|
|
The Siege of Najaf
For three weeks, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army fought
fierce street battles with US forces in Najaf. US troops were unable for
political reasons to attack their base in the Imam Ali shrine – the holiest site
for Shia Islam. Al-Sadr’s defiant stand has brought him new supporters, mainly
from the poorest sections. Meanwhile the stooge government of Ayad Allawi looks
increasingly weak. LYNN WALSH reports on recent developments in Iraq.
EARLY IN AUGUST, renewed fighting broke in Najaf between US
forces and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. This was sparked off by a newly arrived
US marine force provocatively entering the ‘exclusion zone’ which was part of
the ceasefire agreed after the conflict in April-May, from which the US forces
had to retreat. According to the New York Times (19 August), local marine
commanders decided to smash al-Sadr’s militia forces without seeking authority
from their commanders in Baghdad, though with the encouragement of the new US
ambassador, Negroponte.
The gung-ho US marines met with stronger resistance than
they expected, and had to call in US army reinforcements. The conflict rapidly
escalated into a major confrontation between the US and al-Sadr’s guerrilla
forces.
Al-Sadr called (5 August) for an uprising against the
occupation forces. Hundreds of young fighters flocked from other cities to join
his Mahdi army, and thousands also came to provide ‘human shields’ in the Imam
Ali mosque. There were uprisings in at least seven other Shia cities in southern
Iraq, most of which became no-go areas to US and Iraqi government forces.
Renewed fighting also flared up in a number of cities in the Sunni triangle,
especially Falluja.
Al-Sadr’s insurgency demonstrated the weakness of the Allawi
government. Allawi authorised the US offensive against al-Sadr’s forces. But he
could not give the go ahead for a US assault on the Najaf mosque, the shrine of
Imam Ali, founder of Shia Islam. Serious damage to the mosque and occupation by
foreign forces would have provoked an explosion amongst the whole Shia
population, with reverberations throughout the Islamic world.
Reflecting their dilemma, Allawi and his ministers followed
a zigzag course. They issued at least three ultimatums to al-Sadr, threatening
to destroy him if he did not leave the mosque. In between, they offered various
compromises under which al-Sadr could leave the mosque and ‘join the political
process’. Al-Sadr indicated that he was prepared to leave the mosque – provided
US forces withdrew from Najaf. These ‘negotiations’ led to nothing.
Meanwhile, US forces used increasingly heavier forces to
pulverise parts of the old city and the huge Valley of Peace cemetery where much
of the early fighting took place. Tanks, helicopter gunships and bombers were
used to smash any buildings thought to be providing cover for al-Sadr’s militia
– causing scores of deaths and hundreds of casualties to non-combatants.
Step by step, the US forces tightened the military cordon
around the mosque. There were signs around 24/25 August that preparations were
being made for a final assault. Allawi claimed that only Iraqi forces would
enter the mosque. But the presence of Iraqi National Guard contingents was
purely symbolic. They would not have been able to enter Najaf at all except
behind massive US forces. They were present purely to create the illusion of an
‘Iraqi operation’ to recover control of the mosque. Al-Sadr appeared to
recognise the probability of an assault, reducing the defenders to around 300
for a last stand.
Events took a different course, however. The Grand
Ayatollah, al-Sistani, who had been in London for medical treatment for three
weeks, returned to the country, and called for a march of all Shias to Najaf to
reclaim the mosque and end the conflict.
Support for al-Sadr
AL-SADR’S CONTROL of the Imam Ali mosque, which he seized
early this year, gave him a powerful base. Not only is the mosque one of the
world’s most revered sites for Shia Islam, but tens of thousands of pilgrims
bring a considerable income to the mosque. Al-Sadr’s main mass support, however,
comes not from Najaf, but from the poor Shia districts of Baghdad and the cities
in the south. Shia Islam and Iraqi nationalism have always had a powerful
influence amongst the poor and dispossessed.
Baghdad’s Sadr City, named after Moqtada’s father who was
assassinated by Saddam in 1999, is crowded with over two million people (40% of
the city’s total population). They live in hellishly hot and overcrowded slums,
afflicted by extreme poverty and mass unemployment. There is deep-rooted rage at
the lack of any progress since the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. Memories of
Saddam’s ruthless repression of the 1991 Shia uprising are still strong, and
many fear that Allawi, a former Baathist, is attempting to reassemble Saddam’s
former Sunni-dominated state apparatus. They see Allawi and his ministers as
stooges of the US occupation.
