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The world after Afghanistan
THE DEFEAT OF the Taliban regime is undoubtedly a victory
for the US superpower. It has, for the time being, restored the ‘credibility’
or prestige of US imperialism, the pre-eminent power of world capitalism, which
was seriously damaged by the September 11 terrorist strikes on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. Deep outrage at the atrocity, the most destructive
single terrorist attack in history, aroused public support in the US and in many
other countries for US military action, for a ‘war against terrorism’.
The war was quickly directed against the Taliban regime, in
the first place to destroy the main base of the al-Qa’ida terrorist network.
This intervention, however, inevitably connected with longstanding aims of US
imperialism, strategic control of the Central Asian region and privileged access
to its oil and gas reserves.
The rapid overthrow of the Taliban regime confirmed the US’s
overwhelming military power. As after the Gulf war of 1990-91, the idea is about
that the US can intervene anywhere, without risking casualties amongst its own
forces, in order to impose its ‘imperial order’ across the globe. As after
the Gulf war, however, this victory will soon appear much more limited. While
its military superiority is unquestionable, US imperialism is far from having
unlimited power to determine the course of international events.
Even the US victory in Afghanistan itself is only partial.
The Taliban has been smashed, but other key objectives have not been achieved.
Osama bin Laden, wanted ‘dead or alive’ by Bush, has not been captured, nor
has sultan Omar, the Taliban leader, been caught. It appears that they have
escaped to remote areas or to Pakistan, helped by tribal leaders and possibly by
sympathetic elements in the Pakistan military. While several thousand foreign
Taliban fighters have been killed or captured, many imprisoned under barbaric
conditions, thousands have melted into the tribal society from which they came.
The Taliban is finished, a product of a particular period of
Afghanistan’s tortured history. But there is no assurance at all that many of
the elements who joined the Taliban, or who were part of the al-Qa’ida
network, will not reappear later in Pakistan, Kashmir, or further afield. So
long as the conditions which turn people towards movements like the Taliban
exist, there will always be more recruits. The failure of ‘modernisation’ on
the Western capitalist model, extreme poverty, lack of education and healthcare,
and especially the humiliation of domination by rich foreign powers, will
continue to push strata of the population towards ‘Islamic fundamentalism’,
or more accurately right-wing, Islamic parties and movements. Most of the
leaders of these movements are linked to feudals and tribal leaders, who
implacably oppose social progress. But they attract mass support because of the
absence of any alternative, particularly the lack of mass parties fighting for
the working class, poor farmers, and the dispossessed.
The smashing of the Taliban regime will not in itself curb
the development of reactionary Islamic groups, or of their armed militias or
terrorist adjuncts. On the contrary, the military pounding of Afghanistan,
together with the intensified oppression of the Palestinian people, will only
fuel the sense of grievance, reinforce despair, and produce more recruits for
terrorist organisations and suicide attacks.
The US-led ‘war against terrorism’ will not assure the
safety and security of people in the US or elsewhere. On the contrary, military
action which appears to wide sections of the population in the underdeveloped
countries as wanton revenge, will only increase the risks. At the same time, the
US’s barbaric treatment of prisoners in Afghanistan and the cancellation of
many democratic and legal rights for non-citizens in the US will shatter the US’s
credibility as an upholder of ‘democracy and freedom’.
No stability in Afghanistan
WHAT DOES THE rout of the Taliban regime mean for
Afghanistan? Will the provisional government, sponsored by the US and other
Western powers, open up a new period of stability and social progress? Despite
pressure from the powers to introduce reforms, especially reducing the most
conspicuous restrictions on women, the prospects are not good. The provisional
government is a fragile coalition of warlords, the very leaders who tore
Afghanistan apart and created the conditions for the Taliban to come to power.
The country’s economy, devastated by 20 years of civil war, has been set back
even further by the recent conflict. While most Afghans appear to have welcomed
the overthrow of the Taliban, there is nevertheless deep resentment at the role
of the US, particularly the air strikes which claimed the lives of thousands of
civilians – and are still continuing.
