Lexit
is not enough
The recent book by Costas
Lapavitsas, The Left Case Against the EU, calls for a rupture with the
capitalist European Union and its institutions. But it does not provide
an all-rounded programmatic guide for the workers’ movement to the
questions posed by the issue of the EU, argues CLIVE HEEMSKERK,
particularly important now in the context of Brexit.
The Left Case Against the EU
By Costas Lapavitsas
Published by Polity Press, 2018, £14.99
Costas Lapavitsas is a
radical economist who, for eight tumultuous months in 2015, was also an
MP in the Greek parliament, as the newly-elected government led by
Syriza – the Coalition of the Radical Left – was confronted with the
austerity demands of the infamous troika: the European Commission, the
European Central Bank, and the IMF.
Lapavitsas was elected in
January 2015 as part of the mass response in general strikes,
demonstrations and huge social struggles against the years of misery
suffered by Greek workers and the big majority of the middle class after
the economic crisis of 2007-09 and the EU-organised bail-outs of
2010-12. On entering parliament he at once came into conflict with the
leadership of Alexis Tsipras and his finance minister Yanis Varoufakis,
supporting the Left Platform within Syriza which advocated a default on
the Greek debt and immediate exit from the eurozone.
After the ultimate
capitulation of Tsipras, signing up to the vicious terms of a third
bail-out despite the mass rejection of further austerity in Greece’s
July 2015 referendum, Lapavitsas was among the 25 Left Platform MPs who
founded the Popular Unity party. Popular Unity contested the general
election that followed in September on a programme for a left exit –
Lexit – from the euro but, falling 7,600 votes short of the 3% threshold
to win representation, ended up with no seats. Lapavitsas returned to
academia and has written this book against the EU, drawing on his
experiences of what was a critical testing ground for different radical
and socialist ideas. Notwithstanding its important flaws, it is
particularly relevant for labour movement activists in the context of
Brexit and a possible future Jeremy Corbyn-led government.
The book is scathing about
Tsipras and, especially, Varoufakis who, having learnt nothing from the
Syriza episode, toured Britain to support a remain vote in the 2016 EU
referendum and still argues for a programme of ‘reforming the EU’. But
Lapavitsas, as he denounces the economic, financial and legal-political
framework underpinning the EU and its institutions, doesn’t present a
sufficiently rounded-out analysis.
In his concluding pages he
does sketch out elements of a socialist programme based on
nationalisation of the banks and "public ownership of key resources".
The book’s very last paragraph says: "If capitalism was challenged
domestically, several forms of socialist federal integration would
become possible in Europe". But, generally, the issue is posed as "a
rupture with the transnational institutions of the EU" being the first
"crucial step". This puts the tasks the wrong way round. The danger is
that the actual power of the EU is exaggerated and, without a concrete
programme to deal with the immediate issues a workers’ government would
face, the working class could potentially be demobilised, feeding the
idea that the situation is hopeless.
Exaggerating the EU ‘juggernaut’
Although the EU founders
dreamt of establishing a ‘united states of Europe’, at a fundamental
level the EU is not a state at all but a treaty-based alliance between
the different national capitalist classes of its member states. Each
agreement, from the 1957 Treaty of Rome that created the European
Economic Community (EEC) onwards, has pursued the development of a
Europe-wide regulated market while attempting to enhance the club’s
ability to project its members’ interests as a coherent regional bloc.
However, that does not make the EU, as the EEC was incorporated into in
1993, a state power.
Particularly since the
collapse of Stalinism in Russia and eastern Europe – a grotesque
caricature of a socialist planned economy rotted by the internal
contradictions of bureaucratic rule – there have been powerful economic
and geopolitical pressures pushing the national capitalist classes of
Europe together. In the increasingly multi-polar world that has emerged
over the past 30 years, the pressure has been on to develop the EU as a
unified power, to engage on equal terms with the US, China, Japan, the
now capitalist Russia, and the emerging economies.
