Fanning the flames in Iraq
DESPITE THE attempt by the Bush administration to give a
positive spin on developments in the last weeks of the US elections, the reality
in Iraq is worsening daily.
The disappearance of 380 tonnes of high explosives from the
Al Qaqaa weapons depot was a major embarrassment for Bush since his campaign
team had said that the explosives were removed by Iraqi security services before
Saddam Hussein had been overthrown. On 6 October, the Iraq Survey Group (set up
by US occupation forces to discover weapons of mass destruction) had said, in
effect, that there were no WMD and it was unlikely they existed after the first
Gulf war (1990-91). Yet when dangerous weapons were found, the occupation forces
let them slip through their hands! The irony was not lost on hundreds of
thousands around the world.
Embarrassing revelations intertwine with horrific ones. A
survey published in The Lancet, the British medical establishment’s journal,
estimates that 98,000 Iraqis have died since the occupation began, over 50%
women and children. The survey excludes Falluja, the scene of some of the most
intense US bombardment. According to the report, risk of violent death is now 58
times higher than it was before the invasion.
While the real figures will probably never be known, the
levels of violence lurch upwards almost daily with new outbreaks in previously
quiet areas. The insurgency continues to control 24 towns and cities.
Thirty-nine car bombs exploded in September compared to 34 in August – one
killed over 30 children in Baghdad. Responsibility for this horrific incident
was ostensibly claimed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his Tawhid wa-Jihad group. US
imperialism’s propaganda has attempted to portray al-Zarqawi as the main
‘bogey-man’ of the insurgency, ascribing to him much greater influence than he
actually has, in order to tar all those fighting against the US occupation with
the same brush.
Socialists, however, whilst explaining that the US invasion
created the chaos – the breeding ground for these tactics – cannot support
methods of indiscriminate car and suicide bombings. Such tactics cast the
working class and poor peasantry in the role of onlookers in the battle to rid
the country of imperialist forces. Bloody incidents which these tactics create
can be manipulated by reactionary forces to increase sectarian tensions between
different Iraqi communities. Most importantly, as the recent hostage taking and
barbaric assassination of people like Ken Bigley have shown, these tactics
actually undermine support for the struggle to drive out imperialist forces in
Iraq and internationally.
The most brutal military repression has not stopped car
bombings. Even in the most strongly fortified areas, US forces and the stooge
Iraqi government are not safe. This was shown in the triple car bombing inside
the Green Zone in Baghdad on 4 October which killed 21 and was a huge blow to US
prestige.
Events like this have compelled US occupation forces to
admit that the size of the insurgent forces are closer to 20,000 than previously
mentioned figures of two to seven thousands. Despite this, US imperialism
intends to attempt to bring all areas under the control of ‘coalition’ forces
and the interim government, particularly in the Sunni Triangle, in the run-up to
planned elections in January 2005. US officials hint that unless this is done,
large areas will be unable to participate, undermining the legitimacy of the
elections and US authority in the process. Iraqi commentators say the opposite
is the case and the response to new offensives could be to bar such hardline
Sunni areas from taking part.
The US strategy is a high-risk one, a ‘carrot-with-stick’
policy offering reconstruction aid in negotiations conducted by representatives
of the interim government (and, no doubt, handsome bribes and contracts for
influential individuals) while conducting brutal bombing raids against insurgent
forces.
This is what happened in Samarra before high profile attacks
on US forces led to a change in tactics, with a joint US-Iraqi invasion and
takeover of the insurgent held city on 1 October. This was hailed as a major
victory for the interim government and US occupation forces. But Anthony
Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies commented:
"The US can probably win any given tactical engagement but, as in Vietnam, that
is irrelevant to the political outcome or winning any meaningful form of
strategic victory". (Financial Times, 21 October)
Moreover, militarily it was not as significant as portrayed.
Samarra originally was overrun mainly by forces of the former Republican Guard
allied with Islamist insurgents. During its recapture, only Islamist forces were
prepared to fight, as former Republican Guard leaders had been bought off by the
interim Iraqi government.
Samarra was a dry-run for Falluja which has become a
national symbol of opposition to the occupation, the scene of an ignominious
withdrawal of US marines in April. Relentless nightly bombing raids and attempts
to foster divisions between the militias entrenched in the city have led US army
strategists to believe they can win a similar victory here. But thousands of
fighters occupy the city. The retaking of Samarra did not have more widespread
consequences because it was achieved in such a short time. A drawn out siege of
Falluja would lead to a repetition of April’s events when US military action
sparked a wave of uprisings in other towns and cities. This time the effects
could be even more widespread.
The Iraqi president, Ghazi al-Yawar, explained that if a new
assault is carried out, Mosul, home to three million Iraqis, could explode into
uprising. As a result, it was no wonder that the Bush administration ‘requested’
the redeployment of the British army’s Black Watch regiment to near Baghdad to
release some US forces for the assault on Falluja.
If, as is likely, British troops get pulled into drawn out
confrontations with insurgent forces and are part of military operations which
result in thousands of civilian casualties, much bigger and more radical
anti-war protests could become commonplace. Involvement in the Sunni Triangle
could open them up to greater attack in southern Iraq as well.
Under such circumstances, questioning among the ranks of the
army, combined with an overwhelming mood to bring the troops back, will make
things more difficult for British imperialism. Complaints about the lack of
equipment are now being made public and, in part, reflect a questioning by the
troops of the whole military operation.
This was highlighted by the arrest of 17 US army reservists
for refusing to deliver fuel to troops in Taji, north of Baghdad. Those arrested
explained that the fuel had already been refused by other US troops because it
was contaminated with water and also because their vehicles were ‘deadlined’ –
deathtraps incapable of speeds greater than 40mph and without aerial or humvee
support.
Even the highest echelons of the US military have complained
about equipment provision. Former head of US ground forces in Iraq,
Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez, wrote to the Pentagon: "I cannot continue to
support sustained combat operations with rates [of equipment replacement] this
low". Paul Bremer, ex-US viceroy of Iraq, complained that, during his period in
Iraq, the main problem was that there were never enough troops on the ground.
The latest blow to the claimed efficiency of the US high-tech war machine came
from Iyad Alawi, Iraq’s prime minister, who blamed the recent killing of 50
Iraqi soldiers on the border with Syria by insurgent forces on the failure of
the US forces to provide suitable training, equipment and protection to the new
Iraqi army.
This does not bode well for the build-up to the elections.
The agreement of Moqtadr al-Sadr’s Mahdi militia to hand in some heavy weaponry
in return for cash, especially in Sadr City in Baghdad, was seen as a boost to
US fortunes. This is linked to an apparent change of tactics by many of the
opposition militias in relation to participation in the elections.
Representatives of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have called for all Shia
groups to take part, and it appears for the moment that even al-Sadr will
participate in a so-called ‘monster list’ which would include representatives of
the present interim government. This may indicate that Shia leaders fear that
they could lose the opportunity to entrench their political influence if they do
not take part in the elections.
However, all this could be shattered if there are major
civilian casualties in the attempt to take cities like Falluja or if
house-to-house searches for remaining heavy weapons are undertaken in areas like
Sadr City, as threatened by the government. The country remains a quagmire for
US and British imperialism. The instability caused by the invasion will continue
to reverberate around the world, demanding a socialist solution to the endemic
chaos and violence that capitalism brings on a daily basis.
Kevin Simpson
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