
Lost in Euroland
As the eurozone crisis develops, its political and
institutional leaders are becoming increasingly desperate as they look
for a way out. All roads are treacherous. As ROBERT BECHERT reports,
however, this is also a severe test for the left.
"THE EURO SHOULD Not Exist (Like This): Under the
current structure and with the current membership, the euro does not
work. Either the current structure will have to change, or the current
membership will have to change". (UBS Investment Research, 6 September)
This blunt statement, at the start of a widely
circulated report by a leading Swiss bank, summed up the fundamental
character of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone. Despite a series of
emergency meetings and the agreement of rescue plans, this crisis has
continued to deepen, threatening not only the European economy but also
to worsen the already deteriorating world situation, and a dreaded
‘double-dip’ recession. That was the reason US Treasury Secretary,
Timothy Geithner, attended an EU finance ministers meeting in
mid-September. European governments face a potentially massive crisis
with no easy way out, as long as capitalism remains.
Desperate attempts are being made to patch up a
‘solution’, although how long any deal will last is a different
question. Within 24 hours of a plan surfacing at the mid-October G20
finance ministers’ meeting, Angela Merkel’s spokesperson warned against
"dreams currently doing the rounds" that everything will be solved at
the following week’s EU summit. One minister warned of a "world of pain"
if no solution was found, something which millions are already starting
to suffer as the crisis hits.
The widely perceived helplessness of the governments
and EU institutions, and the fact that they have been lagging behind
events, incapable of putting forward a solution, have only added to the
spreading popular fears of what lies ahead.
This is not an abstract crisis. The eurozone
disarray is adding to the misery facing many workers and youth across
Europe. Living standards are falling as inflation is rising, alongside
unemployment in many countries. Cuts in services and wages are
widespread. In Greece, currently the worse hit country, the vast bulk of
the population is plunging downward into a deep economic and social
crisis and facing a huge drop in living standards. The Financial Times
estimated that "planned tax increases and spending cuts for 2011 are
equivalent to about 14% of average Greek take-home income – or €5,600
for every household… [measured on] a per-head basis, the total 2011
austerity package is worth €2,200". (18 October)
Europe is on the edge, facing the possibility of a
sudden crisis, especially a banking and financial meltdown that could
paralyse much of the ‘real’ economy.
A wake-up call
AS POPULAR FEARS grew, governments in and out of the
euro rapidly became aware of the potentially devastating impact that an
event, like a sudden Greek default, could have. After looking over the
abyss of what a new banking crisis and/or a country leaving the euro
would mean, the main eurozone countries drew back and agreed to make
another attempt to defuse the situation.
In recent weeks, warning signs were flashing.
Rumours flew around about the condition of the banks. Many are facing a
critical situation which is why the European Central Bank (ECB) has
again taken steps to prop some up. While the early October collapse and
subsequent nationalisation of the Belgian-French Dexia bank took the
headlines for a few days, it was hardly mentioned that, simultaneously,
two smaller banks, Max in Denmark and Proton in Greece, were also
nationalised.
While UBS published its views on the euro, the chief
executive of Bosch, the world’s largest auto parts supplier, warned that
the eurozone has entered "an extremely critical situation". While the
German-owned Bosch has full order books now, "in 2008-09 we experienced
how fast these orders can melt away". (Financial Times website, 7
September)
The worsening world economic prospects are deepening
the European crisis, not just in the eurozone but also in Britain.
Wolfgang Münchau wrote: "The most disturbing aspect of the eurozone
right now is that every crisis resolution strategy depends upon a
moderately strong economy recovery". (Financial Times, 5 September)
The Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI)
warned before the euro’s launch that it would not lead to unity, but
would breakdown as a result of clashes between the rival national
capitalisms and, in the absence of a workers’ alternative, strengthen
nationalism. (See box)
In fact, the euro has created a Frankenstein
monster. The Greek crisis has brutally revealed this truth. At one time,
markets expected a ‘managed default’, and there were voices inside the
stronger eurozone countries that Greece should be thrown out. The German
transport minister, Peter Ramsauer, told Die Zeit in mid-September that
it would "not be the end of the world" if Greece were kicked out of the
single currency. But the growing realisation that this meant the
prospect of massive collateral damage across the international banking
system has forced other governments to act.