But, because of the two
pillars on which the capitalist system is based, the private ownership
of the means of production and the nation state – which are not only
economic entities but social and political formations with features such
as territorial boundaries, language, culture, etc, not moulded by purely
economic forces – there have remained counter-pressures to achieving
European unity. The essential character of the EU as an agreement
between the different capitalist classes – a far-reaching agreement but
still subject to the power play between its component nation states –
has not changed.
Yet littered throughout the
text, Lapavitsas makes references to the EU as a "transnational
juggernaut", a "veritable machine… for the relentless application of
neoliberal ideology across Europe". It possesses, he argues, "a complex
administrative machinery… employing a large bureaucracy". It has
"mountains of legislation", backed by "the transnational presence of the
European Court of Justice". This is used by "the neoliberal machine in
Brussels", he writes, to enforce the "harmonisation of national
legislation on the presumption of the superiority of EU law".
In fact, the main legislative
and executive EU institutions, the European Commission, the Council of
the EU, and the European parliament, have fewer than 45,000 staff, less
than the employee headcount of some English county councils. The
austerity policies since the 2007-09 financial crisis were not, as
Lapavitsas asserts, "determined by professional politicians and
technocratic experts inhabiting the core institutions of the union", but
by the governments of the 28 different nation states of the EU. While
the EU does facilitate collaboration between the capitalists to exploit
the working class on a continental scale, it is not a ‘super-state’, as
rabid Tory Brexiteers maintain – and also, unfortunately, some on the
left.
Shifting responsibility
It is correct to recognise,
as Lapavitsas does, the disparity in power between the different member
states – he refers to an EU inner core, "among which Germany enjoys a
hegemonic ascendancy", and "several peripheral groupings". However, a
hierarchy of powers is a general feature of global capitalism, not
unique to the EU. Most importantly, while the EU institutions provide
the framework through which the power relations between the different
national governments are mediated, this does not make the EU itself a
state power, able to "impose neoliberal reforms" upon member states.
Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx’s
long-term collaborator, famously wrote that the state included
"institutions of coercion of all kinds" but, in the last analysis,
exercised its power through ‘special bodies of armed men with prisons’.
EU laws would undoubtedly be used, for example, to entangle a future
Corbyn-led government in distracting legal battles if Britain were to
remain within the bosses’ club. It was a mistake – and a warning for the
future – that in 2016 Jeremy Corbyn did not repeat the stand he took
against the EU in the 1975 referendum, looking instead to conciliate the
Blairites, the organised representatives of capitalism within the Labour
Party. In the binary choice presented in the referendum, the Socialist
Party refused to give a vote of confidence to the capitalist EU and
voted leave. But we did not exaggerate its power. ‘EU law’ could not
prevent a Corbyn government, backed up by a mass movement, from
implementing socialist policies. Ultimately, the EU has no tanks.
This is not an academic
issue. What the real character of the EU is has importance for how the
workers’ movement confronts the question of the EU in its day-to-day
struggles, programmatically in its trade union organisations and
political parties, and how a workers’ government would deal with it.
So when Lapavitsas says, for
example, that "national electorates were allowed to vote for any party
they wanted as long as the same array of economic and social policies
were adopted in the end", he is being one-sided. Was the capitulation of
the Syriza government elected in January 2015 really foreordained by
‘the power of the EU institutions’? If a Corbyn-led government had
emerged from the 2017 general election would there not have been the
opportunity for the labour movement to fight for it to adopt a different
‘array of economic and social policies’ – socialist policies –
regardless of EU law?
Exaggerating the ‘EU
juggernaut’ can potentially encourage passivity and a mood of fatalism.
It removes the responsibility to struggle from the leaders of the
workers’ organisations and left parties to suggest that it is "external
forces [that] shape national tax, tariff, subsidy, credit and money
policies". Fundamentally, what the Syriza government lacked was not
permission from "external forces" – the EU institutions – to implement
socialist policies like capital controls and nationalisation of the
banks, but a clear programme, and the will to carry it out, to take
decisive measures against capitalism in Greece and appeal to the
European working class for support.