The provisional government is far from having centralised
authority over the whole country. It is a coalition of warlords, who are
striving to re-establish their hold over their local fiefdoms. The Northern
Alliance, on which the US relied for its initial offensive against the Taliban
regime, is still the dominant element in the government. One of its leaders,
general Rashid Dostum, now deputy defence minister, has a well-known record of
brutal repression and civil war atrocities. Heavily rearmed by the US, his
commanders are once again carrying out widespread pillaging and looting. He is
also protecting former Taliban commanders.
Hamid Karzai was brought in, at the insistence of the West,
to head the government as he is from the majority Pashtun (Pathan) section of
the population. His influence over the Pashtun warlords of the south, however,
is very limited – and is being further undermined by resentment at the
continued US bombing campaign.
The new governor of Kandahar province, for instance, is Gul
Agha Shirzai, who was previously the notoriously repressive and corrupt governor
of Kandahar before being ousted by the Taliban. Back in power, with the help of
US dollars and weapons, Gul is now defying both the Kabul government and the US.
Recently, he freed three Taliban leaders on the US’s ‘most wanted’ list.
The regional warlords, with their substantial private armies, and support from
the local feudals and tribal leaders, are a powerful destabilising factor.
"Afghanistan’s economy", stated a World Bank
report in December, "is in a state of collapse". Twenty-five years
ago, Afghanistan was already one of the most backward countries in the world.
Years of civil war have pushed the country back even further. There are no jobs,
no services, minimal transport. Agriculture is devastated, and farmers are
turning back to heroin cultivation, briefly suppressed under the Taliban. The
World Bank estimates that at least $25 billion is needed over the next five
years to begin reconstructing the economy. Whether anything like this amount
will be forthcoming in practice is doubtful, in the light of the Balkans and
other devastated war zones. At the so-called ‘donors conference’ of major
powers in Tokyo on 21 January there will no doubt be grandiose promises of
reconstruction aid – how much is actually delivered remains to be seen.
Wide sections of Afghan society undoubtedly welcomed the
overthrow of the Taliban regime, which proved to be as repressive and corrupt as
the warlords it replaced. They are far from welcoming the US as a ‘liberating
power’. There is deep resentment at the civilian casualties of the devastating
US air strikes. A Pashtun tribal leader from the southern city of Kandahar
recently warned Karzai that "their loyalty to the government was being
stretched to the limit if the US bombing of al-Qa’ida, which has killed
hundreds of civilians, continued". (Ahmed Rashid, Daily Telegraph, 12
January 2002)
India and Pakistan
HAS THE DEFEAT of the Taliban regime increased regional
stability in Southern and Central Asia? Within days of the Taliban’s downfall,
the subcontinent was brought to the brink of war between two major regional
powers, both armed with nuclear weapons. This was the biggest mobilisation of
forces since 1971, when India and Pakistan fought their last full-scale war.
It was inevitable that the end of the Taliban would trigger
conflict between India and Pakistan, just as the defeat of the Milosevic regime
in Bosnia-Hercegovina later spilled over to the conflict in Kosova/Kosovo. The
defeat of the Taliban was also a defeat for the Pakistani ruling class and
intelligence services, which had promoted the Taliban as an instrument of its
regional influence and to provide cover for Pakistan-sponsored guerrilla groups
operating in Indian-Occupied Kashmir. As Pervaiz Musharraf, under intense
pressure from US imperialism, had signed up for the ‘war against terrorism’,
the Indian government demanded that Musharraf end his support for armed Kashmiri
groups and take action against their activists. The Indian government was also
reacting against the armed attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December by
gunmen linked to anti-Indian Kashmiri groups. The forthcoming elections in the
province of Uttar Pradesh, moreover, are undoubtedly another factor behind the
actions of the Hindu nationalist BJP government.
India mobilised over half-a-million troops along the
Indian-Pakistani border, together with heavy artillery and missiles capable of
carrying nuclear warheads. "I have mobilised to be ready for war",
stated general Sunderajan Padmanabhan, the Indian army’s chief of staff. He
warned Pakistan that "if anyone is mad enough to use nuclear weapons
against India, the perpetrator shall be punished so severely that his
continuation in any form would be doubtful... we are ready for a second
strike".