Al-Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi army, is drawn from these
strata. Iraqi leaders who fear the potential power of the Shia poor, denounce
the Mahdi army as ‘gangsters’, ‘fanatics’, ‘uneducated rabble’, and so on. But
al-Sadr’s militia are highly organised, with a neighbourhood command structure.
They have organised medical care and food supply. The militia clearly has strong
support in the areas where it operates. Moreover, sections of the police are
sympathetic to the militia.
During a demonstration to protest at the US siege of Najaf,
"two police stations near the area allowed posters of Sadr to be propped up on
rooftop watchtowers. The afternoon prayer was broadcast from speakers hooked up
to a police vehicle". (International Herald Tribune, 16 August 2004)
Al-Sadr has been criticised by other Shia leaders as a young
hot-head, a semi-educated upstart, etc. But he inherits a family tradition of
resistance. Family members, al-Sadr often reminds his audiences, played a
prominent part in the 1920 revolution against British occupation. His uncle, who
was attempting to build an Islamic opposition to Saddam, was murdered by
Saddam’s thugs in 1980. In 1999, his father, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq
al-Sadr, was also murdered by Saddam for organising opposition amongst Baghdad’s
Shia poor.
Until recently, however, Moqtada al-Sadr’s influence was
relatively limited. But it has grown dramatically, partly because of his
increasingly open opposition to the occupation and Iraqi collaborators, and
partly because of the US forces’ unsuccessful attempt to ‘arrest or kill’ him.
"The interim government is illegitimate and doesn’t
represent the Iraqi nation", al-Sadr’s representative, Sheikh Azhar Kenani, told
reporters in the Najaf mosque. "Therefore we reject it. We demand that all
occupying forces leave our country". (Observer, 22 August)
A young militia fighter, who came from Amara to help defend
the mosque, explained why he supported al-Sadr. "They [other Shia parties] just
use Islamic slogans to cover up what they are doing. Syed Moqtada is a
nationalist and he demands the rights of the Iraqi people and the rights of the
poor. He is the only one who didn’t betray the people and cooperate with the
Americans". (Guardian, 12 August)
Support for al-Sadr has grown as disillusionment with US
‘liberation’ has intensified. His intransigent opposition to Allawi as a vehicle
for continued US occupation resonates with wider and wider layers.
Some media reports suggest that some inhabitants of Najaf
and other conflict zones are angry at al-Sadr’s tactics, which have resulted in
many civilian deaths, injuries and massive destruction of neighbourhoods. "Moqtada
Sadr is just another man looking out for himself", says a woman forced to
abandon her home in Najaf. "He doesn’t look after the people. If he cared for
the people, why is he fighting? Why are people being killed?"
Most people, however, appear to blame the occupying forces.
A senior Najaf cleric, Mohammad Bahar al-Uloum, a former member of the Iraqi
Governing Council, blamed the US and Allawi’s government for the violence. "The
Americans have turned the holy city into a ghost town. They are now seen as full
of hatred against Najaf and the Shia. Nothing I know will change this".
(Financial Times, 14 August)
Some Shia families are divided. A Najaf factory owner said
that "when the Americans [came] they said, and we thought, they were liberators.
Now we think of them as occupiers. Of course, Moqtada al-Sadr has the right to
resist the occupation but this is not the right time. We should wait and see
what happens with the election". His son, however, said that he intended to join
the Mahdi army. "I am ready to join Moqtada al-Sadr now. Did the Americans come
to Iraq because of Saddam Hussein? No, they came for money and oil and because
they want to destroy Islam. They want to control the country and leave the poor
people suffering". (Independent, 14 August)
Another member of al-Sadr’s militia, said that he initially
supported last year’s US invasion. Now he sees Allawi as a US stooge and a
tyrant no better than Saddam. "Americans came here to remove Saddam, but they
did not kill him. Instead, they are killing us while Saddam stays in an
air-conditioned room". (Telegraph, 20 August)
Support for al-Sadr’s stand in Najaf is shown by the
thousands of Shia who have flocked to the Imam Ali shrine from the Shia
strongholds in the south. One time, there were over 3,000 ‘human shields’ in the
mosque.
In October 2003, a poll conducted by the Iraqi Centre for
Research and Strategic Studies showed that only 1% of Iraqis supported al-Sadr.
But by May this year, a poll by the same organisation showed that his support
had risen to 68%, second only to support for the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
This was the result of Paul Bremer’s attempt to ‘arrest or kill’ al-Sadr, and
the Mahdi army’s uprising at that time, from which the US was forced to retreat.