The same choice will face a
possible Corbyn-led government too, whether it comes to power before or
after the Brexit process is concluded. Brexit, after all, is merely a
summary term for renegotiating treaty relations with 27 other nation
states who are still, at present, members of the EU club – a task that
would face an incoming Corbyn government whether Britain is formally
within the EU or not.
Is ‘no negotiations’ a principle?
The most important Brexit
policy Jeremy Corbyn could adopt would be to declare that a government
he leads would take whatever decisive socialist measures are necessary
in defence of the working class, and that he will reopen negotiations
with the EU on that basis. Negotiating with the EU, or individual
capitalist states, is not a question of principle.
As Socialism Today wrote in
the aftermath of the 2016 referendum: "This should be accompanied by an
enabling declaration that all EU treaty provisions and regulations which
go against policies that advance working class interests – like the
rules on state aid or the posted workers’ directive – would no longer
apply and that any attempts by the EU institutions to legally enforce
them would be annulled". (Corbyn’s
Brexit Opportunity, Socialism Today No.201, September 2016)
A socialist programme for how
to deal with the EU, we went on, "starting on the national terrain,
refuses to accept the limits prescribed by the EU. It proposes bold
socialist measures to take control of the domestic economy and builds
concrete international workers’ solidarity and collaboration. But it
relegates to a secondary if not tertiary consideration the observing of
EU institutional ‘formalities’ when they impede bilateral international
agreements. That is the opportunity which has opened up for a Jeremy
Corbyn-led Labour Party after the Brexit vote, if a clear socialist and
internationalist position is adopted".
Lapavitsas does not pose the
issue like this, however. He insists that the "two fundamental reasons"
for the capitulation of the Syriza government in 2015 were "the rigid
institutional structure", and "the absolute ideological hostility"
towards left-wing policies, "of the mechanisms of the EU and the EMU".
This is looking in the wrong direction.
He attacks Tsipras for
promising, prior to Syriza’s victory in 2015, that "tough negotiations"
with the EU could lead it to reverse its austerity demands. He lambasts
the Syriza leadership for telling "the Greek people that it would ‘tear
up’ the bail-out agreements, while also keeping the country in the
eurozone and avoiding a break with the EU… How the Greek negotiating
team could maintain these deeply contradictory positions simultaneously
was entirely unclear". His conclusion is that "there can be no
disobedience from within, no ‘creative ambiguity’ in negotiations, no
attempt to force the mechanisms of the EMU to relent… This is a hopeless
path that leads to certain defeat".
He does say at one point that
there would "have to be domestic programmes that directly challenged the
power of capital". But what is presented as decisive is "a rupture with
the transnational institutions", "a break", "an upheaval", "rejection".
Once again, exit from the EU institutions is posed as the key task:
"That is the only positive lesson for the European left from the debacle
of Syriza". But this is not a sufficiently concrete programme for the
workers’ movement.

The euro and the EU
A workers’ government coming
to power in one of the countries within the eurozone, the European
monetary union (EMU) of 19 of the 28 EU member states, would face a more
complex situation than in those outside the euro with their own
currencies. There would be no prospect of a long-term ‘peaceful
co-existence’ within the EMU. Exit would be posed, but that does not
exhaust the question of what programme would have to be pursued.
The goal of monetary union
had been present from the earliest days of the EEC, with the Committee
of Central Bankers established in 1964. The need to manage exchange
rates between the member states was given further impetus by the
volatility created by the collapse from the late 1960s of the post-war
Bretton Woods global system of fixed exchange rates around gold and the
US dollar. The problems faced by the European countries were
immortalised in US president Richard Nixon’s secret taped dismissal of
concerns about the Italian currency: "I don’t give a shit about the
lira!" But it was not until the new world situation that developed after
the collapse of Stalinism – pushing the different national capitalist
classes of Europe together to attempt to compete with the US hyper-power
in a temporarily favourable economic and political conjuncture – that
the conditions were in place for the euro to be established.