For now, discussion of forcing weaker countries like
Greece to leave, or the possibility of stronger countries like Germany
deciding to quit the euro, has stopped, although this can reappear in
the future. The failure of Dexia was a wake-up call. One reason for
Dexia’s collapse was its exposure to Greek government debt, estimated at
39% of its equity capital. But this is not unique. This summer, the
comparable figure at Germany’s second biggest bank, Commerzbank, was 27%
(Wall Street Journal, 31 August). Dexia’s collapse is a warning that it
would be extremely expensive to maintain a financial firewall around
Greece should it suddenly default.
A more drastic haircut?
WITH SPREADING FEARS of both the ‘health’ of banks
and the impact of a Greek collapse, banks again turned to the ECB as a
‘safe’ place to invest, rather than lend to other banks, and for
short-term funding. But it is not just a question of Greece triggering a
crisis: unexploded financial bombs litter the European landscape. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has just cut back the
forecasts it made in July for 2012 economic growth in central and
eastern Europe – in Hungary, from 2.8% to 0.5%. Not only does this bode
ill for Hungarians but it also threatens Austria’s banks, which are
heavily exposed to Hungary.
The new drive to attempt to stem the crisis was
behind the pressure in October to force Greece’s creditors to accept
more of a ‘haircut’, a reduction in the amount of their loans they will
actually get back. In July’s rescue deal an average 21% was agreed. At
that time, the French government, fearing the impact on its own banks,
rejected a 40% cut. However, by mid-October, figures of 40-60% were
being discussed such was the seriousness of the situation. This,
governments hope, would avoid a formal default and allow a managed
restructuring that would prevent a sudden crisis. But even with this
figure it would not be the rich who really paid, the banks would attempt
to offload the cost onto taxpayers and customers.
Nevertheless banks resisted the increased losses.
German banks, in particular, complained bitterly. Andreas Schmitz, head
of BdB (German banking federation) complained that politicians should
not declare ‘war’ against banks (Bild.de website, 15 October). The next
day, Schmitz accurately summed up the current reality when he said that
the 15 October anti-bank protests were "a diversion from the fundamental
problem: that we can no longer finance our welfare states". (Financial
Times website, 16 October) Of course, by ‘we’ he meant the capitalist
system and its ruling classes.
Really, a poker game is going on as the different
countries and financial institutions struggle over the size of the
‘haircut’ and the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility), how the
EFSF will be funded, the role of funding from outside the EU and other
issues. Relations between the French and German governments have become
strained. While there is enormous pressure to reach an agreement, even
if there are doubts as to how long it will last, the risk of an
‘accident’ causing a disaster is ever present.
Dangerous to leave
FEARING THE CONSEQUENCES of a breakup of the current
eurozone or an abrupt Greek default, the stronger EU powers are debating
possible new structures to tighten controls over economically weaker
countries as a price to provide financial support.
While eurobonds would appear to be a logical
capitalist solution for the ruling classes to attempt, they would run up
against the growing popular opposition in all countries to the idea of
underwriting other countries’ banking debts. This is not simply a result
of nationalist campaigns against, for example, Greece. Falling living
standards in most countries and the bitter understanding since 2007/08
that much of the bailouts will actually end up in the hands of the banks
and finance markets also fuel the opposition.
In answer to this opposition to financing other
countries’ debts there are proposals to set up new structures to impose
controls on eurozone countries. How effective they would be is another
question. In 2003, the euro’s original stability and growth pact was
ignored because the two largest powers, France and Germany, broke its
conditions. In an attempt to escape political pressures for flexibility,
the Dutch finance minister, Jan Kees de Jager, while supporting the
German economics minister, Philipp Rösler’s idea of a European stability
council that could impose sanctions, said that its decisions should be
made by "academics and experts – but no politicians" (Spiegel Online, 22
August).
However, such measures would only backfire. In
Germany there is already resentment at what is seen as the EU moving
towards a ‘transfer union’. The tensions inherent within the eurozone
will increase, especially in this period when there is no immediate
prospect of sustained economic growth.
