Quantitative easing
Plan B – will it work?
In a desperate move to boost US growth, the
Federal Reserve has launched QE2, a second round of quantitative easing.
Its main effect will be to devalue the dollar, an attempt to boost its
exports at the expense of its rivals, particularly China. This
unilateral action by US imperialism can only intensify the currency wars
and trade conflicts. LYNN WALSH reports.
WORLD CAPITALISM AVOIDED a deep slump on the scale
of 1929-33 through a combination of economic stimulus, bank bailouts and
quantitative easing (the pumping of cheap liquidity into the system)
carried out by the G20 states. The advanced capitalist countries were
more severely affected by the ‘great recession’ than the semi-developed
countries, which were partly sustained by the demand for raw materials
from China, which continued to grow at around 9% a year. Global GDP
growth began to revive in the second half of 2009 and the beginning of
2010. This, however, has been accompanied by mass, structural
unemployment and a savage attack on working-class living standards.
From the spring of this year, however, the fragile,
uneven recovery began to falter. This was for a number of reasons,
including the slowdown of the US economy. The sovereign debt crisis
which opened up earlier in the year, particularly affecting the
peripheral eurozone countries, had a negative effect on business
activity. Economic stimulus packages in the US and Europe began to fade
away. Moreover, a number of major economies, notably Britain and
Germany, turned away from fiscal stimulus to ‘fiscal consolidation’, a
policy of the drastic reduction of state deficits over a short period of
two to four years.
The US economy, in particular, began to slow down in
the second half of this year. After July 2009, the US economy began to
grow at an annualised rate of around 3%, but by the second quarter of
2010 growth had fallen to an annualised rate of 1.6%. It increased
slightly to 2% in the third quarter, but this was mainly on the basis of
businesses rebuilding their inventories (stocks of goods for sale, etc),
which is most likely a temporary effect that will fade away at the end
of this year.
The Obama administration undoubtedly wanted to
introduce a second economic stimulus package this year, but was deterred
by both opposition in Congress and massive public hostility to what are
seen as outrageous handouts to the banks and big business. The approach
of the midterm elections at the beginning of November ruled out another
package. Since that time, the strengthened Republicans have mounted a
clamour of opposition against renewed stimulus measures or even another
round of quantitative easing. However, with major economic initiatives
stymied politically, a new round of quantitative easing carried out by
the Federal Reserve, which has a degree of independence from Congress
and the administration, was left as the only available option. Having
argued the case for another round of ‘credit easing’, Ben Bernanke
launched QE2 the day after the midterm elections – promising to inject
more than $600 billion of ultra-cheap credit into the banking system.
This is a desperate attempt to revive growth in the US economy, which
will have a profoundly destabilising effect on the global economy.
Deflation or inflation?
QE2 IS REALLY a poor substitute for another economic
stimulus package. But ‘stimulus’ had become confused with ‘bailout’,
which was seen as a massive handout to the banks and finance companies
at the expense of taxpayers. While millions of workers and middle-class
people have faced unemployment and foreclosures, Wall Street returned to
profitability. The securities industry was hit by losses of $42.6
billion in 2008, but raked in $55 billion profits in 2009. They paid out
a record $20.3 billion in bonuses. Obama’s treasury secretary, Timothy
Geithner, admitted earlier this year: "We saved the economy but we kind
of lost the public doing it".
Apart from persistent, long-term, structural
unemployment, the Obama administration and the Fed also fear the slide
into deflation, raising the spectre of Japan in the 1990s and since. In
the twelve months to October, the overall inflation in US consumer
prices was 1.2%, while core inflation (excluding food and energy) rose
just 0.6%. This is the lowest level of core inflation since the 1961
recession. Deflation is a drag on growth because it makes debt more
expensive (raising real interest rates) and leads consumers to postpone
purchases in the expectation that prices will be lower at a later date.
