistaken view that it is possible, by working with
‘progressive’ sections of the national capitalist class, to end poverty
and corruption, and develop a more ‘humane capitalism’. This echoes the
‘stages theory’ supported by Stalinists and some reformist socialists in
the past. They argued that, before it was possible to overthrow
capitalism, it was necessary to develop industry and the economy in the
semi-colonial countries in conjunction with ‘progressive capitalists’,
postponing the question of socialism to the distant future.
Such ideas led to the defeat of the working class in
the Spanish civil war and Chile in 1973 and have never resulted in its
victory. In the modern era, the ruling class of the semi-colonial
countries is linked to imperialism and is unable to develop society.
This task falls to the working class, with the support of other classes
exploited by capitalism, and is part of the socialist transformation of
society.
This is not the first time Chávez has attempted to
appease the ruling class. It is a repetition of what he argued following
the collapse of the right-wing coup in 2002. He urged people to return
home, appealing for national unity and the building of a national
consensus.
Even the IMT has been compelled to recognise this is
a wrong policy: "‘Helped’ by his reformist advisers the president has
drawn some incorrect conclusions from the referendum". (Woods, The
Venezuelan Revolution at the Crossroads, 11 January) Surely Chávez has
some responsibility in this as well.
Woods argued earlier that "Chavez has grasped the
fact that the revolution needs to make this qualitative leap".
(Encounter with Hugo Chávez, April 2004) Again, in The Nationalisation
of Venepal: What Does it Signify? Woods assured his readers that
"President Hugo Chávez has consistently revealed an unerring
revolutionary instinct". (21 January 2005) Yet neither of these
characteristics has been shown in the ‘incorrect conclusions’ drawn by
Chávez.
Chávez, addressing the opening congress of the newly
formed PSUV, was compelled to recognise that the government remains
blighted by ‘inefficiency, bureaucracy and corruption’. He also laid
stress on the need to solve the "persistent problems such as crime, food
shortages and inflation". "Why has milk disappeared? Why does insecurity
continue to be such a problem… Why have we not been able to restrain
corruption, let alone defeat it?"
These are very important questions. Unfortunately,
Chávez’s answer was that 2008 would be the year of the ‘three Rs’:
‘revision, rectification and re-launching’. Yet the problems he
identified cannot be solved by ‘slowing the revolution’.
Developing class consciousness
A FEW DAYS later, Chávez appeared to swerve back to
the left. In Alo Presidente on 20 January, addressing the food
shortages, he threatened the nationalisation of the land and banks. This
is not the first time he has threatened the banks and other sectors with
nationalisation, and it is not at all certain that it will be carried
out. It is not an accident that this threat was made during the PSUV
congress and will be used to try and undercut criticism by some
activists of his swing to the right. At the same time, it illustrates
how his regime can still swing back to the left and adopt more radical,
left measures including nationalisation.
Bureaucracy and corruption are crucial problems
facing the movement in Venezuela. Yet, without a genuine system of
workers’ control and democracy, a real struggle against them is not
possible. This reflects one of the main weaknesses in the movement.
Carrying through the socialist revolution requires the conscious,
independent organisation of the working class, supported by the youth,
urban poor, radicalised sections of the middle class and others
exploited by capitalism. Because of its collective class consciousness,
which develops because of its role in production, the working class
needs to play this decisive leading role.
This has not been reflected in a fully conscious or
organised way yet in Venezuela. Without this conscious check from below,
the development of bureaucratic methods will inevitably emerge in any
revolutionary or workers’ movement. From the beginning, Chávez and the
leaders of the movement have adopted a top-down approach. The regime has
been content for the masses to support them – and move into struggle
when the threat of counter-revolution was sharply posed – but the masses
have not been consciously in the leadership of the movement.
The establishment of the PSUV can offer an important
opportunity to build a new mass party of the working class which, with a
revolutionary socialist programme, can become an important weapon to
take the revolution forward. At the time of writing its first congress
is taking place, attended by 1,600 delegates (and scheduled to last up
to two months!) The PSUV claims over five million have registered to
join, although it remains unclear if these are people mainly joining to
build a socialist party or people registered by local organisers from
the electoral register.
If the PSUV is to become an instrument for a
successful revolution it will need a fully active rank and file, and not
only be an amalgam of the membership of the existing pro-Chávez parties.
The right to form tendencies and allow democratic debate will be
essential if the party is to develop into an effective weapon for the
working class rather than become a tool for the government.
Unfortunately, the PSUV was launched from the top
down with Chávez appointing a committee involving two former generals to
set it up. In January, Jorge Rodriquez was charged with the ‘general
co-ordination of the PSUV’. The CWI supports fighting for a fully
democratic PSUV with a revolutionary socialist programme.
The democratisation of the trade unions and the
building of democratically elected committees in the workplaces to
establish a system of genuine workers’ control are among the most urgent
tasks. Similar committees need to be established in the communities and
in the army rank and file. Linked on a district, citywide, state and
national level, they could form the basis for a workers’ and peasants’
government. Through the nationalisation of the five family conglomerates
and banks, a democratic, socialist plan of production of the economy can
be drawn up.
This would open up the possibility of forging links
with the mass movement in Bolivia and, together with the establishment
of genuine workers’ democracy in Cuba, could allow the development of a
democratic socialist federation of these countries. This, in turn, could
be a springboard to develop the socialist revolution throughout Latin
America. Such a path is the surest way of defeating the threat of
reaction which, as the referendum defeat illustrates, is growing if
capitalism continues to exist.
|