Events this year have posed the question about the
eurozone’s future, whether all the present members will remain? As the
UBS report (see box) shows, there would be substantial economic and
political costs and dangers involved in leaving the zone. This is the
Frankenstein factor. The eurozone countries have created a system which
is imposing huge costs on some economies and strangling others, but
which is very dangerous to leave.
However, while these costs can delay such a break,
tensions could mount that will force a brutal shakeup. This is why,
despite the massive overheads, there are discussions about the
possibility and methods of a breakup. In Germany, there is a kind of
undercover debate within the ruling class because, while leaving the
euro would remove the need for it paying towards the weaker eurozone
countries, this would, at a stroke, cut its ‘home’ market from 332
million to just under 82 million. At the same time, German exports would
be undermined by a new currency that would probably initially soar in
value.
A living struggle
ALONGSIDE THE MOUNTING euro crisis and national
difficulties, there is rising anger among workers, youth and the middle
class as the effects of the crisis bite deeper. This is the reason for
the unpopularity of most European governments, the mass demonstrations
and strikes in a series of countries.
A new stormy period has begun and sharper struggles
will develop. While determined struggle, the threat of resistance or a
very serious economic or social situation can force governments to make
temporary concessions, generally the ruling classes will be forced by
the crisis of their system to, at best, hold down living standards. That
is the meaning of Schmitz’s statement and the reason why ruling classes
will be forced to attempt to push attacks through.
Faced with serious opposition, governments will tend
to move to use more authoritarian methods. These will vary according to
the situation in each country but, in the worst-case scenario, the
ruling classes will even look to dictatorial measures. Today, Greece is
facing a social and economic disaster and its ruling class is not
confident of what will happen. This is the background to the report last
May in the German mass-circulation Bild, that the CIA was speaking of a
possible coup in Greece in the event of severe unrest developing. This
is unlikely in the near future, but in a situation of continuing turmoil
such an attempt cannot be ruled out. The Greek military have done this
before – the last time in 1967, and they ruled for seven years. But a
new coup, in a time of deep crisis, could be quite different from the
last colonels’ regime.
Such a development is not inevitable, but depends on
the character and policy of the opposition movements, particularly the
workers’ movement.
In some sense it is a race between the left and the
right as to who will lead the opposition to the eurozone’s polices. In a
number of countries, it has been right-wing populists who, in the
absence or weakness of the left, have made electoral gains by combining
some social issues with nationalistic, anti-EU and anti-migrant slogans.
Unfortunately, the response of the official
leadership of the workers’ movement has been limited, with most of the
pro-capitalist trade union leaders only organising action when they have
been pushed from below. Even when actions are organised, union leaders
try to restrict them to symbolic actions and strive to avoid them
becoming a step in a serious struggle.
European left
THERE IS A reluctance within the trade unions and in
many left parties to challenge the EU or the euro, which is sometimes
justified by pointing to the EU’s right-wing nationalist opponents.
Rather than explaining that the EU is not a step towards socialist
internationalism but a club of capitalist nations run in the interests
of big business and the big powers, the largest grouping of European
left parties, the European Left Party (ELP), talks of a ‘re-foundation’
of the EU. It does not mention any break with capitalism and, by
implication, supports the continuation of the euro.
The UBS report warns of the wider possible
consequences of a massive crisis and eurozone breakup. There would not
only be huge disruption but the growth of national tensions and
conflicts. UBS is not alone in warning of "some form of authoritarian or
military government, or civil war". In mid-September the Polish finance
minister warned the European parliament, in a ‘personal’ comment, of the
dangers of new wars in Europe. Later, he was asked to explain this and
he said that, while war is not likely "within a four-year legislative
timeframe… Not in the months ahead, but maybe over a ten-year timeframe,
this could place us in a context that is almost unimaginable at the
moment".
While not immediately posed, future conflicts
between states cannot be ruled out if the working class is not able to
impose its own socialist solution to the crisis. But the EU, a
completely capitalist institution that is effectively run by the major
powers, is not a vehicle for either socialist change or democratic
socialist planning.