But will another round of QE have a significant
effect on US growth? The first round undoubtedly eased the credit
squeeze, but operated together with the bank bailout and the economic
stimulus programme. Ultra-cheap credit for the banks, however, did not
lead to a big upsurge in bank lending to small and medium businesses, or
home buyers or consumers. Had the additional credit been channelled to
workers and middle-class people, it might have had a significant effect
in stimulating demand and lifting the rate of growth. Most of the extra
liquidity, however, was channelled abroad in speculative activity by the
banks, hedge funds, and wealthy speculators. At the same time, the major
banks are currently sitting on $1 trillion of ‘excess’ capital reserves
(that is, reserves over and above what they are legally required to hold
against possible losses).
The forces of deflation will remain strong despite
QE2. There is a massive debt burden, with millions of foreclosures and
distressed mortgages. There are still a huge number of unoccupied
houses, and house prices are still falling. There is a mountain of
credit-card debt, with interest rates on consumer credit way above the
Federal Reserve’s base rate. Above all, unemployment is a drag on the
economy. Despite the limited ‘recovery’ of GDP growth, unemployment in
September 2010 remained officially at 9.6% of the workforce. This did
not include eleven million who had stopped looking for work or who had
been forced to accept part-time employment. Adding these people to the
figures, the September rate of under-employment was 17.1%, about one in
six of the workforce.
Unless there is a revival of demand, businesses will
not invest in new plant and equipment, or even sustain their current
levels of production. QE2 could provide more cheap credit to business,
but in itself will not restore profitability. Without demand – as John
Maynard Keynes put it – extra credit creation is merely "pushing on
string".
Strengthened by the midterm elections, Republicans
lost no time in denouncing the launch of Bernanke’s QE2. They have
accused Bernanke of paving the way for "currency debasement and
inflation". These advocates of ultra-free market policies consider the
economy should be left to take its own course, regardless of the
consequences for the working class and middle-class people. Bernanke and
other Fed leaders have been forced to hit back at their critics, but (it
has now emerged) they originally considered much bigger credit-creation
measures but pulled back under the barrage of criticism, settling for
the relatively modest $600 billion QE.
Do the accusations of the free-marketeers have any
validity? With regard to the dollar, QE2 will undoubtedly lead to a
major devaluation. This is, in fact, one of the main aims of the policy,
to stimulate growth through boosting exports. Inflation, however, is not
an immediate danger for the US – let alone the Weimar-type
hyper-inflation predicted by some ultra-rightwing ideologues.
If all the additional credit created by QE2 were
spread throughout the US economy it might well have the effect of
stimulating price increases as demand tended to outrun the supply of
goods and services. In fact, on the basis of past performance, most of
the additional credit will actually be deployed in speculative
investment abroad, particularly in so-called ‘emerging markets’, the
semi-developed economies of Brazil, Asia and so on. This trend, it is
true, is likely to stimulate inflation in those countries, thus
exporting inflation from the US. In time, the increased dollar price of
imported commodities and manufactured goods will have some effect on
domestic prices. But at the moment the forces of deflation within the US
are still strong, with weak demand (because of unemployment, reduced
incomes, and the huge debt burden) and huge overcapacity in the
manufacturing, house-building and service sectors. All this puts
downward pressure on prices.
In the longer term, however, quantitative easing
could lead to an acceleration of inflation. At the moment, the Federal
Reserve is trying to promote inflation of around 2%, which it calculates
would lighten the burden of debt (through lowering the real interest
rate) and allowing small- and medium-sized businesses to raise their
prices (with wages lagging behind prices) and improve profitability. The
more far-sighted bourgeois strategists positively want a higher rate of
inflation, of at least 2% or even 4% for a period. Economists like
Krugman and Stiglitz see this as essential to escape the ‘debt trap’ and
stimulate sustained growth.