Faced with this threat and under intense pressure from the
US, Musharraf retreated. On 13 January, Musharraf declared a ban on five
Pakistan-based Muslim groups, including the two the Indian government blames for
attacking its parliament last month and for launching attacks in Indian-Occupied
Kashmir. Leaders of groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba have
been arrested. At the same time, Musharraf promised to reform thousands of the
Islamic schools, the madrassahs, from which the Taliban and other right-wing
Islamic militias recruited.
In response, the Indian government welcomed Musharraf’s
measures, but said that it would only consider demobilising its forces when
Musharraf actually ‘operationalised’ the promised measures. How rigorously
the measures will be put into effect remains to be seen. Musharraf already faced
massive opposition for his support for the US offensive in Afghanistan, and will
now face increased anger at the suppression of the Kashmir guerrilla
organisations. Possession of the whole of Kashmir has been a burning issue for
the Pakistani ruling class, and especially the military, since independence in
1947. While Musharraf appears to be in firm command at the moment, anger at his
perceived betrayal of Kashmir could lead to moves against him by sections of the
military and the ruling class. At the same time, there is enormous popular
resentment against India for its rule over Indian-Occupied Kashmir.
Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups have threatened to carry out suicide strikes
against the Indian military – which could provoke counter moves by India.
The Indian leadership threatened war, including willingness
to retaliate with nuclear weapons. In reality, it appears their intention was to
put pressure on the Pakistan government to retreat, a ‘calculated and
calibrated’ move in a dangerous poker game. Large-scale military mobilisations
have a dangerous logic of their own. When "two wild bulls fight in the
jungle", admitted general Padmanabhan, "they carry on regardless [of
outside influences]".
Although still gridlocked in a tense border confrontation,
it appears that the immediate threat of war has receded. For so long as the
Kashmir issue remains unresolved, however, there will be the potential for
renewed confrontation and war. In the last 13 years, over 35,000 people have
died in the conflict over the division of Kashmir. Neither the ruling class of
Pakistan nor of India has the least intention of conceding control to the other,
or of accepting the only real solution, an independent state of Kashmir. Because
of the irreconcilable conflict between national capitalist states, such a state
could only be realised on the basis of the socialist solution.
US military power
HAS THE US intervention in Afghanistan confirmed the claim,
put forward by the Bush administration and many commentators, that the US can
now intervene decisively throughout the world on the basis of air power alone,
without having to mobilise major US ground forces? This claim implies that, on
the basis of hi-tech weaponry and communications, US imperialism now has the
ability, without facing major casualties of its own forces, of removing ‘rogue’
regimes or blocking radical regimes which threaten the interests of
international capitalism. If this were so, the US – given its
military-technological superiority – would be able to maintain international
‘law and order’ according to Washington’s rule book.
This claim, however, is being sustained on the basis of a
few, exceptional examples. In the case of the Gulf war of 1990-91, the
devastating US air strikes played a decisive part in destroying the defences of
the Iraqi regime. Despite the claim to ‘precision bombing’, the offensive
claimed thousands of civilian lives, while the destruction of services such as
electricity, water, and health services caused many more deaths. Even so, the US’s
defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime was clinched only by the mobilisation of
massive ground forces. Even then, however, the US recognised that it could not
occupy Iraq without provoking a major, and possibly protracted, ground war. That
would have broken the US-dominated ‘Gulf coalition’ against Saddam’s
regime, and produced massive US casualties and an inevitable political backlash
within the United States. Bush senior was later heavily criticised for not ‘marching
to Baghdad’. But against Bush junior’s hawks, like Donald Rumsfeld’s
deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who have recently argued for a new offensive against
Saddam’s regime, more sober leaders like Colin Powell and Sandy Berger
(national security advisor during the Gulf war) have reminded the younger Bush
of the realities of the 1991 situation.
