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Ukraine’s orange revolution
"IT’S A pity that the camp as a symbol of this process is
already history… but on the other hand, we are only beginning the Orange
revolution", was the comment of Victor Yushenko in the middle of January as he
signed the order to remove the tent city from Kiev’s central street, the
Khreshatik. Hundreds of his supporters were still camping out, determined to
stay until Yushenko, who gained 52% of the vote (as against 44% for his
opponent, Victor Yanukovich) in the rerun election, was inaugurated.
The inauguration could not take place until the official
result was announced, and this was not possible until the Supreme Court had
decided on the validity of the complaints made by the loser. As a last-ditch
attempt to get the vote annulled, Yanukovich submitted another 620 volumes of
documents and 250 video cassettes of evidence of alleged voting fraud, but
succeeded only in delaying the time before Yushenko became Ukraine’s new
president.
The ‘Orange revolution’ that gripped Ukraine in December was
only pushed out of the headlines by the tsunami that hit Asia on the day of the
rerun election. But the effects on the whole region are likely to be like a
slow-motion tsunami. Its impact has already spread to other countries. In
Kazakhstan, a student protest in mid-December at the commercialisation of higher
education led to the sacking of the minister responsible. At the same time,
president Nursultan Nazarbayev has banned the main opposition bloc, Democratic
Choice Kazakhstan (an alliance of the neo-liberal, pro-Western opposition and
the Communist Party). In Russia, 2005 has started with widespread protests by
pensioners at the so-called monetarisation of their social benefits (free travel
and cheap health care have been abolished, and a smaller monetary compensation
is supposed to be paid). The protestors blocked roads, including the main
highway between Moscow and its international airport, in a movement comparable
in size to that of 1997, when miners blockaded the government’s building in
Moscow for three months.
With Yushenko’s victory, Western, particularly US,
capitalists are basking in what they see as another victory for their tactics of
using foundations and NGOs to bolster pro-Western ‘democratic’ forces against
sitting presidents. Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine are to be followed, they plan,
by Croatia, Kirgizia, Moldova and Kazakhstan. In Kirgizia, the opposition has
already started daily protests in the centre of the capital, Bishkek, and has
ordered thousands of green scarves and flags to be produced. In Kazakhstan, the
‘revolution’ is to be coloured after its native flower, the tulip.
The US State Department has reportedly invested tens of
millions of dollars in backing these ‘revolutions’. But it is one thing to
finance movements in small countries such as Georgia and Serbia, quite another
in Ukraine, one of the biggest countries in Europe. The Orange movement won
because the outgoing regime of Leonid Kuchma was seen as extremely corrupt and
unpopular. The obvious rigging of the ballot in the first election only acted as
a catalyst for hundreds of thousands of people to protest at the manipulation,
corruption and low living standards, or simply to demand change. Yushenko’s
support from Western powers added a further impulse as many participants saw him
as pro-European, believing that if Ukraine was to join Nato and the EU things
would dramatically improve.
Not everyone, however, wants to link up with the EU and Nato.
This is particularly true of the eastern and southern regions, where 70% of
industry is based. Miners in the Donetsk basin bitterly complain that, when
Yushenko was prime minister, he led a western-backed programme to close down the
mines. The Yanukovich camp, backed by Russia, tried to play up this ethnic
division by threatening to organise a referendum to form a South-Eastern
Autonomy running from Kharkov through Donetsk to Odessa and the Crimea. Yushenko
was no better, although not so blatant in his use of the national question. Even
so, members of the CWI in the Crimea report that he attempted to win the support
of the Tatar minority by promising them backing in their struggle against the
Russian majority on the peninsula.
The use of the national question in this way was not due to
carelessness or a lack of understanding by the politicians but was part of a
conscious tactic by the two camps to win support. One of the leading Russian
polit-technologists (as spin doctors are known here) sent by Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, to help Yanukovich, bitterly complained that he had not followed
his advice. He believed Yanukovich’s attacks on the EU would backfire as many,
particularly in Western Ukraine, actually see the EU as attractive: "I told them
to whip up anti-Polish feeling!"
In the same way, the West openly dangled the ideas of
joining Nato and the EU, although it is clear that can only be a long-term
option. Significantly, however, when the leaders of either the ‘blue’ or the
‘orange’ camp attempted to play the national card they met with resistance from
ordinary people, many of whom have watched in horror the consequences of ethnic
conflicts in other countries. Nonetheless, the dangers for the future are clear
to see. If the economic situation does not improve and the different clans of
the bourgeoisie continue to struggle between themselves, ethnic conflicts could
quickly spin out of control.
For Russia 2004 started with the humiliation of losing
influence in Georgia after Mikhail Saakashvili came to power in the ‘Rose
revolution’. The year ended with the even more devastating blow of the Orange
revolution. Putin’s reaction was bitter and outspoken against the West, and
domestically against any opposition. As soon as the pensioners’ protests broke
out, the state waged a full witch-hunt to find ‘the guilty’ so that criminal
action could be started. Only as the protests developed was the state forced to
back down and talk of ‘administrative measures’. Yushenko’s victory in this
sense has only added to the potential instability that is building up again in
the whole region.
For now, Yushenko has the near impossible task of forming a
government that will both satisfy his Western and big-business backers whilst
offering improvements in living standards to the masses who came out on to the
streets. He already faces big problems, not least because the US will not be
happy that Ukraine is pushing through its decision to withdraw its contingent
(the fourth largest, with over 1,000 troops) from Iraq.
Even more problematic will be healing the wounds caused by
the clash between the different wings of the ruling elite. It is rumoured, but
of course denied, that a deal was done with outgoing president Kuchma to
guarantee him immunity from prosecution for corruption and other wrongdoings
whilst he was in office. But one of the motives driving the protesters was that
the criminals should be brought to justice. Some of the outgoing regime have
taken those demands seriously. On the night of the rerun election, the transport
minister ‘committed suicide’, presumably because of his heavy involvement in
manipulating the first election.
Yushenko will face contradictory demands: on the one side,
from the people, who want justice for the crimes of the past ten years; on the
other, from leading supporters, such as Julia Timoshenko – herself allegedly on
Interpol’s wanted list – who also wants an amnesty for her uncle, currently in a
US prison on money-laundering charges.
There are four front-runners for premier, a position that
now holds more powers than before the election as a result of the compromise
Kuchma forced from Yushenko before agreeing to a rerun. Each represents
different interests and demonstrates how difficult it will be for Yushenko to
hold his bloc together.
It appears to be only a matter of time before the new
Yushenko regime runs into serious clashes between its own leaders and
supporters. The only thing that is absolutely clear is that the working masses
of Ukraine will gain little, if anything, from the recent movement, except for
the experience that mass action on the streets can force the government to back
down. But next time, as a result of the inevitable attacks on living standards
coming from Yushenko’s government, the next stage of protests will have a more
working-class content. This can only bring forward the day when the workers
themselves begin to build their own political organisation.
Rob Jones
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