The achievement of a common
currency managed by one central bank – the ECB – has, as Lapavitsas
correctly says, "led to the creation of a gigantic monopolist over the
final means of payment across much of Europe". When the 2008-09 crisis
broke and Greece, Portugal and Ireland were shut out of the
international financial markets, the ECB was in a powerful position as
the provider of liquidity to private and public banks in difficulties.
That power was brutally wielded, as Lapavitsas graphically recounts in
the chapter, ‘Greece in the Iron Trap of the Euro’.
The ECB provided liquidity to
Greek banks through refinancing operations and the Target2 system of
interbank settlements between the national central banks of the eurozone.
Loans to fund Greek public debt were organised by the troika in two
bailouts in 2010 and 2012 – in which it was estimated that only 4.5% of
the funds went to finance the deficit on the current spending of the
Greek government on public services, etc. The rest went in debt
servicing payments primarily to foreign lenders. The loans were made
conditional on the government – the social democratic Pasok party in
2010, and the national unity government between Pasok and the
conservative New Democracy under the non-party technocrat Lucas
Papademos in 2012 – agreeing to swingeing public spending cuts,
privatisation, labour market reforms limiting union rights and
collective bargaining, and other draconian austerity measures.
The result was a collapse in
economic output by nearly 7% in both 2011 and 2012, with adult
unemployment reaching 27% in 2013. The total contraction of over 25%
from 2008 to 2016 was worse than any economic depression in an advanced
capitalist country since that which followed the crash of 1929.
The currency question
Does this mean that a
workers’ government in a eurozone country would be powerless against the
ECB? Not at all. Lapavitsas agrees that states have the ability to issue
fiat money – money not backed by a physical commodity like gold – "with
no obligatory convertibility into anything other than itself". "This
self-referential relationship", he goes on to explain, "rests on the
authority of the state and tremendously augments its power to intervene
and shape economic policy". Indeed.
Bank notes and other physical
or electronic monetary tokens aid the recording and distribution of
material values but, from a national economic standpoint, ultimately
have no effect on the aggregate of products, the limits of which are the
available mass of material values. No economy, of course, exists in
national isolation and to participate on the world economic arena it
would be necessary for a government to hold reserves of a tradable
currency. But the point is that membership of the eurozone in and of
itself would not prevent a workers’ government from nationalising the
banks, introducing capital controls, issuing a transitional domestic
currency – which would effectively be an alternative means of payment –
and implementing the other steps necessary to take control of the main
levers of the economy. Such measures would be pursued not as a
self-sufficient solution but as the first act in an international
struggle for socialism – including the call for a socialist united
states of Europe, probably posed, in the first instance, as an alliance
or confederation of independent socialist states.
The technical infrastructure
already exists for capital controls – limiting the amount of money that
can be brought into and out of a country – or creating a new currency;
most of it could be performed electronically through current software.
After the Syriza government’s capitulation it was revealed that
Varoufakis actually had plans for a parallel payments system, using tax
file numbers to create PIN accessed accounts which would have allowed
the payment of pensions, public-sector wages, and other transactions
with the state. The issue is not a technical one but one of the
programme of a workers’ government and the mobilisation of the working
class to defend its implementation.
Lapavitsas ridicules the
"clever technical plans" of Varoufakis which – and this was their
critical weakness – were prepared behind the backs of the working class.
But it is insufficient just to say that tackling the currency crisis
would have meant "actively building mass support and preparing to
confront the violent reaction of domestic and foreign interests". Yes,
but what means of payment – currency tokens – would be used to record
and distribute goods and services as the struggle unfolded?