In Kosova, US air power was used to pulverise Milosevic’s
forces, while the forces of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) were used as a
surrogate ground force by the US. Nevertheless, the US together with Britain,
Germany and other Nato allies, had to mobilise a ground force in preparation for
intervention to inflict a decisive defeat on Milosevic. It was that threat,
combined with the signal from the Yeltsin government that Russia would not
oppose such a move, that led to Milosevic’s retreat from Kosova.
In Afghanistan, the US succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban
regime even quicker than it expected. Again, remorseless air strikes, continued
over a sustained period, were a major factor in destroying the Taliban’s
forces. Undoubtedly, new technology, particularly sophisticated satellite
communications, allowed a small handful of special forces to track the Taliban’s
ground forces and pinpoint targets. Even so, the US would not have been able to
rout the Taliban without ground forces. In this case, despite misgivings about
their potentially unruly role, the US rearmed and financed the warlords of the
Northern Alliance and anti-Taliban Pashtun leaders in the south to bear the main
burden of the ground offensive.
Compared to the Iraqi regime or Milosevic’s forces, the
Taliban was relatively poorly armed, lacking any modern air defences. Moreover,
the political support of the Taliban regime was far more deeply undermined than
most outside observers realised. From being welcomed as being bringers of peace
in 1996, the Taliban became widely hated for its oppression and corruption.
Widespread opposition to the Taliban, combined with a traditional readiness by
local warlords to change to the winning side, led to the rapid collapse of the
Taliban’s position. This was a major factor in the rapid defeat of the regime.
The US was not fighting against a national liberation struggle, such as that in
Vietnam in the 1960s, where a guerrilla army supported by North Vietnam enjoyed
popular support amongst the population of the South. Intervention against the
backward looking Taliban regime, linked to feudals and tribal leaders, is one
thing. Defeating a peasant insurgency based on the demand for land and the
overthrow of an oppressive regime, or against an insurgent working class, would
be an entirely different matter.
Until recently, Bush’s Washington hawks, such as Rumsfeld
and Wolfowitz, were clamouring for a renewed military intervention against
Saddam’s regime. The immediate repercussions of the war in Afghanistan,
especially the escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan, has forced
them to think again. Even for the US superpower, with its enormous military and
economic resources, a simultaneous struggle to contain the outbreak of war in
the Indian subcontinent and to wage war against Iraq would be a nightmare
scenario. Even Wolfowitz has been forced to concede that a US military offensive
against Iraq is something for the future, not an immediate prospect. Instead,
the State Department and the Pentagon are drawing up plans for an intervention
against terrorist bases in countries like Somalia, Yemen, Philippines,
Indonesia, etc. Perhaps they have not forgotten, however, that even
interventions in such poor, chaotic states as Somalia have not been without
their cost in US casualties and political backlash at home.
New world order? New contradictions
WILL GEORGE BUSH the younger be able, on the basis of the
Afghan victory, to establish a more durable Mark II of the New World Order
proclaimed by Bush the elder after the Gulf war? Even the first base is not
secure. Afghanistan itself could easily slide into renewed civil war and further
social disintegration. Tensions within India, Pakistan and other states of the
subcontinent are sharper than ever before, with the inherent possibility of a
major regional war erupting. Russia, the Central Asian Republics, Iran, and
other neighbouring powers, while supporting or acquiescing in the US
intervention, are all contending for regional power and economic advantage.
In the adjacent region of the Middle East, the traditional
‘cockpit of the powers’, national and social antagonisms are even sharper
than in the Gulf war period. The Israel/Palestine peace process, promoted by the
US in the aftermath of the Gulf war, partly as the price paid for the support of
Arab regimes against Iraq, has completely broken down. The level of conflict is
sharper than at any time since the formation of the state of Israel in 1948. The
failure of secular, nationalist organisations such as the PLO and former left
organisations to achieve any sustained gains for Palestinians has increased
support for Islamic organisations such as Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah,
which use terrorist tactics. As in the Indian subcontinent, the national borders
and social structures established after the end of the second world war are in a
state of disintegration. In order to woo support from the Arab regimes for the
intervention in Afghanistan, Bush proclaimed that he was in favour of a
Palestinian state. From the leader of the superpower which is the main backer of
the Israeli state, this is a completely hollow pronouncement.