In June, a poll conducted by the CPA itself, found that 81% of Iraqis said their
opinion of al-Sadr was ‘much better’ or ‘better’ after his April uprising. A
recent poll, moreover, showed that Allawi’s approval rating is just 2%, about
the same level as Saddam Hussein’s. (Independent, 24 August)
Al-Sadr’s programme
AL-SADR HAS been identified with the call for an Islamic
republic in Iraq, a theocratic regime based on the rule of clerics and sharia
law. This ideology is that of right-wing Islam, comparable with the outlook of
Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Islamic republic after 1979. At the
same time, al-Sadr has attempted to position himself as leader of Iraqi
nationalist resistance to US imperial occupation. His intransigent opposition to
the occupying authority and its Iraqi collaborators with it has not only won him
increasing support amongst Shias throughout Iraq, but has also drawn support
from Sunnis.
In recent months, al-Sadr has been more reticent about his
desire for an Islamic republic in Iraq. Last year, after the US proconsul, Paul
Bremer, appointed the now defunct Iraqi Governing Council, al-Sadr unilaterally
proclaimed an alternative government composed solely of his own supporters. This
received little support from other groups. "However", writes Sami Ramadani,
"when asked last week about the political and social programme of al-Tayyar al-Sadri’s
(the Sadr current), one of al-Sadr’s main spokesman said that al-Sadr opposed
the publication of such a detailed programme because it had to evolve from and
be agreed at a conference of all Iraqi political forces". (There’s More to Sadr
than Meets the Eye, Guardian, 24 August)
Al-Sadr appears to recognise, at least to some extent, that
the idea of a Khomeini-style regime lacks broad support in Iraq, which has a
different ethnic and religious composition and history from Iran. Although the
Shia are a majority (about 60%), there are also Sunnis, Kurds, and other
minorities and secular trends who are not attracted by the idea of a Shia
theocracy. It has been reported that al-Sadr recently broke with his clerical
mentor, Kazen al-Haeri, a Khomeiniist ayatollah based in Iran. (Unruly Hero,
Financial Times, 21 August) This may indicate an attempt to distance himself
from Khomeiniism and make a broader nationalist appeal to Iraq’s opposition
forces.
"Secular as well as Islamic anti-occupation forces in Iraq
are now beginning to drop their caution about Moqtada al-Sadr and are openly
siding with his resistance forces in Najaf", writes Sami Ramadani. "The National
Foundation Congress, the influential umbrella organisation that represents most
religious, nationalist and other secular forces opposed to the US occupation, on
Saturday issued an eight-point proposal, already approved by Sadr, to peacefully
end the crisis in Najaf". (Guardian, 24 August) The proposal was essentially
pro-Sadr, in calling for an end to the US-led forces’ offensive in Najaf,
Baghdad, and other areas of Iraq.
Al-Sadr appears to be trying to model himself on Hassan
Nasrallah, the leader of the radical Lebanese Shia movement, Hezbollah, which
forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000. After establishing itself as a
powerful guerrilla force, Hezbollah has also developed as a powerful political
party in Lebanon. Iraq, however, is not Lebanon, anymore than it is Iran, and it
remains to be seen how Sadr’s movement will develop.
Referring to the rapidly growing support for al-Sadr’s Mahdi
army, Ramadani comments that "most of the parents and grandparents of the young
Sadri patriots were probably supporters of the once powerful Iraqi Communist
Party, now in Ayad Allawi’s interim government…"
The current domination of the national resistance by Shia
and Sunni right-wing Islamic forces is indeed a powerful condemnation of the
‘Communist’ party and of the Stalinist policies that were at one time the
predominant influence on the workers’ movement throughout the Middle East. In
the post-second world war period, strong secular forces developed, including
workers’ organisations. Stalinist leaders tail-ended bourgeois-nationalist
leaders, including military dictators (like Kassim and later Saddam in Iraq),
who rewarded their support with ruthless repression. Today, the party supports
Allawi’s government and advocates a broad coalition for the promised elections
on the basis of support for ‘democracy’ and a mixed economy (a capitalist
economy with a state sector). The Financial Times describes the party’s leader,
Hamid Majid Mousa, as "aside from his communist label, in many ways the US’s
ideal partner". (12 August)
Failed time and again by bourgeois nationalist parties and
Stalinist caricatures of ‘socialist’ and ‘communist’ parties, a new generation
has turned to Islamic leaders like al-Sadr and his underground Sunni
equivalents.
