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One year after Venezuela’s recall referendum…
What dangers threaten the revolution now?
On 15 August 2004, a recall referendum aimed at
ousting Venezuelan president Chávez was resoundingly defeated by a
mobilisation of the masses – particularly in poor shantytowns, through
electoral ‘battle units’ and other organisations of the ‘Bolivarian
revolution’. This opened up a new phase in the revolutionary process.
But, explains CHRISTINE THOMAS, a recent visitor to Venezuela, although
the opposition forces have been severely weakened, the threat of
counter-revolution remains.
HUGO CHÁVEZ’S ELECTION as president in 1998
represented a massive rejection by Venezuelan workers and poor, and
sections of the middle class, of the vicious neo-liberal policies
unleashed by the corrupt political establishment of the ‘Fourth
Republic’. His anti-imperialist, anti-neo-liberal populism radicalised
the poorest layers of Venezuelan society. They saw in Chávez a political
leader who at last represented and spoke for them rather than the rich
oligarchs who had squandered Venezuela’s oil wealth, leaving them to
sink ever deeper into poverty. His victory raised expectations that
their desperate need for decent jobs, healthcare, education and homes
would now be met.
The Venezuelan ruling class and US imperialism, on
the other hand, fear that the masses, aroused and radicalised, could
demand even more radical measures and move in a direction that threatens
their interests. US imperialism, in particular, fears instability in a
country that supplies 15% of its oil needs. Last year’s referendum was
the third major attempt by the Venezuelan ruling-class opposition,
backed by US imperialism, to overthrow Chávez and crush any potential
threat the movement might pose in Venezuela and Latin America as a
whole. But every counter-revolutionary move – the military coup of 11
April 2002, the two-month long bosses’ lock-out and attempt at economic
sabotage at the end of the same year, and the recall referendum – has
been blocked by mass action by the workers and poor, who have in turn
become more radicalised and had their expectations further increased.
In the post-referendum period, the balance of forces
has tipped temporarily in favour of the masses. The opposition forces –
the rich elite, corrupt political parties and trade union leaders, the
Catholic Church, etc – have emerged from these defeats fragmented and
demoralised. Chávez himself initially sought an accommodation with the
opposition, calling on them to work with him to rebuild the country. But
under pressure from the workers and poor he has moved in a more radical
direction, describing the Bolivarian revolution for the first time as
‘socialist’, stepping up land reform, and carrying out the regime’s
first nationalisations. At the same time, he has ratcheted up his
anti-imperialist, anti-US rhetoric and actions in the region.
This left turn has alarmed the Venezuelan capitalist
class and US imperialism. They are concerned that the masses, having had
their expectations raised, could push Chávez in an even more radical
direction, seriously undermining their economic control which, while
facing some encroachments, has so far been left largely intact. The US
administration has recently launched vitriolic verbal attacks on Chávez,
accusing him of backing terrorists in Colombia and fomenting unrest in
Bolivia, Ecuador and throughout Latin America. US secretary of state,
Condoleezza Rice, described Chávez as a "major threat to the whole
region".
Chávez’s strengthening economic relations with Cuba,
where Venezuela provides cheap oil in return for Cuban doctors, etc,
have effectively broken the US embargo, throwing Fidel Castro’s regime a
much-needed economic lifeline since the collapse of the Soviet Union
removed its major economic backer. Chávez is also viewed as an
impediment to the US strategy of building up Colombia as a regional
power base to defend US interests in Latin America.
Most importantly, Chávez has been seeking
alternative international markets for Venezuelan oil, signing agreements
with China, Russia and Iran as well as other Latin American countries.
He has threatened to retaliate against any US aggression by cutting oil
supplies and, at the International Youth conference held in Caracas in
August this year, declared that the North American market was not vital
to Venezuela. Although much of this is anti-imperialist rhetoric, faced
with an already unstable situation in Iraq and the Middle East, US
imperialism wants to be sure that its supply of oil from Venezuela is
not under threat.
But US imperialism’s room for manoeuvre is
constrained at the present time. A combination of the weakness of the
opposition and the massive oil income at Chávez’s disposal to finance
social reforms which benefit the poor – his main social base – mean that
a stalemate between the contending forces in society now exists and
could continue for a period.
A direct invasion of Venezuela by US forces, as in
Iraq, is ruled out at this stage. Iraq has exposed the limits of US
global hegemony. Even if the US was not suffering from military
overstretch, an invasion would be extremely risky, unleashing a wave of
resistance that could engulf the whole of the Americas. US imperialism
has therefore been compelled to pursue a more indirect approach, resting
on and working through the Venezuelan opposition and right-wing
reactionary forces in Colombia.
