The European elections in June and the three state elections in eastern Germany in September showed very drastically the political upheavals in Germany. These are not snapshots, but indications of longer-term developments explains WOLFRAM KLEIN of Sol (CWI Germany).
The background to political developments in Germany is the deteriorating economic situation. In recent decades Germany distinguished itself from other developed capitalist countries by having a considerably higher share of industrial production in its economy. According to the World Bank, in 2022 this share was 10% higher than in the USA, France and the UK. For years German capitalism was able to achieve high export surpluses thanks to high productivity and low production costs. Those in power in Germany could often boast that they were the ‘world champion in exports’ – or at least runner-up to China.
This has changed fundamentally in recent years. Germany has (again) become the sick man of Europe. In July 2024, industrial production was 15.2% below its peak of November 2017. After 2019, price-adjusted gross fixed capital formation shrank every year. Labour productivity per worker was lower in 2023 than in 2017. One reason for this decline is the slowdown in the global economy. Another factor is the war in Ukraine. For decades the German economy benefited from cheap Russian natural gas, which mainly advantaged energy-intensive sectors such as parts of the chemical industry. Added to this is the problem of climate change and the issue of switching to more environmentally friendly production processes.
When the German traffic-light coalition came to power in 2021 – named after the colours of the parties involved; red for the Social Democrats (SPD), yellow for the Liberals (FDP), and green for the Greens – they talked a big game about industrial structural change. In fact, their ‘environmental measures’ are largely disguised subsidies for industry. The carbon neutrality targets that they were supposed to achieve are being watered down more and more as the deadlines approach.
Anti-working class attacks
A typical example is the car industry. Instead of advocating a massive increase of public transport as an alternative to environmentally harmful private transport, politicians have been focusing on electric cars for years. This strategy can now be considered a failure. German e-cars are hopelessly behind their Chinese competitors. In 2023, 4.1 million cars were produced overall in Germany, which has capacity for producing 6.2 million. Production fell by a further 9% in the first half of this year. The crisis is a capitalist crisis, a consequence of global overcapacity.
The car industry is reacting to the crisis with an intensified battle for market share in which the construction of new and (hoped for) profitable plants goes hand in hand with job destruction on the other side. In fact, job losses in Germany have become a major issue in recent months after years of complaints about labour shortages. Volkswagen is threatening mass redundancies and automotive supplier ZF is threatening to cut 14,000 jobs by 2028. The same applies to other industries. ThyssenKrupp is planning to sell off its entire steel division.
After years of the German capitalists wailing about labour shortages, this is a new situation. This does not mean that the labour shortages have completely disappeared. Capitalism is such an irrational system that unemployment and labour shortages can exist at the same time. But the unfilled jobs, such as in nurseries or hospitals, are paid much less than the jobs cuts in industry.
Germany was also considered the ‘sick man’ of Europe over twenty years ago, around the year 2000. Back then the government of Gerhard Schröder responded with Agenda 2010 and the Hartz laws. These were a massive attack on the working class, worsening conditions for the unemployed, and with the fear of unemployment used as leverage against workers to accept lower pay, worse working conditions, etc. A low-wage sector emerged and the gap between rich and poor increased massively.
The Hartz laws may have increased the competitiveness of German capitalists in the short term, but they have also undermined it in the medium term. German capitalism is less and less capable of increasing labour productivity across the board (although, of course, in some individual plants there have been impressive increases), not least because it has created a low-wage sector and has little incentive to replace cheap labour with expensive machines – and it responds by attacking wages and working conditions.
Now capitalists are calling for a new version of the Hartz laws. It was a great advantage for them that the original attacks were carried out by a government in which the SPD was closely linked to the trade union apparatuses. Now, from the point of view of the ruling class, another similar attack is due. But given the weakness of the present government, it is hard to imagine that it would be able to carry out such an attack. There have been significant real wage losses, but these were a consequence of price increases, especially in 2022, which were only partially offset by wage increases. They also did not increase the competitiveness of German capital, but only passed on additional burdens to the working class. They have therefore not satisfied the capitalists’ desire to attack the working class.
Discredited government
Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that a German government that has not delivered on its promises has become discredited. According to a survey conducted in October, 36% are not at all satisfied with the government, 43% are not satisfied, 19% are satisfied and 0% are very satisfied! According to another opinion poll from mid-October, the three governing parties would only get 30% of the vote (SPD 16%, Greens 11%, FDP 3%) if there were elections now, less than the opposition CDU/CSU alone (31%).