The ELP, whose strongest parties are Die Linke (The
Left) in Germany, Parti Communiste (PCF) in France, Bloco de Esquerda
(Left Bloc) in Portugal and Izquierda Unida (United Left) in Spain, puts
forward a number of individual policies that socialists support,
although often these are vague, loose formulations. However, it does not
link these together into an overall anti-capitalist, socialist
programme.
This approach was seen in Die Linke’s three demands
on what the German government should argue for at the October 15/16 G20
finance ministers’ meeting. They were: worldwide, strict regulation of
‘finance casinos’; a tax on financial transactions; and a coordinated
conjunctural programme. However, these proposals could not be fully
implemented under capitalism and, while Die Linke also mentioned its
call for public ownership of the banks, its approach was one of
demanding are measures that could be taken within capitalism.
Naturally, socialists argue for individual demands
that can immediately improve the conditions of working people and the
poor. But such campaigns should be accompanied by an explanation that
these demands can only provide temporary improvements and that,
especially in this time of crisis, a socialist transformation of society
is required. Without this explanation they are attempts to run this
system in a ‘better’, ‘fairer’ way, which will ultimately fail.
The speculators’ grip
A KEY FACTOR in the development of this crisis has
been the massive pressure from the financial markets. Since the breakup
of the post-second world war Bretton Woods currency system and the
deregulation of finance there has been a huge explosion of the finance
markets, alongside a similar growth of all forms of speculation in
commodities, property and spread-betting on anything that moved, or
didn’t. The figures are mind-blowing and hard to grasp. In the EU in
2010, finance transactions were 115 times the EU’s €12,300 billion GDP
(Financial Times, 18 August). All the political leaders bow to these
markets. Often their official statements are directed simply to the
markets.
Naturally, the question of how to break the grip of
this speculative market’s grip over nearly all aspects of life is a
burning issue. It cannot be ruled out that different capitalist nations,
or groups of nations, may attempt to isolate themselves or place some
controls on these markets – in effect, states clipping the speculators’
wings in the wider interests of capitalism as a whole. But this would be
no long-term solution. For example, an attempt to go back to a system of
fixed exchange rates would not, in the medium or longer term, prevent
currency crises or forced devaluations.
There is now growing support for a tax on financial
transactions (a Robin Hood or Tobin tax). This is now the official
policy of the EU Commission, seen as a useful political gesture and a
way of raising funds. While socialists would not oppose such a tax, it
would leave untouched the basic power of the huge financial and trading
institutions that run these markets.
Similarly, simply leaving the euro would not solve
the problems of Greece or other countries. Socialists opposed the
introduction of the euro and today support breaking its grip and that of
the ‘troika’ (the EU, ECB and IMF) that are effectively dictating what
the Greek government should do. The key question in Greece is breaking
with the capitalist system. Without this, living standards will fall for
some time.
A socialist task
SOCIALISTS WOULD NOT oppose leaving the euro but
would firmly link such a move to a socialist, not state capitalist,
policy of bank nationalisation. In a single country breaking from
capitalism, a state monopoly of foreign trade and capital controls would
be necessary as a defence from the international markets until similar
movements spread to other countries. These steps, as part of a policy to
bring the commanding heights of the economy into democratically run
public control and ownership, would allow a start to be made in planning
the use of economic resources for the benefit of all. Without such a
socialist policy the results of leaving the euro would be along the
lines spelled out in the UBS report, namely a cut in living standards.
Much of the popular opposition to the EU is based on
the way it is run in the interests of the big countries and companies,
and the privileges of its bureaucratic elite. Socialists, however, while
fighting nationalist oppression and EU diktats, do not oppose the EU or
the euro from a narrow, nationalist standpoint. The unification of the
whole of Europe would be an enormous step forward. But this cannot be
achieved on a capitalist basis. The existing EU institutions are
agencies of the capitalist ruling class, incapable of surmounting
capitalist limitations.
The task facing socialists is to argue for a
socialist internationalist alternative to the pro-business EU – a
voluntary socialist confederation of European states. Without this there
is the danger that opposition will take a nationalist direction.
This decisive turning point has opened up a new
period of sharper struggles that will provide an opportunity to rebuild
the workers’ and socialist movement, not as an end in itself but in
order to build the forces that can fundamentally change society, end the
chaos and instability of capitalism, and really make poverty and fear a
thing of the past.