Anger at the oppression of the Palestinians, and especially
of the denial of their national rights, is one of the foremost sources of hatred
of the US and the Western powers generally amongst Arab and Islamic peoples
internationally.
Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two of the US’s key allies in
the region, are time bombs waiting to blow. In return for access for cheap Saudi
oil, the US has for 50 years turned a blind eye to the repressive methods and
religious bigotry of Saudi Arabia’s monarchical dictatorship. One of the
glaring contradictions of the Afghan war is that both the Taliban and Osama bin
Laden/al-Qa’ida were armed and financed by wealthy Saudi supporters, with the
connivance of the ruling class. This rebounded on the Saudi royal family when
the right-wing Islamic groups, including bin Laden, turned on them because they
accepted US bases in the ‘holy land’, following the Gulf war. There is the
strong possibility of upheavals in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt in the next
period, which would plunge the whole region into conflict – besides
threatening Western oil supplies.
Bush senior’s New World Order rapidly crumbled, even with
the advantage of generally favourable world economic conditions for capitalism
during the 1990s. The emergence of the rapidly growing ‘tiger economies’ and
the spectacular financial boom in the US, and to some extent in Europe,
sustained the capitalist triumphalism launched by the collapse of the Stalinist
states after 1990. The Asian currency crisis of 1997 triggered political
upheavals in South Korea, the Philippines, and especially Indonesia. However,
the wider effects of these crises were to some extent cushioned by the
continuation of the boom in the United States, which only broke in 1999.
Today, however, the picture is very different. Capitalism is
facing a generalised world slump, with the prospect of a prolonged period of
stagnation and decline (which does not rule out a continued cycle of weak
recovery and renewed recession). This will not prevent major capitalist states,
particularly the USA, from reinforcing their military capacity. The sharp
increase in US arms expenditure after 11 September confirms this, as does Bush’s
decision to press ahead with the national missile defence system, ‘Star Wars
II’.
An economic downturn does not rule out military intervention
by the major powers, or armed conflict between regional powers. On the contrary,
historically, periods of economic and social crisis have always been accompanied
by increased conflict between national capitalist states, and between
antagonistic national and social groups within states. While possessing
enormous, historically unprecedented military power, it will be impossible for
US imperialism to maintain a stable world order.
The upheaval in Argentina is an important marker of things
to come. Economically, Argentina marks a breakdown of globalisation, an
exploitative process dominated by the multi-national corporations and promoted
by US imperialism. Capitalist leaders in Argentina have been forced, in order to
try and save their political skins, to turn away from the neo-liberal policies
of the IMF, and internationally others will be forced to change direction too.
Politically, Argentina signals the reassertion of the power of the working class
(and also the rebellion of the impoverished middle class), who have risen up
against the bloodsucking policies of the international banks and corporations.
What solution does the US superpower offer to Argentina? And
the next country plunged into crisis? What solution does it have to the
generalised economic, social, and political crisis now unfolding?
Even some commentators in the serious capitalist press are
beginning to question the validity of the ‘free market’ and the ideology of
‘liberal individualism’. Commenting on the mood of political and ideological
uncertainty provoked by September 11, John Lloyd, writing in the Financial Times
(12 January, 2002) says: "What we need most of all is a big idea to
organise, even to civilise opposition to liberal democracy and to
capitalism". Despite the scepticism of this commentator, however, the ‘big
idea’ exists, and remains valid: socialism. Not the grotesque Stalinist
distortion of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, but genuine socialism
based on democratic planning and the democratic running of society at every
level. A new world socialist order would provide the real wealth required for
everyone to enjoy civilised conditions of life. Only that would provide the
basis for harmonious international relations and the elimination of conflict and
war. The re-emergence of the working class as a powerful political force
internationally will ensure that socialist ideas are renewed and brought to the
fore as the only way out of the capitalist quagmire.
Without social justice, impossible on the basis of
capitalism, there is no way of eliminating terrorism and war. Military
intervention only aggravates the problem, as the example of Afghanistan will
unfortunately demonstrate.
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