So far, one of the reasons for the government’s unpopularity has been that it is divided and gives the impression that it cannot solve any problems. Now the coalition parties are already starting to position themselves for the 2025 federal elections by trying to raise their profile at the expense of their coalition partners. This will not make the government appear any more united than before and will discredit it further.
So can we assume that the current government will continue to muddle along until the end of its term? We are living in such unstable times that almost nothing can be ruled out. But if a new major package of attacks is to be launched, it will probably come under a CDU-led government. In this case, the trade union leaders would be less willing than with an SPD-led government to shield the government from the wrath of the working class.
However, we should not exaggerate the difference. The loyalty of right-wing trade union leaders is not only to social democracy as a party, but also to capitalism as a system. This is why, even under a CDU-led government, they would not be prepared to organise the maximum resistance to the attacks on the working class that are necessary from a capitalist perspective. The task of Marxists is to organise within the unions alongside others on the left to build a fighting trade union leadership that can provide the necessary resistance.
The successes of the AfD
The CDU has benefited from the crisis of the governing parties. However, the main beneficiary so far has been the AfD (Alternative for Germany). The AfD emerged in 2013 as an EU-sceptic, right-wing populist, nationalist party. It started out very ‘respectable’, with a high proportion of economics professors, but has since radicalised to the right. Its fascist wing has become stronger. In the 2024 European elections the AfD became the second strongest party with 15.9%, ahead of the SPD. In September, it became the second-strongest party in the state elections in Saxony (30.6%), the strongest party in Thuringia (32.8%), and the second-strongest party in Brandenburg (29.2%).
In post-election surveys in all three federal states, AfD voters cited immigration and crime and internal security as the two most important issues. All the other parties to the right of Die Linke (left party) and the media promoted these issues as the central problems in the weeks leading up to the polls. Thus they objectively helped the AfD in the election campaign. However, this also shows that support for the AfD can decline in the short term when other issues take centre stage.
One result of the post-election surveys is that the number of voters who said that they voted for the AfD out of conviction (and not just out of disappointment with the other parties) has risen significantly: in Saxony from 40% to 50%, Thuringia from 39% to 52%, in Brandenburg from 36%to 52%. As the proportion of AfD voters in the population has risen at the same time, this means that the proportion of the population that acquiesces to racist ideas has also increased. Although this is not surprising given the years of racist propaganda that parties and the media have been feeding the population, it is nevertheless worrying.
While there is a large fascist wing in the AfD, the party as a whole is not fascist. Unlike the Nazis before they came to power in 1933, the AfD has no armed formations or anything similar. However, there are violent Nazis in Germany, although there are regional differences, and they are encouraged by the AfD’s electoral success. But not only by them. The racist agitation of establishment parties and the media also has an effect.
So far, all other parties have emphasised that there is a firewall against the AfD and that it is not acceptable to cooperate with it. In fact, there are holes in this firewall. But above all, they are continuing a policy on two levels that is pushing voters to the AfD. On the one hand, they increase the acceptance of racist, nationalist and other right-wing ideas and demands by adopting them from the AfD in the deceptive hope that they will steal the AfD’s thunder. In fact, experience shows that people usually vote for the original and not the copy. On the other hand, their neo-liberal social policies are fuelling dissatisfaction and alienation, from which the AfD can benefit.
To fight the AfD effectively, we need a united struggle that opposes it directly, exposes its lies and fights for a political alternative to capitalist anti-working class policies and racist division.
Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance
The second big winner of the latest elections alongside the AfD was the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW). The fact that a party entered the European parliament (with 6.2%) and three state parliaments with double-digit results (Saxony 11.8%, Thuringia 15.8%, Brandenburg 13.5%) just a few months after it was founded is unprecedented in Germany. Its leader Sahra Wagenknecht was a leading member of Die Linke for many years and before that of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism, one of the forerunners of Die Linke).
From 2015 to 2019, she was one of the two leaders of Die Linke’s parliamentary group in the Bundestag. She originally belonged to the left wing of the party and made headlines in the 1990s for her uncritical relationship with Stalinism. After 2010, in particular, she moved sharply to the right in her economic views, including with an untenable juxtaposition of a ‘bad capitalism’ and a ‘good market economy’. From 2016 she began uttering statements on immigration that intensified right-wing prejudices. In her book Die Selbstgerechten (The Self-Righteous) she trivialises oppression experienced on the basis of identity, feeding into a ‘culture war’ agenda.