Later, if GDP growth begins to accelerate then
inflation could also begin to accelerate even more. The Fed’s plan would
then be to take back some of the liquidity previously pumped into the
economy, through raising interest rates and selling securities
(government bonds, company bonds, etc) now held by the Fed. But even
Bernanke admits that this is an untested and risky policy. Today, the
strategists of capitalism fear deflation, but further down the road they
will once again face the perils of inflation (their bête noir in the
1970s). Increased gold purchases by the wealthy pushed the price of gold
(in current dollars) to a record high in early November (though in
inflation-adjusted terms it is 40% below its 1980 peak).
A speculative binge
OFFICIALLY, THE AIM of QE2 is to stimulate growth in
the US economy through a new injection of cheap credit. Few people,
however, even at the Fed, believe this will have a dramatic effect on
the home economy. The main – unacknowledged – aim is to devalue the
dollar, lifting US growth through a growth of exports. US leaders will
deny this. Financiers, however, are more realistic. "Devaluation is the
intention, devaluation is what is going to happen", commented the
chairman of Elara Capital, a major foreign exchange trader.
The first round of QE has already brought about a
massive devaluation of the dollar (around 20% from its peak level). This
is because most of the additional liquidity has been used for
speculation in overseas markets rather than investment in the US. There
has been a huge growth in the dollar ‘carry trade’, which involves
financiers, speculators and big corporations (sitting on piles of cash)
borrowing cheap dollars and investing them in countries with stronger
currencies and higher interest rates. This has brought a new bubble in
so-called ‘emerging markets’, semi-developed economies like Brazil,
India, Indonesia, etc. There has also been increased investment in
commodities, including food, which has pushed up world prices over
recent months. Despite the availability of ultra-cheap credit at home,
big business does not see big possibilities of profitable investment
within the US, and therefore prefers to speculate internationally. But
the new bubbles being blown with cheap QE credit will inevitably burst,
provoking new crises in the semi-developed economies that appeared to
escape the worst effects of the 2008-09 downswing.
The flow of funds out of the dollar and into other
currencies depresses the value of the dollar and lifts the value of
target currencies. While improving the competitive position of US
exports, this process renders exports from countries with rising
currencies less competitive. In recent months, Brazil and other states
have intervened on foreign-exchange markets to try to limit the rise of
their currencies. But, given the huge daily turnover on foreign
exchanges, this has become increasingly difficult, despite the big
foreign-currency reserves held by many of these countries
(‘self-insurance’ adopted after the 1997 Asian currency crisis).
China, however, is in a different position, as the
Chinese regime has pegged its currency, the yuan or rmb, to the US
dollar. The regime has allowed a marginal (3-4%) revaluation of the yuan
against the dollar since June, but refuses to allow the substantial
(20-40%) revaluation demanded by the US and other advanced capitalist
countries. Such a huge realignment would undoubtedly undermine China’s
exports, threatening a slowdown of the Chinese economy, with the
possibility of social instability and explosive movements of Chinese
workers and small farmers.
US leaders have ever more stridently been accusing
China of ‘currency manipulation’ because it rejects a substantial
revaluation of the yuan. However, QE2 is undoubtedly a massive exercise
in currency manipulation. This was bluntly spelled out recently by the
German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble: "It is not consistent when
the Americans accuse the Chinese of exchange rate manipulation and then
steer the dollar exchange rate artificially lower with the help of their
[central bank’s] printing press". (Financial Times, 7 November)
QE2 will undoubtedly intensify the ‘currency war’
which was the main issue at the Seoul G20 summit, where there was no
agreement on measures to curb surplus/deficit imbalances or currency
movements. A number of semi-developed countries have already adopted
capital controls in an effort to reduce speculative flows of money, and
QE2 undoubtedly increases the likelihood of outright protectionist
measures being adopted.
Bleak outlook for world capitalism
THE LATEST FORECASTS from the OECD (18 November)
suggest that the 33 OECD countries (dominated by the advanced capitalist
economies) will grow by 2.7% this year, and (they predict) 2.3% in 2011.
World growth, however, will be 4.6% and an estimated 4.2% next year. The
main factor in the higher level of world growth (compared to the OECD
group) is the growth in China, which has been sustained by a massive
economic stimulus package. China has created demand for energy, raw
materials and producer goods from countries such as Japan, Germany,
Brazil, Australia, etc.