Extracts from a UBS study: Euro Breakup, The Consequences
The economic cost for a ‘weak’ country leaving the euro
The cost of a weak country leaving the euro is
significant. Consequences include sovereign default, corporate
default, collapse of the banking system and collapse of
international trade. There is little prospect of devaluation
offering much assistance. We estimate that a weak euro country
leaving the euro would incur a cost of around €9,500-11,500 per
person in the exiting country during the first year. That cost would
then probably amount to €3,000-4,000 per person per year over
subsequent years. That equates to a range of 40-50% of GDP in the
first year.
The economic cost for a ‘stronger’ country leaving the euro
Were a stronger country such as Germany to leave
the euro, the consequences would include corporate default,
recapitalisation of the banking system and collapse of international
trade. If Germany were to leave, we believe the cost to be around
€6,000-8,000 for every German adult and child in the first year, and
a range of €3,500-4,500 per person per year thereafter. That is the
equivalent of 20-25% of GDP in the first year.
The political cost
The economic cost is, in many ways, the least of
the concerns investors should have about a breakup. Fragmentation of
the euro would incur political costs. Europe’s ‘soft power’
influence internationally would cease (as the concept of ‘Europe’ as
an integrated polity becomes meaningless). It is also worth
observing that almost no modern fiat currency monetary unions have
broken up without some form of authoritarian or military government,
or civil war.
Europe in turmoil, a socialist analysis
June 18, 2005
THE CURRENT crisis is a vindication of the
analysis of the Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI) that
the European capitalist classes are unable to unify Europe to
construct a capitalist ‘United States of Europe’, as even some
Marxists outside the ranks of the CWI believed.
The EU ‘project’ for greater economic and
political integration was rooted in the pressure on the European
capitalists from competition from US imperialism and, more recently,
from China. This drove them towards increased collaboration and led
to illusions that this would result in a politically unified Europe.
This trend, along with the process of globalisation of the economy
and growth of multi-national and trans-national corporations,
illustrated how the productive forces have outgrown the limitations
of the national state and to a certain extent have even outgrown
continents. The big companies increasingly look towards the world
market rather than simply their national or regional base.
Yet, at the same time, this process has its
limits and comes up against the insurmountable barriers of the
separate nation states and the national interests of the
capitalists…
Some thought that the process of EU integration
and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) represented the point of ‘take
off’ for a unified capitalist Europe. The CWI consistently argued
that this was not the case. Our analysis explained that although the
process of integration of the EU went a long way, further than even
we originally anticipated, at a certain stage a recoil would take
place. This would result in renewed national antagonisms and
conflicts between the various national states. This process of
unravelling would worsen in the event of a serious economic crisis,
recession or slump.
The end of the euro?
THE INTRODUCTION of EMU and the euro was a
political and economic gamble by the capitalists, pushed through in
the teeth of some opposition from their own side, during the
triumphalist wave which followed the collapse of the Berlin wall.
Initially the Bundesbank opposed the introduction of the euro but
was compelled to accept it in the light of the political pressure of
the capitalist politicians who supported its introduction. The
stability pact was introduced as a ‘safety net’, which was intended
to prevent governments resorting to ‘profligate spending’.
Yet, the whole idea of the euro was tailored to
a situation of continued growth of the European economies, with no
real account taken of what would happen in the event of a slowdown,
stagnation or recession...
The ruling classes attempted to impose an
economic union in the absence of an existing political union. As we
explained at the time, this has never succeeded in the past. Without
a political union, moving towards the establishment of a unified
nation state, an economic union or currency could not survive
indefinitely…
There is a vast difference between a federal
state, such as the US, which can distribute funds to local state
governments in a relatively easy fashion on the basis of an
agreement and the EU. The distribution of resources or funds cannot
be done in the same way, in a Europe composed of different nation
states...
While an immediate collapse of the euro or the
EU is not the most likely short-term perspective, the sharp increase
in political and economic tensions between the representatives of
the various ruling classes will intensify...
However, the onset of a deep economic recession
or slump or world financial crisis will sharpen these conflicts
further and could provoke a relatively rapid collapse of the euro.
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