Since 2022, Wagenknecht has also been a vocal critic of the policies of the German government and other Western governments on the Ukraine war. Here, too, her criticism has not been based on a class standpoint – on the common interests of German, Ukrainian, Russian, US workers etc – but on the interests of the ‘German economy’, suffering from the consequences of the war and the sanctions.
The founding of BSW in early 2024 was then a clear right-wing split from Die Linke. The support for the BSW in polls and in the elections is partly due to Wagenknecht’s personal popularity. In the post-election surveys after the state elections, 50-60% of respondents in all three states said: ‘Without Sahra Wagenknecht I would not vote for BSW’. An important factor in this popularity is her strong stance against government policy.
There were differences between the federal states in the post-election surveys. In Saxony and Thuringia, social security was cited as the most important issue by BSW voters, in Brandenburg it was Ukraine/Russia. However, immigration and internal security were also important issues for BSW voters in all three federal states. In all three states, overwhelming majorities of BSW voters (between 92% and 98%) agreed with the statement: ‘I think it is good that it [BSW] is in favour of more social policy and less immigration at the same time’. This shows the contradictory consciousness after decades of experience with neo-liberal policies and racist propaganda.
After the state elections – provided the CDU keeps to its position of not governing with the AfD – majority governments without the participation of the BSW will not be possible. The post-election surveys show that there would initially be strong support for participation among BSW voters. When Die Linke (or before it the PDS) entered capitalist state governments in the past, there was also regularly initially great approval from the voters. This was followed by four or five years of experience that the government did not achieve what the population had hoped for, and then often by a halving of the number of votes in the elections. If the BSW were to form coalitions with the CDU it would fare no better.
Further defeats for Die Linke
Die Linke is the big loser of the European and state elections. In the European elections, it halved its share of the vote to just 2.7%. In the state elections in Saxony, it received only 4.5% (down 5.9%). Falling below the 5% threshold, it only entered the state parliament with six MPs because of an exemption rule. In the state elections in Thuringia, it received 13.1 % (down 17.9%). There, for the first time in the whole of Germany, it had held the office of prime minister for five years.
Since the founding of Die Linke, Sol has fought within the party against its participation in governments with parties such as the SPD and the Greens, which pursue capitalist policies against the mass of the population. This participation has led to Die Linke – especially in east Germany where it is traditionally stronger – being seen more and more as part of the establishment rather than as a progressive opposition.
A new party leadership was elected at the national party congress in October. However, there was no fundamental change in policy. Some of the party are trying to rebuild the party through grassroots work and canvassing. In various places there has been an influx of young activists into the party in recent months. They often have a more student background, an outlook of the ‘left-wing scene’. But many of them are seriously motivated to enter into a dialogue with ordinary people through canvassing and other activities. This offers opportunities, but will not be enough on its own to stop the party’s decline. If grassroots activists work hard to build and root the party and make it clear that it is different from all other parties, this will come to nothing if the party in its parliamentary positions continues to act as part of the establishment.
An interesting development in recent weeks has been that the national executive of the Green Youth, the youth organisation of the Greens, announced its resignation from the party and declared its intention to set up a new left-wing youth organisation. Several state executive committees and numerous current and former members of state executive committees have joined the call. They justified their decision by saying that the Greens had moved further and further to the right. This is true, although it is also true that the Greens were already a pro-capitalist, neo-liberal party when these people joined. But when young people become more radicalised due to the intensifying multiple crises of capitalism, we can only welcome such developments.
It is positive when they talk about class politics. One of their spokespeople described herself as a socialist. But there is still a lot that is unclear about this initiative. What do they mean by class politics or even socialism? On the subject of war and peace in particular, the resignation statement criticised Germany’s rearmament policy, but otherwise did not take a position on the wars in Ukraine, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The Left Party was also not mentioned in this declaration. However, there are apparently links via the German version of the magazine Jacobin. This could give Die Linke the opportunity to carry on as before instead of overcoming its contradictions.
If these young people, who are rightly turning away from the Greens, were absorbed by government supporters and bureaucrats inside Die Linke, they would discover that they have ended up with a paperback edition of what they correctly broke with in the Greens. Instead, the aim should be for the fighting parts of Die Linke, together with fighting forces in the trade unions and social movements and this new initiative, if it at least partly delivers what it promises, to build a new workers’ party. The multiple crises of capitalism in Germany and worldwide are deep and the objective need for such a party is greater than ever.