Following a ‘great recession’, which could have been
much worse than it was, these growth figures appear quite substantial.
However, GDP growth is not the whole story. In the advanced capitalist
countries, in particular, this weak recovery has been accompanied by
prolonged mass unemployment, the erosion of workers’ living standards
and an assault on social spending.
The strategists of capitalism recognise that the
recovery, such as it is, has not resolved any of the underlying problems
in the world economy. Moreover, events and renewed episodes of crisis
could at any time cut across this recovery.
In the advanced capitalist countries and some of the
weaker, peripheral economies of eastern Europe, the huge debts
accumulated by the finance sector in the pre-crisis boom have been
transferred to the state, with the burden of repayment being passed on
to the working class. This has effectively added to the enormous debt
burden already accumulated on the basis of a credit-fuelled housing boom
and credit-based consumer spending.
Fiscal stimulus has been largely replaced by fiscal
consolidation. The Keynesian wing of the capitalist class has argued
that state debts should be paid off more gradually as the economies
begin to go into sustained growth. They believe that the governments now
implementing savage spending cuts and tax rises are repeating the
mistake of Roosevelt in the US in 1936-37 when he reversed many of the
New Deal programmes, pushing the US back into recession (only reversed
again by the onset of the second world war). However, a combination of
the enormous international pressure of financial markets and the
ultra-free market ideology of a big section of big-business leaders and
bourgeois politicians has allowed the ‘consolidators’ to prevail. There
is undoubtedly the possibility that spending cuts on a massive scale
will actually induce new downturns in many countries, leading to an
increase rather than a decrease of state deficits.
The Irish government has now (21 November) agreed a
€90 billion rescue package with the IMF, ECB and the British government,
in order to prevent a collapse of the Irish banking system. However, it
is far from certain that this ‘solution’ will hold together. The spectre
of default (‘rescheduling’ of debt) still looms over Ireland, Portugal,
Italy and Spain. A European-wide banking crisis cannot yet be ruled out,
and such a crisis would undoubtedly cut across the growth in the world
economy.
The limited recovery since last year, moreover, has
in no way overcome the major imbalances in the world economy. The
contradiction between the deficit countries (notably the US) and the
surplus countries (China, Japan, Germany, etc) has not been in any way
overcome. These imbalances are the basis of the currency wars now
unfolding, which could spill over into open trade war.
The G20 meeting in Seoul completely failed to reach
agreement on the most pressing issues facing the world economy,
particularly the questions of deficits and currency alignments. There is
no ‘coordination’ between the major economic powers. The USA’s QE2 is a
unilateral act of competitive devaluation. It is a direct challenge to
the Chinese regime and will have a profoundly disruptive effect on the
world money system and trading relations.
Even before Bernanke announced the new credit-easing
measure, China’s central bank announced that it was requiring China’s
commercial banks to increase the reserves they have to deposit in
China’s central bank (from 17.5 to 18% of their capital). This is
intended to dampen growth, to counter the recent acceleration of
inflation. The alternative policy of raising interest rates would have
had the disadvantage for China of attracting more speculative capital
into the country. On the other hand, the reserve requirements (deposited
on the basis of very low interest rates for the banks concerned)
provides the funds necessary for the Chinese government to intervene on
foreign-exchange markets, buying foreign currency and holding down the
level of the yuan/rmb.
Despite the OECD’s relatively optimistic forecast
for the world economy, there could still be a relapse into a new
recession in the short term. On the other hand, there may be a period of
several years of low, erratic growth. That, in turn, could give way to a
new downturn in the not-too-distant future.
What is QE?
THE MAIN POLICY tool of central banks has
usually been the variation of interest rates. Lowering short-term
rates (making credit cheaper), under normal conditions, stimulates
growth. Raising rates dampens growth, and has normally been used to
reduce ‘overheating’ (rapid growth of output putting pressure on the
supply of materials and producer goods, thus leading to inflation).