In December last year, Colombian forces, in
conjunction with sections of the Venezuelan security forces, directly
intervened in Venezuela to kidnap a leading member of the FARC guerrilla
organisation, giving a glimpse of how they could be used to create fear
and instability within the country. There is no doubt that sections of
the US administration privately agreed with right-wing Christian
fundamentalist Pat Robertson, when he recently called for Chávez to be
assassinated or kidnapped to bring about ‘regime change’. Such actions
cannot be entirely ruled out. But every reactionary move has so far
given a leftward impulse to the revolutionary process and any premature
actions could push the masses even further in a radical direction.
The more thinking and serious sections of the
opposition have drawn the conclusion therefore that, having been
defeated at every turn by mass support for Chávez amongst the
radicalised poor, for the time being they have no choice other than to
learn to coexist with him. With the existing balance of forces, any
overt counter-revolutionary steps in the short-term, along the lines of
those previously attempted, risk increasing the radicalisation of the
movement and provoking measures which would further threaten their
control of the economy and the state apparatus. "We have to bite the
dust of defeat", said the governor of Zulia state a few days after the
referendum. "The two Venezuelas must reconcile, Venezuela cannot
continue in conflict", stated the head of Fedecamaras, the main bosses’
organisation.
Despite recently adopting a more strident anti-Chávez
tone, the US administration appears to be pursuing a similar longer-term
strategy of wearing down and exhausting the revolutionary process and
preparing for a more favourable balance of forces before launching
further major actions against Chávez.
Despite this, it remains the case that unless the
working class and poor move decisively to break with capitalism and
establish a democratic workers’ state, the counter-revolution will
succeed in reasserting itself by one means or another. This could come
in an extra-parliamentary form, a future successful coup, as happened in
Chile in 1973, or a ‘democratic’, electoral counter-revolution, as in
Nicaragua in 1990. A victory in either form would represent a disaster
for the Venezuelan masses. The working class and poor are faced with the
urgent task of using this breathing space to build a revolutionary party
that can provide a programme for taking the movement forward and
completing the socialist revolution.
Balance of forces
ELECTORALLY, THE OPPOSITION forces within Venezuela
have been completely divided, with one section advocating abstention and
another deciding to contest elections. Where they have stood they have
suffered one defeat after another. Following elections in October 2004,
they now control just two out of 23 states in the country and have lost
control of the capital, Caracas. In the local and municipal elections,
which were held on 7 August this year, they won less than 20% of the
seats contested.
The main daily newspapers, owned by right-wing
oppositionists who have wholeheartedly supported the forces of reaction
at every stage, ran articles marking the anniversary of the recall
referendum. These focused on what they considered to be the desperate
need for the opposition, "demoralised, disorientated and lacking in
leadership" (El Nacional), to unite in order to present a credible
electoral alternative to the ‘Chavistas’. With parliamentary elections
due at the end of the year and presidential elections in December 2006,
the opposition is bracing itself for yet further electoral defeats.
Chávez has been achieving opinion poll approval
ratings of up to 70%, some of the highest of his presidency. During the
International Youth Festival he talked confidently of staying in
politics until 2030! His confidence has been boosted by electoral
victories over the opposition and the high price of oil on the world
market. Oil represents 85% of Venezuelan exports, a quarter of GDP and
over half of government revenue. In 2004, oil exports generated income
of $29 billion, up from $22 billion in 2001, and the figure is likely to
be much higher this year.
This massive oil bonanza has enabled Chávez to
maintain and increase spending on the ‘Misiones’, the social welfare
reform programmes which were begun in 2003 and have been orientated
overwhelmingly towards the very poor. The benefits are clearly visible
on the streets of the poorest areas of Caracas. A shiny new health
clinic or Mercal state supermarket selling subsidised basic foodstuffs
stand out from the crumbling buildings and infrastructure of the
‘barrios’ – the poverty-stricken shantytowns which lie cheek by jowl
with the opulence of areas like Altamira, where the rich elite lives.
According to government figures, 300,000 Venezuelans
have overcome illiteracy (9% of those aged over ten), two million have
attended primary, secondary and higher education, and 17 million now
have access to primary healthcare as a result of the Misiones.