Through a nationalist guerrilla resistance, Shia and Sunni
Islamic and perhaps other forces will sooner or later force the US and its
allies out. As with guerrilla struggles historically, the Iraqi people are
likely to pay a heavy price in death, injuries and social destruction. Moreover,
if they came to power, none of the Islamic leaders would be able to find
solutions to the burning problems of poverty, social welfare, economic progress,
and democratic and national rights. As the Khomeini regime showed in Iran,
‘radical’ Islamists are too tied to traditional tribal leaders, landlords and
the bazaar (merchants and small capitalists) to break out of the capitalist
straightjacket and successfully throw off the chains of imperialism. Fundamental
problems will only be solved by social transformation, with socialist aims. That
means combining resistance to imperialism with a mass, democratic movement in
which the working class and other oppressed strata play the leading role.
The ceasefire
ON 26 AUGUST, after 22 days of intense conflict, the Najaf
crisis was diffused by al-Sistani, who returned from three weeks’ medical
treatment in London. Al-Sadr’s forces in the mosque were tightly surrounded by
heavily-armed US forces, who had fought their way through the old city to the
perimeter of the mosque. It was reported that only about 300 of al-Sadr’s
fighters were left in the mosque, prepared for a last stand. Al-Sistani,
however, seized the initiative and dramatically changed the situation. He called
for a march of all Shia on Najaf to reclaim the mosque and end the fighting, and
proposed terms for the withdrawal of US/Allawi government forces and al-Sadr’s
militia.
Thousands set out on the march, and around 20,000 arrived at
the mosque. Some attempts were made by Iraqi police and National Guard to
prevent the marchers entering the mosque, and several dozen marchers were killed
and scores wounded. The French news agency AFP reported (26 August): "The gates
of Najaf’s Imam Ali shrine were forced open Thursday by a sea of weeping and
chanting Shiite Muslims… Outside the old city, a surreal scene unfolded as
bewildered American soldiers trapped in their tanks watched as Sistani and
Moqtada posters were waved in their faces".
A Sistani marcher said: "God is great. This is democracy,
this is the new Iraq, this is the greatest defeat we could have inflicted on the
Americans…" Another young marcher from Amara said: "When we reached the area,
the National Guard and the Iraqi police tried to prevent us from heading towards
the shrine, but there was nothing they could do…" Outside the gates of the
shrine, a young Mahdi militiaman said: "God willing, the battle is over, but I
will put my weapon in a safe place because I have a feeling I could need it
again soon".
The deal proposed by al-Sistani was that al-Sadr should hand
control of the mosque to al-Sistani, and the Mahdi army would disarm and leave.
All foreign forces were to leave Najaf. The Iraqi government would repair the
destruction inflicted on Najaf. The crucial point, however, was that ‘visitors’
– meaning the Shia marchers – would be allowed to enter the mosque and stay
until midday Friday. This device would provide cover for al-Sadr’s forces to
leave the mosque peacefully.
Al-Sistani’s proposal was a face-saving formula which none
of the parties involved could reject. Al-Sadr was provided with a means of
honourable retreat. His militia dissolved into the crowd. Even if they give up
weapons, they can easily acquire more later. The Mahdi army will remain a force
to be reckoned with. Its support arises from the deep-rooted grievances of the
poorest strata.
Allawi’s government was also forced to accept the deal. They
had presented at least three ineffective ultimatums to al-Sadr. Allawi would
have liked to see al-Sadr’s forces smashed, and al-Sadr himself eliminated. But
they could not afford to allow US forces to smash their way into the mosque. A
senior (anonymous) Iraqi official acknowledged that al-Sistani’s deal will allow
al-Sadr’s militiamen to return unchallenged to Baghdad and other Iraqi cities.
"We are going to let most of them get away", the official said. (Washington
Post, 27 August)
Through his initiative to defuse the crisis, al-Sistani has
undoubtedly increased his authority, recovering some of the support he lost
through his absence in London (capital of one of the occupying powers) at such a
crucial juncture. In the eyes of many Shia, he alone was able to end the
fighting which has devastated Najaf and threatened serious damage to the Imam
Ali shrine.
Al-Sistani’s call for the Allawi government to repair the
damage in Najaf is significant, though it is doubtful whether Allawi or the US
will honour any such agreement. Although the shrine has not been seriously
damaged, the old city of Najaf is now "a hellish landscape of standing water,
Swiss cheese walls and ruined hotels". (Washington Post, 27 August) One US army
officer compared it to Stalingrad, another to Sarajevo, and a third to Beirut.
US forces lost about eleven troops during the 21 days fighting. But their use of
heavy weapons, including tanks and airborne rocket launchers, have claimed the
lives of hundreds of militia men and non-combatant civilians.
The ceasefire deal (as we go to press) appears to be
holding. US forces have pulled back from Najaf. But even if it holds in the
short run, the truce solves nothing. It is merely a temporary respite.
|