Not unimportant in this
respect was the dual consciousness of the Greek workers and middle
classes towards the euro and the EU. Lapavitsas describes how the euro
was "associated with modernity, progress, and the future" in what was
perceived as, in his words, "a small peripheral country". The first few
years of Greece’s membership of the eurozone had been "marked by a false
sense of prosperity", he argues, with "burgeoning domestic credit
expansion by the Greek banks" taking advantage of the low nominal and
real interest rates within the eurozone to obtain liquidity cheaply. All
this meant that there was deep apprehension about giving up the euro
alongside a burning rage at austerity.
This dual consciousness was
summed up during the July referendum campaign. Opinion polls continued
to show substantial support – 70% in one – for keeping the euro while
the actual plebiscite recorded a 61% vote against the troika’s austerity
demands. A bald call for exit was not enough to point the way forward –
and, in the days after 15 July, rally the workers’ movement which had
shown its defiance in the referendum to oppose Tsipras’s abrupt and
abject capitulation.
Brexit lessons
"The surrender and about-turn
of Syriza is truly a dark chapter in the history of the European left",
writes Lapavitsas. "The first step in accounting for it", he goes on,
"is to consider the outlook of the Greek working and lower middle
classes". They were "prepared to contemplate radical steps. To find
political leadership [however] they instinctively and immediately looked
to the left, and that is where the problem lay".
What more could the Greek
masses have done to resist austerity? From 2010 until Syriza’s victory
in 2015 workers came out in 40 or so general strikes. There was a wave
of workplace occupations, showing both the determination to fight and
giving a glimpse of how a democratic plan could have been drawn up with
workers’ control and management of the economy. Significant social
struggles erupted throughout the country, particularly in 2011-12,
including the movement to ‘occupy the squares’ of Greek towns and
cities.
Electorally, the established
parties of the Greek ruling class were shattered with Syriza – until
2012 "a tiny and untried party of the left", as Lapavitsas describes –
sweeping to power in 2015. The will to struggle was shown again in the
massive vote against the troika’s memorandum in the July 2015 referendum
despite, as Lapavitsas records, the "legions of outlandish claims…
including food shortages, lack of medicine, and violent unrest in the
streets with looting and arson" made by the Greek ruling class.
Syriza had won in January
2015 with 2.245 million votes, in an election with a 63.6% turnout.
Another 390,000 or so went to left or anti-austerity parties, including
the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Yet, despite the failures of the
Syriza leadership in the intervening period, six months later nearly a
million extra votes were won to reject the troika’s austerity demands in
the referendum – 3.558 million for No, 2.245 million for Yes, in a 62.5%
turnout. The problem was not the masses’ determination to fight but the
role of the leadership of the workers’ organisations – and the absence
of a Marxist nucleus with a concrete programme able to point a way
forward at each phase of the movement and with sufficient roots in the
working class to become a subjective factor in the struggle.
Now a new chapter is opening
in Britain, with the possibility of a Corbyn-led government in a
stand-off with the institutions of the EU. Lapavitsas publically
supported Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership challenge in 2015 and writes that
"an answer for Britain – and a pointer for the rest of Europe – could be
provided by the Labour Party".
However, he does not
accompany this with the necessary warning that, over three years on,
Corbyn’s leadership victory has still not been consolidated. The
political and organisational legacy of Tony Blair’s New Labour party has
not been exorcised. The Blairite fifth column, aided by some ‘left’
figures who still look to the EU bosses’ club as a progressive force,
have used the issue of Brexit to regroup and build up opposition to
Corbyn. Not accidentally, all of the 71 MPs who announced support for a
second referendum to stop Brexit on the day of Labour’s first
no-confidence motion in Theresa May had been part of the leadership coup
attempt against Jeremy Corbyn in 2016.
Britain is still the fifth or
sixth largest economy in the world. Events could be more protracted than
in Greece, although no less turbulent. But unless the opportunities are
taken to forge a mass working-class party out of the Corbyn phenomenon,
including defending a socialist and internationalist alternative to the
EU bosses’ club, the danger remains that there could be a Syriza-in-the-North-Sea
episode ahead, and the prospect of a Greek-style defeat.