Despite these obvious social gains, desperate
poverty still blights the lives of millions of Venezuelans. Sixty
percent of households were poor in 2004, up from 54% in 1999. Even
though the state controls the prices of basic foodstuffs, inflation is
running at 15-20% and one in two people do not have adequate housing.
According to a recent opinion poll, unemployment is the main problem in
society. There has been some increase in jobs through initiatives like
‘Vuelvan Caras’, the state job creation scheme, mainly in cooperatives
and small enterprises. But 14% of the population are still without
employment and millions face exploitation and insecurity in the informal
sector as street traders, taxi drivers, etc.
Inherent dangers
IF THIS IS the situation for the majority of workers
and poor when the price of oil is at such a high level, it is clear that
the expectations of the masses can never be met within the framework of
capitalism. The right-wing British magazine, The Economist, accurately
summed up the situation: "If and when oil revenues fall, the economy
would descend into an inferno of recession and inflation". (25 August,
2005)
This is what happened in Nicaragua. After the 1979
revolution which overthrew the hated dictator, Anastasio Somoza, the
Sandinistas had control of the state apparatus. They nationalised up to
40% of the economy but the rest remained in the hands of the capitalist
class who used this control to sabotage the economy. Combined with the
Contra war, waged by proxy by US imperialism, the economy plunged into
crisis, with inflation surging to an incredible 3,600% and living
standards declining by 90%.
With the masses worn down and demoralised by
economic crisis, the right wing defeated the Sandinistas in presidential
elections in 1990 and have since pursued vicious neo-liberal policies
against the workers and poor. Unless the working class in Venezuela
moves to expropriate the monopolies still in the hands of the Venezuelan
and foreign capitalist class, and implements a plan of production under
democratic workers’ control and management, economic crisis and a
failure to satisfy the needs of the masses will lead to demoralisation
and a demobilisation of the movement, paving the way for a victory for
reaction.
This would then be used to usher in a new era of
brutal repression by the ruling class in order to recover total economic
and state control, including destroying workers’ rights and the
organisations of the working class and poor.
The high abstention rate (70%) in August’s local and
municipal elections was a warning for the future. It is true that
historically turnout has been low in local elections, which have not
been seen as relevant to the main concerns of most Venezuelans. A
section of the opposition was also calling for people not to vote.
Nevertheless, the level of abstention in pro-Chávez areas was very high,
despite the fact that Chávez himself had emphasised the importance of
his supporters turning out to vote in large numbers.
Although the turnout is likely to be much higher in
parliamentary and presidential elections, there are the beginnings of
signs of discontent amongst the rank-and-file of the Bolivarian
movement. Some activists were unhappy that grassroots candidates were
bureaucratically replaced from above by candidates unknown by people in
the local communities. In elections for state governors and mayors in
October last year, breakaway candidates stood against official Chavista
candidates. In the local elections, pro-Chávez parties perceived to be
more ‘radical’, such as the Venezuelan Communist Party and Tupamaros
movement, increased their votes in some areas.
Discontent, where it exists, is not aimed for the
most part at Chávez, who still retains enormous authority and support
amongst the masses, but at the ‘bureaucracy’ around him, which is
perceived as being a brake on radical reform, whether through
inefficiency, corruption or conscious sabotage. One woman protesting at
the actions of a leader in the state of Anzoategui summed up the feeling
of a layer of activists: "President, open your eyes... many of those at
your side are deceiving you. Listen to the voice of the people". (El
Nacional)
The leadership of the Bolivarian movement is
extremely heterogeneous. Broadly speaking, one wing is more in touch
with and reflects the mood of the masses, and is under pressure to move
further down the path of radical reform. Another reformist and
pro-capitalist wing, within which some have links with the opposition
forces, is attempting at every stage to hold back the movement and
prevent it from moving in a more radical direction. These divisions have
become more acute since the defeat of the recall referendum. Chávez has
balanced between the different forces in society. His more recent ‘left’
stance has been a response to the masses’ demand for more radical
action. He signed a decree to take VENEPAL, the bankrupt paper company,
into state hands, for example, after the workers launched a determined
struggle in conjunction with the local community, occupying the factory
and demanding nationalisation.
Since January, Chávez has characterised the
Bolivarian revolution as ‘socialist’. This represents a significant
development. The idea of socialism is beginning to seep into the
consciousness of sections of students, workers and poor. In a recent
opinion poll carried out by the Instituto Venezolano de Analisis de
Datos, 47.8% of people said that they would prefer a socialist
government, while only 22.7% opted for a capitalist one.