Manipulation of interest rates is the ‘conventional’ policy tool.
But when banks become reluctant to lend, however
cheap credit may be, lowering rates no longer has a stimulating
effect on the economy. In any case, rates cannot go below zero.
(That is, nominal rates cannot fall below zero: if the rate of
inflation is higher than the nominal interest rate, then the real
[price-adjusted] interest rate will be negative. Clearly, this does
not apply when there is disinflation [a slowing in the rate of price
increases] or outright deflation [falling prices]). When rates
effectively reach zero, as they have done recently in the US, the
only option for central banks (apart from sitting on their hands) is
the use of ‘unorthodox’ tools, such as quantitative easing (QE).
The term ‘quantitative easing’ was first used in
Japan in the early 1990s, and has become common currency. Bernanke,
prefers to use the term ‘credit easing’.
QE is the equivalent of printing money, though
today there is no need to actually print new notes. The central bank
(the Fed, BoE, BOJ, etc) electronically credits itself with a
quantity of money, out of nothing. The bank can then use these new
funds to buy government bonds and other securities (mortgage-based
bonds, company bonds, etc) either directly from the government or in
the secondary market, which is, from the banks and other
institutions and investors currently holding them.
Having sold some of their securities to the
central bank, banks and investors then have a quantity of cash in
their hands that they can use to lend out or invest. The idea is
that QE pumps additional credit into the economy, thus stimulating
business activity and a higher rate of growth. At the same time, the
increased demand for government bonds (from the Fed’s QE purchases)
keeps down the long-term interest rate. This reduces the cost of
government borrowing, thus enabling the government to finance its
deficit.
Unorthodox methods were adopted by the Bank of
Japan after the bursting of the property bubble in 1991, which
resulted in a seizing up of the credit system and serious price
deflation. However, most of the extra yen liquidity got stuck in the
banking system, as banks wrote off bad loans and hoarded cash. QE in
Japan has not overcome the stagnation of the economy or the tendency
to deflation, though it is possible that things would have been
worse without it.
In the US, in November 2008, after the implosion
of the banking system, Bernanke outlined a range of unorthodox
measures that could be used to stimulate growth when the federal
funds rate had dropped virtually to zero. Bernanke eschewed the term
‘quantitative easing’, but proposed that the Fed could (create
credit to) buy (US government) treasury bonds, mortgage-backed
securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and commercial debt
issued by private companies and consumer lenders.
In December 2008, Bernanke cut short-term rates
to virtually zero. Then the first round of QE began in 2009. The
immediate aim was to counter the almost complete seizing up of
credit following the banking crisis and the collapse of the shadow
banking sector. By April 2010, the Federal Reserve had purchased
$1.7 trillion of treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities.
The first round of QE undoubtedly eased the
severe credit squeeze that developed after September 2008 (and
proved highly profitable for the banks, which used the fresh flow of
almost zero-cost liquidity from the Fed to invest in profitable
assets). In combination with the $700 billion bank bailout (TARP)
and Obama’s $787 billion economic stimulus package, QE helped US
capitalism to avoid a catastrophic slump on the scale of 1929-33.
However, there has been only a very weak recovery in the US (and
other major advanced capitalist countries), with the persistence of
high levels of unemployment (officially, almost 10%, more
realistically, almost 20%) and part-time and temporary working.
On the day after the midterm elections, Bernanke
announced that the Fed would buy another $600 billion of treasury
bonds and other securities by June next year. The Fed will also be
reinvesting around $300 billion from maturing assets that it already
holds. The total of securities the Fed now holds on its balance
sheet is $2.3 trillion – this is the measure of the scale of the
additional credit it has pumped into the economy since 2008.
In 2008, other central banks adopted the policy
of quantitative easing. The ECB reluctantly created additional
credit but has now ended its purchases of government bonds in the
eurozone. The Bank of England has indicated that it is prepared, if
necessary, to launch its own QE2, but so far has not done so.