But Chávez does not have a clear idea of what he
means by socialism, let alone how it could be achieved. He talks vaguely
about ‘socialism in the 21st century’ being a ‘new type’ of socialism
and has called on people to bury their old concepts of what socialism
means. This could be interpreted as a rejection of Stalinism. At the
same time, Chávez is strengthening his economic and diplomatic ties with
Castro. He praises the marvellous Cuban health service, which many
Venezuelans are now benefiting from through Cuban doctors working in
Venezuela, Venezuelans training as doctors and patients being taken to
Cuba for operations. The health service is undoubtedly a significant
gain of the Cuban revolution and the planned economy. However, Chávez is
completely uncritical of the bureaucratic nature of the Cuban regime and
the absence of genuine workers’ democracy.
Cuba revisited?
COULD CHÁVEZ BECOME a ‘second Castro’, moving to
overthrow capitalism and landlordism, as sections of the Venezuelan
ruling class and US imperialism fear? Theoretically, such a perspective
cannot be completely ruled out. Castro, when he came to power in 1959,
did not consciously set out to nationalise the economy but moved
empirically in that direction in response to the US blockade and
pressure from the Cuban masses. But because the working class was not
consciously at the head of the revolution, the outcome was a deformed
workers’ state, where capitalism and landlordism were eliminated but
society was and still is controlled from the top down by a bureaucratic
caste.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
international context is very different from the time of the Cuban
revolution when Cuba was supported with material aid by the Soviet
bureaucracy for its own strategic reasons. Nevertheless, it is not
inconceivable that in response to a provocation by the
counter-revolution or a severe economic crisis, the Venezuelan masses
could move spontaneously to seize factories and land, forcing Chávez to
nationalise large sections, even the bulk, of the economy. Such a regime
would be extremely unstable.
The revolution would undoubtedly be defeated at a
certain stage by the forces of reaction, unless the working class was
conscious of the role it had to play, not just in expropriating the
capitalist class but in forming its own democratically elected
committees. These would be necessary to run industry, implement a
democratic plan of production, and lay the basis for a workers’ state
with a programme for spreading the revolution throughout Latin America
and internationally. That is why the struggle for a genuine
working-class, internationalist ‘foreign policy’ is so important today.
It would support economic links with Cuba, for example, but use the
links to encourage real workers’ democracy within the country and extend
the revolution internationally as the only real means of defending those
gains which have already been made. A socialist, internationalist policy
would also raise the idea of a federation of Venezuela and Cuba. On the
basis of full participation by the working class, that would allow the
different strengths of the two economies to be used to maximise
improvements to the conditions of the working class. It would act as a
bulwark against attempts by US imperialism to undermine the revolution,
and as a beacon to others by showing what could be achieved through
democratic, socialist planning.
Chávez’s reaction to future events will, of course,
have a big impact on how developments unfold, particularly in a
situation of economic breakdown. At the moment, he is responding in a
limited way to the radicalisation of the masses and could move further
in that direction. Unfortunately, there are many examples of honest
leaders who, when confronted with the ‘logic’ of the capitalist market,
have moved ‘reluctantly’ to clamp down on workers’ ‘excessive demands’,
despite their best intentions.
With other options too risky at the present time, a
section of the Venezuelan capitalist class are leaning on the movement’s
pro-capitalist wing as a brake on radical reform and a potential vehicle
for rolling back the gains of the working class and poor, paving the way
for a defeat of the revolutionary process and a victory for the
counter-revolution. It is true that the pro-capitalist Bolivarians do
not have the same authority amongst the working class and poor that the
Sandinistas had in Nicaragua after the 1979 revolution or the Socialist
and Communist Parties had in Portugal in 1975, which was used to hold
back the development of the revolution. Nevertheless, if the working
class does not complete the revolution in Venezuela, and demoralisation
and exhaustion set in, this wing could still play an important role in
holding back the movement and laying the basis for capitalist reaction
to triumph.
The pro-capitalist wing of the Bolivarian movement
are quite clear about how they define ‘socialism’: a ‘mixed economy’
where some state-owned companies and cooperatives exist but the main
economic levers remain in the hands of the Venezuelan and foreign
capitalist class. Chávez spoke recently about investigating between 136
and 1,149 companies for possible expropriation. However, these are all
companies which are either already bankrupt or close to becoming so. The
industry minister made his position quite clear when he said that
nationalisation would only take place in ‘extreme cases’, that there
would not be a ‘wave of expropriations’, and that capitalist firms and
‘social production’ could coexist.
Similarly, the seizure of the 13,000-hectare cattle
ranch belonging to Lord Vesty marked a stepping up of land reform.
Previously, only state-owned land had been distributed to the rural
poor. But at this stage, only ‘unproductive land’ is being considered by
the government for expropriation. Nevertheless, 158 peasants have been
killed since 2000 when the Land Law was passed, demonstrating how even
limited reform will still be brutally resisted by the landlords, aided
in some cases by right-wing Colombian paramilitaries.
Partial measures
DRESSED UP IN the language of revolution,
cooperatives are being promoted as the embryo of a socialist society. In
the last six years, 79,000 cooperatives have been created overwhelmingly
in the service sector and agriculture. They have had some effect in
reducing unemployment but this can only be temporary. These cooperatives
are still competing in the capitalist market with private companies and
will be devastated by economic crisis. In reality, many cooperatives
function like private companies, exploiting the workforce and denying
workers’ rights. There are many examples of private employers
‘disguising’ their companies as cooperatives in order to receive state
money.
In the same way, Chávez is encouraging
‘co-management’ of state-owned and now private industries. ‘This is the
revolution. This is socialism’, he declared recently when offering low
interest credit to employers of small private companies who are willing
to bring workers’ representatives on to the board of their companies.
But once again, the industry minister clearly articulated how
co-management, or workers’ participation, will be used as a means of
class collaboration to deceive the workers, increase exploitation and
boost the profits of the capitalist class, as in countries like Germany.
"There is a distorted interpretation of what co-management means", he
said. "The idea is to incorporate workers in management and not
ownership and help avoid unnecessary tensions and contradictions". (El
Nacional)
Unwilling to confront the capitalists’ economic and
state power head on, Chávez is implementing partial controls and
attempting to circumvent the existing economic structures and state
apparatus. So, in addition to the cooperatives, he has created a state
airline, phone company and TV station, and state supermarkets selling
basic products at up to 30% cheaper than in the private sector. These
are all intended to rival existing private monopolies. However, these
and other partial measures, such as price controls on basic foodstuffs
and exchange controls, serve to infuriate the capitalist class and
increase its determination to prevent further encroachments on its
economic and state power.
At the same time, by leaving the large private
monopoly companies, banks and financial institutions, newspapers, etc,
in private hands, it is impossible to democratically plan the economy to
meet the needs of the masses, and the capitalist class remains in a
position to sabotage the economy and undermine the movement. There has
been some reorganisation of personnel at the top of the army, judiciary,
electoral college and other state institutions. But, without the
election and right of recall of all state officials, and without the
existence of a mass socialist party acting as a constant check on the
state, new points of support for capitalist reaction can be generated,
even from amongst today’s ‘pro-Chavista’ officials.
The capitalist class will clearly do everything it
can to subvert those measures which are being introduced in response to
the demands of the masses. It is utilising the media and pressurising
the pro-capitalist wing of Chávez’s government to pursue more
‘realistic’ economic and social policies, to ‘win over’ the four million
people who voted against Chávez in the recall referendum and in order
not to ‘alienate’ foreign investment.
Chávez has himself encouraged joint ventures between
foreign capital and the state-controlled oil industry, PDVSA. In fact,
multinationals already account for almost 50% of Venezuela’s oil output,
while PDVSA’s production has halved since 1998, when Chávez was first
elected. It is true that even a healthy workers’ state could be
compelled to sign economic and trade agreements with capitalist
countries and foreign-owned companies, if the spread of revolution
internationally was temporarily delayed. But this would be on the basis
of a democratic plan of production, a state monopoly of foreign trade,
and a policy of consciously aiming to extend the revolution by appealing
to the working class internationally.
On the basis of a policy of preserving capitalism,
however, foreign investment and trade agreements will be used to
undermine and derail the revolution. It is a warning for the future
that, when Chávez recently agreed an arms deal with the Spanish
government, Spain’s foreign minister defended the deal against US
criticisms by pointing out: "Spain’s role in Venezuela could be to
Washington’s satisfaction, that of putting a brake on Chávez’s dreams of
extending his Bolivarian revolution to other countries in the region".
(El País, 9 May)
Workers’ organisation
THE WORKING CLASS, because of its role in the
production process and its potential collective power, is key to
carrying out the socialist revolution and defeating the forces of
reaction. But, although the working class has been involved in the mass
movement at every crucial stage, it has been as one ‘player’ amongst
many. The working class has not been conscious of its own power or the
responsibility it has of leading the masses to transform society. At
different stages, Chávez has rested on and encouraged the participation
of the masses, but this has been within strict limits. Without a clear
programme to advance the revolutionary process, the movement risks
stagnation and demobilisation. In particular, Chávez has not encouraged
the independent action of the working class. During a recent strike of
Metro workers in Caracas, for example, one Chávez adviser called for
strikes to be banned in the public sector. Chávez threatened to send in
the National Guard against the strikers.
The main task of a revolutionary party in Venezuela
is not to advise Chávez on how to lead the revolution. It is to
strengthen and extend the organisation of the working class and put
forward demands which raise the confidence of workers in their own power
to change society and increase their understanding of what needs to be
done at every stage of the revolutionary process.
This would include exposing how the capitalists will
use co-management to suit their own interests. It would mean building
and strengthening workers’ committees which could implement genuine
workers’ control and management in the workplaces, as a step towards
democratically planning the whole of the economy.
Elements of workers’ control already exist in some
workplaces. In ALCASA, the state-owned aluminium plant, for example,
workers elect the managers, who only receive their previous wage and are
subject to recall. A recent national meeting of workers called to
discuss co-management and workers’ control agreed: "To include amongst
the proposals for revolutionary co-management that the companies must be
the property of the state, without distribution of shares to the
workers, and that any profits will be distributed according to the needs
of society through the councils of socialist planning. These councils of
socialist planning must be understood as bodies which implement the
decisions taken by citizens in assemblies".
A genuine revolutionary socialist programme would
call for a democratisation of the organisations of the Bolivarian
revolution, the formation and extension of democratic workplace
committees, and linking these with elected committees in the communities
and the rank and file of the armed forces, at local, state and national
level.
In addition, workers’ defence forces need to be
formed to defend the movement against reaction. Chávez has recognised
the need to defend the revolution against imperialist aggression and is
doubling the army reserves and setting up ‘popular defence units’ in the
workplaces and on the land. But these will be under his own personal
command and not under the democratic control of the organisations of the
working class and poor.
The solidarity of workers in the rest of Latin
America and internationally is also a vital means of defence. In his own
way, Chávez is an internationalist. Emulating his hero, Simon Bolivar,
he sees himself as the leader of an anti-imperialist alliance in Latin
America and is using oil and the income from oil to promote his aims.
Recent initiatives include the launching of Telesur, a continent-wide TV
company, and Petrosur and Petrocaribe, agreements with various Latin
American and Caribbean countries involving the export, exploitation and
refining of oil. He has also used oil money to buy Argentinean and
Ecuadorian debt, in ‘solidarity’ against the international money
markets.
But Chávez’s main orientation has been towards
neo-liberal leaders rather than appealing to the working class and poor.
The Brazilian president, Lula, for example, has carried out anti-working
class policies and his party is heavily embroiled in a serious
corruption scandal. Yet, on a recent visit, Chávez praised Lula and
dismissed the corruption allegations as a mere ‘right-wing conspiracy’.
On the other hand, he has not made any statements in support of the new
socialist formation in Brazil, P-SoL.
Chávez is accused by imperialism of exporting
revolution to other Latin American countries. But when oil workers went
on strike in two Amazonian states in Ecuador in August, demanding that
more resources be invested in the local communities and that a US oil
company be kicked out of the country, Chávez effectively played a
strike-breaking role, lending oil to the Ecuadorian government to
compensate for the ‘disruption’ that striking oil workers were creating
to supplies.
In contrast, in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina
we had a glimpse of how a genuine policy of working-class, international
solidarity could be pursued. Like Chávez, a democratic workers’
government would have immediately offered aid while exposing how
capitalism places private profit before the lives of the poorest in
society and how US imperialism is totally incapable of meeting the needs
of US workers in times of crisis and in ‘normal’ times. At the same
time, it would have made links with working-class and community
organisations in the US to promote democratic control of the
distribution of aid in the affected areas, raising the confidence and
consciousness of the US working class.
Latin America is a continent in revolt. A successful
democratic socialist revolution in Venezuela would have an electric
impact on the working class and poor of the region, including in the
United States. The Venezuelan working class is therefore now faced with
the challenge of building and strengthening their organisations,
including the creation of a mass revolutionary party with a programme to
ensure that, in the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution,
the forces of revolution prevail.
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